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Chapter 1
Motivation and Outline
1.1 Motivation
Auctions, though existing in the economy since thousands of years, have increasingly gained
importance throughout the last decades. Nowadays, goods in the value of billions of Euros are
allocated each day via auctions in a variety of economic settings. Accordingly, the challenge is
for economists to provide a comprehensive theory of auctions.
Most of current auction theory rests heavily on the assumption that all participants play ac-
cording to the Nash Equilibrium. But it is silent when it comes to explaining how bidders
arrive there. The assumption of Nash Equilibrium play in a game can be motivated by the
assumption that the participating players are all perfectly rational and that each player knows
with absolute certainty that all other participating players are perfectly rational as well. In
this thesis I assess the impact of dropping this assumption. As an alternative, I consider evo-
lutionary learning: Either I still model each player as perfectly rational but assume that she
doesn’t necessarily think that all the other participants are perfectly rational as well. Instead
she uses the strategies that would have generated the highest payoff in past play. This gives rise
to best response dynamics. As an alternative I assume that the each bidder also makes errors
in the individual decision process. This gives rise to quantal response. With these models I
want to answer questions like the following: Can evolutionary learning justify the assumption of
Nash Equilibrium play in repeated auctions? Will agents with initially heterogeneous strategies
coordinate on Nash Equilibrium play? And if yes, which additional assumptions do we have to
impose for the convergence and how realistic are they?
The thesis aims at unifying two research fields in economics that have so far been largely sep-
arated, namely auction theory and the theory of bounded rationality. Since there exists very
few literature in this field, I have to develop the tools for this investigation in the course of this
thesis. I use two complementary approaches:
On the one hand I develop a mathematical formalism that quantifies the average play under
different assumptions about the bounded rationality of the bidders. This is a top-down ap-
proach that only works if the setup of the auctions – such as the number of bidders and the
underlying value distribution – are known. From a methodological point of view, the mathe-
matical analysis has to overcome two particular complications: On the one hand, bidders can’t
observe their opponents’ strategies but only their bids. On the other hand I have to develop
a formalism that allows the integration of discontinuous functions. In the thesis I apply this
mathematical methodology to the analysis of several simple auction setups. This allows me to
quantify bidding strategies under evolutionary learning.
As a complementary approach I program and employ an agent based simulation, the Auction
Simulator. Agent based simulations are a bottom-up approach where the individual reaction of
agents to their environment is accurately specified. The simulation then calculates the interac-
tions of a number of agents in a common environment. By comparing the bottom-up simulation
results with the top-down mathematical predictions that I derived for simple setups, I show
that the simulation works correctly. After this quality-check I use it to reliably assess more
general auction setups where the mathematical methodology would become too complicated
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for the analysis. The simulation results are then analyzed by statistical methods. Simulation
doesn’t have to make the simplifications that mathematical analysis requires and therefore has
the potential to describe auctions more realistically than currently possible. While allowing
already for a variety of setups, the program is designed for easy extendability in the future.
Thereby the Auction Simulator aims at providing a tool for a comprehensive analysis of auc-
tions.
The main question that I set out to answer in this thesis is whether initially heterogeneous
bidders in repeated auctions converge to the Nash Equilibrium. In order to give bidders the
maximum chance of converging, I consider open bid auctions – i.e., auctions where each bidder
gets to know the bids of all other bidders after the auction is over. This assumption is not nec-
essarily satisfied in real-life auctions: Many auctions in the economy just publish the winner’s
bid. This makes no difference for the strategy updating of loosing bidders, however the winner
gets in such an auctions no new information and therefore can not learn. This shows that open
bid auctions give bidders the maximum chance to converge to the NE. The results of my analy-
sis show that even in the open bid case best response bidders in general don’t converge to the
Nash Equilibrium in first-price auctions. However, they do converge in second-price auctions,
no matter, wether an open or a sealed bid format is implemented. The intuitive reason for
this is that in first-price auctions a bidder’s strategy influences the opponents’ optimal strategy
choice so that bidders’ strategies fluctuate in permanent mutual adaptation. In contrast, in
second-price auctions it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid the true value independently of
the opponents’ strategies. Therefore bidders play their NE strategies, either by simple upfront-
reasoning or by best response learning. In consequence, the allocation in first-price auctions is
less efficient than in second-price auctions and the seller revenue is more volatile.
In generalization, the thesis suggests therefore that in a repeated setting auction formats with
weakly dominant strategies are better suited to reach an optimal allocation of goods. There-
fore, the thesis suggests to take a closer look at the auction mechanisms that are implemented
in the economy and occasionally replace them. Since there are a lot of additional possible
constraints on the efficiency of auctions such as for instance the prevention of bidding rings,
recommendations on the optimal auction mechanism must depend on the specific economic en-
vironment. However, I conjecture that volatility in many markets could be substantially lowered
by replacing value shading auction designs by auctions with weakly dominant strategies. This
would result in a better allocation of goods and in a decrease of risk for the economy as a whole.
1.2 Outline
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews results about auction theory and auction experiments from the literature.
Chapter 3 reviews concepts from game theory and surveys the usage of simulations to inves-
tigate markets in the economy.
Chapter 4 mathematically shows that two best response bidders with linear bidding strate-
gies and values from a uniform distribution don’t settle down in the NE in first price auctions
(1PAs) while they do in second-price auctions(2PAs). I derive analytically how the bidders can
calculate their best responses. Bidders can be modeled as being myopic in that they consider
only last period’s payoff. Alternatively they can be modeled as having perfect memory, where
they use the strategy’s aggregated payoff of the whole game. The quantitative analysis of these
two extremes allows me also to predict the behavior of bidders with imperfect memory who
give more weight to recent information than to information from the beginning of the game.
Chapter 5 discusses the consequences of relaxing certain assumptions in chapter 4. The qual-
itative results are shown to remain the same.
Chapter 6 mathematically analyzes the average bidding behavior of two quantal response bid-
ders. Again, bidders can have various degrees of memory strength.
Chapter 7 shows how the newly developed mathematical methods can be applied to pure seller
auctions.
Chapter 8 analyzes the stability of the NE in double auctions. To this end, it extends the
mathematical analysis of linear bidding strategies for perfect memory best response dynamics
to affine linear bidding functions.
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Chapter 9 introduces the Auction Simulator. I discuss the program flow, the key parameters
of the model and the alternative strategy updating algorithms that are used in the simulation.
Chapter 10 reports the simulation results for the setups where I have derived mathematical
predictions in the previous chapters. It shows that the AS quantitatively reproduces these
predictions and thus both, theory and simulation are double-checked for their correctness.
Chapter 11 analyzes the statistics of more complicated simulation setups that are too difficult
to deal with analytically.
Chapter 12 concludes and gives an outlook to future research. It discusses some implications
of the theory for the real economy. In particular, it argues that auction designs that give partic-
ipants incentives to shade their values should be carefully revised and occasionally be replaced
by auction designs with dominant strategies.
The thesis is completed by four appendices and a bibliography.
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Chapter 2
Literature Background on
Auctions
2.1 Private-Value Single-Unit Pure-Bidder Auctions
2.1.1 Standard Formats
In the symmetric independent private values framework (SIPV) of auction theory, two standard
auctions are distinguished: the 1st price auction and the 2nd price auction.1 In these auction
formats, one seller faces several bidders. Each bidder has a private value that is not known to
the other participants. Values are drawn from a common random distribution that is known to
each bidder. Each bidder knows her own but not the other players’ values. Depending on her
value, each bidder decides on a bid which she secretly reports to the auctioneer. The assignment
of a bid to each possible value is called the bidding strategy. The object under auction goes to
the bidder who submits the highest bid.2
In the first-price auction, the winner has to pay her own bid, in the second-price auction the
second highest bid.
In sealed bid auctions, only the winning bid is published after the auction while in open bid
auctions every bid, also the losing ones are published. In the one-shot auction, the publishing of
information after the auction of course does not influence the bidding strategies of players who
have to decide on their bids before the auction. However, in a repeated setting, open and sealed
bid auctions are not equivalent because they induce a different informational structure. In this
thesis I am particularly interested whether repeated auctions converge to the NE. Therefore
I will focus on repeated open bid auctions since they give bidders the maximum amount of
possible information. I conjecture that under best response dynamics, repeated sealed bid
auctions have even worse convergence to the NE than their open bid equivalents. The reason
is that the winning bidder has less information available to calculate her best response.
The first price sealed bid auction (1PSBA)3 is equivalent to the Dutch auction. There, the
price of the object for sale is initially set to a very high level and then continuously lowered,
e.g. by a clock that counts down the price. When the first bidder raises her hand, she acquires
the object at the price that is currently shown by the clock. 1PSBAs and Dutch auctions are
widely used throughout the economy: Procurement of companies and governments, the sale
of agricultural products, land conservation auctions, IPOs and the privatization of government
owned companies are all done via these auction formats.4
The 2POBA is roughly equivalent to the English auction where the price is increased until
1A range of other formats is also considered in the literature: 3rd and higher price auctions where the winner
has to pay the nth highest bid, all-pay auctions where all bidders have to pay their bids - also the losing ones,
etc. However, for most of the analysis I will focus on first and second-price auctions.
2In principle, also other allocation rules are possible such as the allocation to a certain bidder with a proba-
bility proportional to the bid of that bidder.
3All abbreviations can be found in the appendix
4Or in the multi unit equivalents of first-price auctions such as discriminatory or uniform-price auctions.
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all but one bidder have dropped out.5 This auction type is typically used in art auctions or
auctions of rare wines.
2.1.2 Revenue Equivalence
Friedman (1955) was the first to analyze bidding in 1PAs by mathematical methods. He an-
alyzed repeated auction settings and proposed to use simple statistical methods to extract
information on the bidding behavior of competitors. This information can be used by bidders
to increase their expected profit in future auctions.
A theoretical break-through in the analysis of auctions was the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
(RET). It was first published in Vickrey (1961) and then generalized independently by Myerson
(1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981).
The RET states that all private value single sided auction formats yield the same expected
seller revenue and allocation of goods as long as the following conditions are met:
• The item goes to the bidder who submits the highest bid6
• The cost of submitting the lowest feasible bid is equal for the different auction formats
• Bidders have private independent values
• Bidders’ values are drawn from the same distribution and this distribution is known to
each bidder
• Bidders are risk neutral
• Bidders have no budget constraint
• Bidders are perfectly rational. They know that all the other players are also rational,
and that all of these other players know that all the other players are perfectly rational,
etc. ad infinitum. This implies that all bidders bid according to their Nash Equilibrium
bidding functions
The last point is often not explicitly mentioned because it is implicitly assumed in most of game
theory. However, as I will show, it is crucial for revenue equivalence to hold: If we drop the
assumption that each bidder knows that each opponent is perfectly rational, the RET breaks
down.
In the specific cases of 1PAs and 2PAs with n bidders and values drawn from a uniform distri-
bution, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) bidding functions are given as follows:
for 1PAs: bid =
n− 1
n
· value
for 2PAs: bid = value
(2.1)
I will prove this well known result subsequently.
The expected seller revenue is given by
for 1PAs:
n− 1
n
· E[highest value] = n− 1
n
n
n+ 1
=
n− 1
n+ 1
for 2PAs: 1 · E[2nd highest value] = n− 1
n+ 1
(2.2)
which is a special case of the RET. The order statistics can be found in any statistics textbook.
A more general proof of the RET for arbitrary value distributions was first developed by Vickrey
(1961). The exposition here closely follows Jehle and Reny (2001). They restrict bidders to
symmetric bidding functions b(v) that increase monotonically in v. Denote the probability
density of the value by f(v) and the CDF by F (v).
52PSBA, Japanese and English auction with private values are equivalent in that the unique equilibrium
bidding strategy is bidding the true value of the object. However, they differ in the information dynamics in
the case of affiliated values: In the English and the Japanese auction each bidder learns the bids of all losing
bidders. This can change the outcome even in a one-shot auction in the case of affiliated or common values. In
a repeated setting this holds true even more.
6The RET even holds for the more general assumption that the probability of winning with a certain bid is
the same among the different auction formats.
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Now, imagine that bidders do not report their bids but their values to the auctioneer who uses a
publicly known payment rule that determines the allocation and the payments that the bidders
have to make. The central part of Vickrey’s idea is to find an incentive-compatible payment
rule that induces truthful reporting of values by the participating bidders.
Imagine that a bidder in a first-price auction with n participating bidders reports a value of r
while having a true value of v. Then her expected payoff is given as
EPO(r, v) = Fn−1(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob of winning
· {v − b(r)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff if she wins
(2.3)
Note the implicit assumption of homogeneous bidding functions. Only under this assumption
can the probability of winning be written as a function of the reported value. If we allow for
heterogeneous bidding functions, Vickrey’s argument doesn’t hold anymore. A great part of
the remainder of this thesis will focus on the implications of allowing heterogenous bidding
functions in auctions.
Setting the derivative of equation (2.3) with respect to r equal to 0 at r = v (because it shall
be optimal to report truthfully) and solving for b(r) yields the NE bidding function
b(v) =
1
Fn−1(v)
v∫
0
xdFn−1(x) (2.4)
In particular for a uniform value distribution with f(v) = 1 and F (v) = v we obtain
b(v) =
1
vn−1
∫ v
0
xdxn−1 =
1
vn−1
v∫
0
x(n− 1)xn−1dx = n− 1
vn−1
vn
n
=
n− 1
n
v (2.5)
which proves the claim that I made in equation (2.1). For two participating bidders this amounts
to bidding half their value in a first-price auction.
In contrast, bidders in second-price auctions have a (weakly) dominant strategy of bidding
their true value: Bidding more than their value induces an unnecessary risk of negative payoff.
Bidding less than the value on the other hand is suboptimal since then the bidder risks foregoing
positive payoff.
The comparison of payoffs between first and second-price auctions is straight forward. In first-
price auctions, the density of the highest value of n independent draws from a value distribution
is given by dFn(v) = nF (v)n−1f(v).
Therefore the expected seller revenue in a first-price auction with an arbitrary value distribution
is given as
EPOsell1PA =
1∫
0
dv b(v)nF (v)n−1f(v) = n
1∫
0
v∫
0
xdF (x)n−1f(v) (2.6)
since
b(v) =
1
F (v)n−1
v∫
0
xdF (x)n−1 (2.7)
In second-price auctions the crucial quantity is the density of the second highest value. The
probability density that the value of a specific bidder i is v is given by f(v). The probability
that a specific bidder j 6= i of the remaining (n − 1) bidders has a value above v while all
the other (n − 2) bidders have values below v is given by (1 − F (v))F (v)n−2. Therefore the
probability that any bidder 6= i has a value above v while all the others have values below v
is given as (n− 1)F (v)n−2(1− F (v)). Since there are n bidders, the probability density of the
second highest value is therefore given by
g(v) = n(n− 1)f(v)F (v)n−2(1− F (v)) (2.8)
Therefore the expected seller revenue in a second-price auction is given as
EPOsell2PA =
1∫
0
dv vn(n− 1)f(v)F (v)n−2(1− F (v)) (2.9)
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since in the Nash Equilibrium b(v) = v.
To show the equivalence of expected seller revenue in first- and second-price auctions consider
the following series of transformations:
EPOsell1PA = n
1∫
0
dv
v∫
0
xdF (x)n−1f(v) = n
1∫
0
dvf(v)
v∫
0
x(n− 1)F (x)n−2f(x)dx =
= n(n− 1)
1∫
0
dx(
1∫
x
dvf(v))xf(x)F (x)n−2 =
n(n− 2)
1∫
0
dx(1− F (x))xf(v)F (x)n−2 = EPOsell2PA (2.10)
Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981) independently generalize the result and show
that in the independent private values framework all auction formats with the same allocation
rule - which might be probabilistic - and equal participation cost yield the same expected
seller revenue. Myerson (1981) in addition develops an auction that maximizes expected seller
revenue. Interestingly this auction does not necessarily allocate the good to the bidder who
values it most. Moreover it requires the seller to set a reserve price above her value so that
possible mutually beneficial trades are prevented. So, even under the assumption of perfect
rationality, there is a tradeoff between the efficiency of an auction and its ability to maximize
expected seller revenue.
2.2 A Quick Tour through Auction Theory
Besides private-value single-unit pure-bidder auctions, there are various other auction types:
Seller Participation: In many auctions not only bidders but also several sellers might act
strategically.
If only one bidder who wants to buy some good participates, but several potential sellers
compete to sell the good, we face a pure seller auction. An example of this is are procurement
auctions where several suppliers compete for a contract.7
In a double auction, a bunch of bidders faces a bunch of sellers. There, in addition to bidders
and sellers competing against their peers on the same side of the market, they also have to act
strategically against the opposite side of the market. A profitable deal requires the match of a
bidder with a seller who asks less than the bidder bids.
Like in the pure bidder case, also the second-price pure seller auction has a dominant strategy
of bidding the true value. For double auctions, McAfee (1992) designs a dominant strategy
format. The price is set in the middle of the highest bid and the lowest ask that could not be
matched. Note that this auction format might prevent the smallest profitable trade, so it is not
fully efficient.
Multi-unit Auctions: Instead of bidders/ sellers who want to trade exactly one unit, bidders
might want to buy/ sell multiple units. For the exposition here I focus on the pure bidder case,
auctions with seller participation are straight forward generalizations of this setup.
In the discriminatory auction (DA) bids are ordered from the highest to the lowest. Starting
from the highest bid, the demand of bidders is satisfied until the supply is exhausted. Each
bidder has to pay her own bid. The DA is the equivalent to the first-price auction in the single-
unit case.
In the uniform price auction (UPA), each successful bidder pays the highest unsuccessful bid.8
7Of course, a model that is only based on the contract value fails to capture other important determinants
such as the expected quality of fulfilment
8The market clearing price in the UPA can in principle be set anywhere between the highest losing and the
lowest winning bid. I will stick to the particular convention that the highest losing bid determines the payment.
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The UPA is sometimes sloppily denoted as the multi-unit equivalent of the second-price auction
in that bidders have a dominant strategy of bidding their true value. However, this is only true
in the limit of infinitely many participating bidders or if only one unit is for sale. If only few
bidders participate or if some bidders dominate the market by demanding the majority of units,
the UPA looses its dominant strategy property. This is intuitively clear: A big player has an
incentive to bid below her value. Even if she foregoes some profitable trades by bidding less
than her opponents, she might in total still profit from the lower price she has to pay for the
other units.
Ausubel (2004) designs an open bid format for multi-unit auctions with a weakly dominant
strategy9. The seller continuously raises the price and bidders indicate their demand at the
prevailing price. Whenever there is excess supply because a bidder reduced her demand, the
other bidders get their residual supply10 at that price. A sealed bid dominant strategy multi-
unit auction is the Vickrey multi-unit auction. In this format, a winner who wins ki units pays
the ki highest losing bids of the other bidders.
Note that multi-unit auctions allow for a much richer structure than single-unit auctions since
the demand for units might be interdependent: In the case of homogeneous goods, the will-
ingness to pay for an additional unit might increase or decrease with the number of units the
bidder has obtained so far. In the case of heterogeneous goods, goods can be substitutes or
complements so that the willingness to pay for a certain unit depends not only on the number
but also on the composition of goods the bidder has obtained so far. Much of current research
focuses on the assessment of the impact of these dependency structures on the outcome of auc-
tions.
Also for multi-unit auctions, there exists a Revenue Equivalence Theorem: In equilibrium, the
expected payoffs (and payments) in multi-unit auctions with the same allocation rule differ at
most by an additive constant
In addition to investigating these auction structures, considerable effort has been made to relax
the assumptions of the RET one by one. Each of these extensions causes the RET to break
down.
Risk Aversion: It is easy to see that risk aversion of bidders destroys revenue equivalence: In
first-price auctions risk averse bidders weight the risk of not obtaining the asset heavier than
if they were risk neutral. Therefore they bid higher and the expected seller revenue is raised
in first-price auctions by introducing risk aversion of bidders. In second-price auctions, bidding
the true value involves no risk, therefore there is no change in bidding behavior. Consequently,
if we assume risk averse bidders, first-price auctions give more expected seller revenue than
second-price auctions - the RET breaks down.
Asymmetric Value Distributions: Instead of having values drawn from the same distri-
bution for all bidders/sellers, auctions behave significantly differently if this assumption is
dropped. If values are drawn from different distributions, then Maskin and Riley (1999) show
that strong11 buyers prefer 2PAs, whereas weak buyers prefer 1PAs. Lebrun (1999) shows
that for 1PAs with asymmetric value distributions there always exists an equilibrium. Fibich
and Gavious (2003) explicitly calculate such equilibrium bids in asymmetric 1PAs by using
perturbation theory.
Value Dependencies: Instead of private independent values, values can be affiliated or com-
mon. Affiliated values can be positively or negatively correlated. To model affiliated values,
each bidder i is assumed to obtain a signal xi. Her true value depends then on all the other
bidder’s signals as well,
vi = vi(x1, x2, · · · , xn) (2.11)
If the value is the same for each bidder,
vi = v(x1, · · · , xn) (2.12)
we speak of a common value setting.
Common values give rise to the winners curse: Assume a jar full of coins is auctioned off and
9i.e., an auction format where the bidders’ optimal strategy does not depend on the opponents’ strategies
10i.e., the total supply minus the sum of amounts demanded by the other bidders, provided this is nonnegative
11In the sense that a strong buyer’s value distribution stochastically dominates the weaker buyer’s distribution
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bidders have a normally distributed estimate of the value. In each auction type, the highest
bidder is likely to have estimated too much for the jar and therefore to make a loss - the winners
curse. Consequently, bidders in all auction types should reduce their bids because they take
this risk of overbidding into account. An interesting possibility to overcome the winners curse
is given by the linkage principle. It states that sellers should commit to publish all information
they have about the value of a good -even the bad news. The resulting narrowing of value
estimates leads to a reduction in the winners curse and hence to higher bidding. Therefore
expected seller revenue is raised by the release of information.
Obviously, in affiliated and common value auctions, the revenue equivalence between second-
price and English auctions breaks down. This is because in open bid formats, bidders get
information about their opponents’ signals during the bidding process that influence their own
value. Moreover, also revenue equivalence between first- and second-price auctions breaks down:
Expected seller revenue from second-price auctions is at least as high as that of first-price
auctions. For more information on auctions with interdependent values see, e.g., Krishna (2002).
Repeated and sequential auctions: Another current research topic is equilibrium bidding
in sequential auctions.
Jeitschko (1998) analyzes equilibrium strategies in 1PSBAs with 2 rounds and 3 bidders. In
each round there is one unit of a homogeneous good up for auction. Bidders can have either
a high or a low valuation. Each bidder demands exactly one unit, so the winner of the first
round drops out. Two effects are considered: Bidders can estimate their opponents’ types
from the first auction and condition their second round bidding strategy on this information.
Additionally, bidders know that their first round bids influence their opponents’ bids of the
second round (low bids in the first round lead to lower bids in the second round) and therefore
bid strategically. This induces a tradeoff between raising and lowering bids. In effect, prices
may fluctuate between the two rounds but there is no unique result wether prices increase or
decrease.
Hausch (1986) shows similarly for a multi-unit setting that the strategic anticipation of infor-
mational effects by bidders can lead to higher or lower expected seller revenue in sequential
vs simultaneous auctions. This result is driven by the following tradeoff: The release of infor-
mation about bidders’ valuations in sequential auctions reduces via the linkage principle the
winners curse and thereby increases seller revenue. On the other hand - as in Jeitschko (1998)
- bidders in sequential auctions have an incentive to reduce their bid in order to reduce the
others’ bids in later rounds. This reduces seller revenue.
Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) consider a two round auction where bidders demand more than
one unit. The essential feature of this model is the investigation of the impact of (dis)economies
of scale on seller revenue: A bidder’s value for the second item depends on wether she has won
the first round. The paper shows that under economies of scale, 2PAs are more profitable for
the seller while the converse is not necessarily true.
McAfee and Vincent (1997) investigate sequential auctions where the seller posts a reserve price.
If the seller does not commit not to auction off the good in a later round, bidders might react
strategically and lower their bids below the reserve price in order to force the seller to lower
the reserve price in a later round. The paper shows that as the time between auctions goes to
zero, expected seller revenues converge to those of a static auction without reserve price. Note
that in contrast to the other papers, here the same good is repeatedly auctioned in all rounds
as might be the case for instance in the auctioning of rare wines.
Theoretical work on auction theory is virtually countless. A good informal overview is given
by Klemperer (1999). More advanced introductions are given in Jehle and Reny (2001) and
Wolfstetter (1999). A handbook that summarizes much of the current state of auction theory
is Krishna (2002).
In summary, theoretical auction literature focuses on deriving the NE of specific auction setups.
So bidders in these models are implicitly assumed to be perfectly rational and to know with
certainty that each of their opponents is perfectly rational as well. In addition, bidders are
assumed to know exactly the details of the auction setup such as the number of participat-
ing bidders and the underlying values. This assumption will be dropped in my thesis: Best
response play corresponds to dropping the assumption that each bidder knows with certainty
that each opponent is perfectly rational while she is still assumed to be perfectly rational her-
self. Quantal response in addition assumes deviations from perfect rationality for the individual
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bidder. Therefore, the literature doesn’t provide much insight into the questions that I want to
investigate.
2.3 Auction Experiments
There also exists a vast literature on auction experiments. The bottom line of this literature
is that the NE is a good proxy for describing human behavior in auctions. However, there are
significant deviations from the predictions which force the experimenters to refrain from the
assumption of perfectly rational bidders.
Among the oldest and the most influential papers are the experiments described in Cox, Rober-
son, and Smith (1982), their criticism in Harrison (1989) and the following discussion in the
American Economic Review, see Friedman (1992), Kagel and Roth (1992), Cox, Smith, and
Walker (1992), Merlo and Schotter (1992) and Harrison (1992).
Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982) describe experiments where bidders in 1PSBAs tend not to
bid according to their NE biding functions but to overbid. This result also held in an exper-
imental setup that compensated for risk aversion. Harrison (1989) argues that in the specific
experimental setup the expected payoff losses when not bidding according to the equilibrium
bidding function were too small to compensate for the increased deliberation cost. This is
termed as the ”flat maximum critique”. Accordingly, bidders in these experiments act bound-
edly rational. When evaluated in payoff-space instead of the space of bidding strategies, the
deviations from theory were not significant. This comment triggered one of the fiercest discus-
sions in experimental economics up to date because many experimentalists saw the article as a
severe criticism to their methods from an outsider to the field.
A more comprehensive survey of auction experiments up to 1995 is given in Kagel and Roth
(1995). They show that auction experiments show in general persistent deviations from equi-
librium predictions. In particular, in contradiction to the predictions of the RET, all auction
formats yield different expected seller revenue:
1PSBAs yield more revenue than Dutch auctions. In both formats bidding is significantly above
the NE prediction. Bids in 2PSBAs are also significantly above the NE prediction whereas re-
peated English auctions quickly converge to the NE of bidding the true values.
Kagel explains this finding by assuming that in 1PSBAs and 2PSBAs bidders focus on the
price dimension of the auction whereas the accept/reject problem in Dutch and English auc-
tions leads them to focus on the profitability dimension thus pushing them closer to the NE.
For the efficiencies they report that 88% of 1PAs and 2PAs are efficient compared to 80% of
Dutch auctions. English auctions yield the optimal efficiency of ∼ 100%.
Similarly, in experiments for multi-unit auctions also persistent deviations from the NE were
observed, see e.g., Cox, Smith, and Walker (1984).
Kagel and Roth (1992) report that in 1PSBAs, the outcome depends on the number of partici-
pants: For relatively few players there is overbidding and for relatively many players underbid-
ding when compared to the NE strategies.
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (1999) explain the experimentally observed overbidding in first-price
auctions by a quantal response equilibrium under constant relative risk aversion. They inves-
tigate also two alternative explanations, namely nonlinear probability weighting and a model
based on the ”joy of winning”. While the first alternative provides a reasonable good fit to the
data, it does not show the expected ”inverted S-shape” corresponding to the overweighing of
low risk probabilities and underweighing of high probabilities. Therefore, the authors prefer
the QR/CRRA model. The ”joy of winning” model performs significantly worse than the other
two.
Engelmann and Grimm (2003) report on experiments for multi-unit auctions. While value
shading auction designs like discriminatory of uniform price auctions show significant devi-
ations from the NE, bidding behavior in dominant strategy auction formats like Vickrey or
Ausubel auctions are close to the theoretical predictions.
Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004) report on experimental evidence that bidders in symmetric
first-price auctions follow a best reply dynamics. The authors let bidders specify in each round
a stepwise linear bidding function with two value segments before their value is drawn: Bidders
decide on the slope β of the bidding function separately for the two value segments. They
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consider 2 asymmetric and one symmetric treatment. For each bidder in each treatment they
determine the empirical best reply function. By this they denote the risk-neutral best reply bid
function to the distribution of the rivals’ actual bid functions. Then they investigate wether
the shapes of observed bid functions (concave, convex, humped or linear) can best be matched
by empirical best reply functions, by risk-neutral NE bidding functions or by risk-averse NE
bidding functions. Their result is that the shapes of the bid functions in the different treatments
are best matched by assuming best reply behavior of bidders.
Garrat and Wooders (2004) reinvestigate data that were originally reported by Kagel. They
show that in experimental second-price auctions, bidders tend to overbid, but auction efficiency
is rising over time since players learn to coordinate on the same strategy above the NE.
In conclusion, the literature on auction experiments shows that the NE is a good proxy for
behavior of bidders in auctions. However, there are significant systematic deviations from it.
This indicates that bidders in experimental auctions act boundedly rational. In the next chapter
I will therefore briefly survey concepts from bounded rationality.
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Chapter 3
Literature Background on Game
Theory
3.1 Motivation
As already noted before, this thesis is an attempt to construct mechanisms that lead to ’optimal’
economic systems. In particular I look for mechanisms that increase the allocative efficiency of
auctions and markets. This property goes hand in hand with a decrease of risk and instability
in these economic systems. Of course, these claims rest on several assumptions.
The most important assumption is about the nature of rationality of the participants. Classic
economic theory assumes each agent to be perfectly rational and to know that all the other
agents are also perfectly rational. Proofs are literally made under the assumption that each
person in the world, each decision maker in a firm would act in exactly the same way if you ask
them to solve the identical problem and that everybody knows this fact.
But real economic agents are not perfectly rational. They have different experience, different
aims and pursue different strategies. The concept of bounded rationality tries to take this into
account by relaxing some but not all the assumptions of standard game theory.1
In this thesis I investigate the efficiency of auctions under different relaxations of agents’ ratio-
nality: Agents might stay perfectly rational (best response or fictitious play) or make errors in
their responses (quantal response). However, no agent can be sure that the other participants
are necessarily perfectly rational. Therefore, agents in auctions can not derive how their op-
ponents will act in the future. Instead, I will focus as an alternative concept on evolutionary
learning where players observe the success of their strategies in the past in order to choose their
strategy for future play.
3.2 Bounded Rationality
3.2.1 Reasons for Bounded Rationality
Besides the observation that in reality people do not act perfectly rational, there are also a
number of more formal arguments that cast doubt on the underlying concepts of standard
game theory:
Rubinstein (1991) gives a wonderful example that shows the problem of merely identifying and
including all relevant information into the game solving process: He considers the battle of
sexes with payoffs of 3 and 1 if coordination is reached. This game has three possible equilibria:
There exist two pure strategy equilibria where players coordinate and one mixed equilibrium.
However, including the possibility that player 1 throws away one dollar at the start of the game
1Obviously, if we relax each and every assumption on agent rationality we can not predict anything interesting.
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leads to the unique selection of the most favorable equilibrium for player 1 by iterated weak
dominance arguments. In the final outcome player 1 actually doesn’t dispose of the dollar,
so the change in the outcome just comes from assumption that player 2 has thought of the
possibility that player 1 disposes of one dollar. But one can never be sure to have thought of
all relevant influence factors for the outcome of a game and this severely undermines the power
of the NE solution concept.
A battery of arguments are given by Conlisk (1996). He structures his criticism around two
main points:
First, it has repeatedly been seen that subjects in economic experiments fail to behave perfectly
rational. Instead, it is often observed that the subjects use rules of thumb and avoid thinking
through the consequences of their decision in all detail. Deviations from perfect rationality can
also be seen in ’real’ economic systems.
Second, the assumption of perfect rationality fails to take deliberation costs into account and
therefore is logically inconsistent: The time, computational power and research needed to find
the perfectly rational solution are not for free. By incorporating deliberation cost into perfectly
rational behavior, one runs into an infinite regress problem: Imagine, players try to determine
how deeply they should think through some problem before they make their next move. Then
in effect, this is an optimization problem where players try to balance the trade-off between
expected payoff and deliberation cost. But the deliberation cost of solving this optimization
problem is no yet taken into account. Taking it into account results in a higher-order optimiza-
tion problem which again has to be solved in some resource intensive way.
These shortcomings of the concept of perfect rationality of course haven’t gone unnoticed by
the developers of game theory as reported in Goeree and Holt (1999), p. 10.564:
There is, however, widespread criticism of theories based on the ”rational choice”
assumptions of perfect decision making (no errors) and perfect foresight (no sur-
prises). This skepticism is reinforced by evidence from laboratory experiments with
financially motivated subjects. Nash participated in such experiments as a subject
and later designed similar experiments of his own but lost whatever confidence he
had in game theory when he saw how poorly it predicted human behavior. And Rein-
hard Selten, who shared the 1995 economics Nobel Price with Nash and Harsanyi
remarked that ”game theory is for proving theorems not for playing games.”
In Goeree and Holt (2001), the authors formulate their criticism on game theory even sharper:
”The rationality assumptions that underlie this analysis are often preceded by per-
suasive adjectives like ”perfect”, ”intuitive” and ”divine”. If any noise in decision-
making is admitted, it is eliminated in the limit in a process of ”purification”. It is
hard not to notice parallels with theology, and the highly mathematical nature of
the developments makes this work about as inaccessible to mainstream economists
as medieval treatises on theology would have been to the general public.”
I agree with the criticism that the NE concept is somewhat fishy. Certainly, the NE concept is a
powerful tool to determine the general direction of the outcome of games. But it is inappropriate
to assess the finer subtleties of player behavior. Only in one respect I disagree with the authors:
Accounting for bounded rationality in games surely doesn’t make the mathematics easier.
As an alternative to the assumption of perfect rationality, theory has in the last 15 years
developed a theory of evolutionary learning. This research area has its roots in two quite
distinct scientific fields: Economics and theoretical biology. The main idea in evolutionary
learning is that players in repeated games use simple rules to update their strategies. The
resulting dynamics can be amazingly complex. One of the main questions in that context is
wether evolutionary learning converges to the NE (convergence) and - if there exists more than
one NE - to which one (equilibrium selection).
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3.2.2 Concepts from Evolutionary Game Theory
The following section closely follows Fudenberg and Levine (1999). Short overviews of evolu-
tionary game theory are also given in Sigmund and Young (1995) and Fudenberg and Levine
(1996).
Myopic best response: Under myopic best response, in each period each player plays her
best response against the observed behavior of her opponent in the last round.2 The underlying
story is that once a player has formed an opinion about the strategy of the other player in a
particular round, she believes that her opponent will stick to that strategy also in the next
round. So, agents are boundedly rational with limited foresight.
The conceptual problem with this story is that each player implicitly supposes that she is
more intelligent than her opponent, since she assumes, she can change her strategy while the
opponent doesn’t. Even if a sophisticated player 0 assumes an intelligent opponent who will
play a best response against her own last move and plays a best response against this strategy,
she implicitly assumes that she can think through more iterations than her opponent.
Nevertheless, (near to) myopic strategy updating has been experimentally observed in various
settings.
Fictitious Play: The basic idea of fictitious play (FP) is that players keep track of the whole
game and play their best response against the historical frequency distribution of opponents’
strategies. Originally fictitious play has been proposed as a method for NE calculation. However
more recently it has come into its own right as a learning model.
Formally, each player i has an exogenous initial weighting function, mapping the opponents’
strategy space onto the real numbers, κ0i : S
−i → R+. κ0i indicates player i’s prior beliefs
that her opponents play a particular set of strategies. The weight is updated each time, the
opponents make a particular move by
κti(s
−i) = κt−1i (s
−i) +
{
1 if st−1−i = s
−i
0 if st−1−i 6= s−i
(3.1)
The probability that player i assigns to the event that the players −i play s−i at date t is given
by
γti (s
−i) =
κti(s
−i)∑
∼
s
−i∈S−i
κti(
∼
s
−i
)
(3.2)
Fictitious play is defined as a rule that assigns a best response to the assumed probability
distribution of opponents’ strategies.
Later in this thesis I will analyze fictitious play in auctions. In auctions, no player knows her
opponents’ values, therefore no player can observe her opponents’ bidding strategies directly.
I will assume then - in analogy to FP - that players at each strategy updating choose their
own strategy that performed best against the historical bid distribution of her opponents. So,
she plays the strategy that would have maximized her payoff if she had played it for the whole
game up to the current round.
In the thesis I will alternatively use the terms fictitious play and perfect memory best response
to describe the same behavior.
Truncated Fictitious Play and Imperfect Memory Play: Obviously, myopic play and
fictitious play are two extremes that do not capture the behavior of real people. In reality,
people will mainly act based on information from the last few rounds. To model this behavior,
I consider two possibilities:
As a first possibility, players could consider only the last n rounds and update their strategies
according to fictitious play over this period. In other words, they weight information from
the last n rounds equally and neglect all information from rounds longer ago. This is called
truncated fictitious play. Note that n = 1 corresponds to myopic play. If, on the other hand,
2Note that the term ”myopic play” is often also used to describe behavior that tries to maximize just next
round’s payoff and doesn’t allow for more sophisticated strategic behavior. However, when I use the term
”myopic” in the thesis, I refer to agents who only look at information from the last round to update their
strategies.
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n = N where N is the number of rounds played in the game so far, then we rediscover fictitious
play.
As an alternative I offer the model of imperfect memory play. I have not found a comparable
model in the literature, however it seems to me at least as appropriate as truncated fictitious
play for interpolation between myopic and fictitious play (=perfect memory play).
The main idea of imperfect memory play is that the importance that players give to past
information gradually dies out3. In auctions, the information of interest is the payoff that each
strategy generated in the past. I denote the payoff that strategy j would have generated t as
PO(t)(sj). The cumulated payoff under imperfect memory is then given as
PO
(t)
imp(sj) = PO
(t)(sj) + λPO(t-1)(sj) + λ2PO(t-2)(sj) + · · · (3.3)
Updating to the strategy that maximizes PO(t)imp yields myopic best response for λ = 0, fictitious
play for λ = 1 and a smooth interpolation for λ ∈ (0, 1). Under imperfect memory play
memory gradually dies out according to an exponential function.4 As much as I know from the
psychological literature, this captures the decline of players’ memory more realistically than
truncated fictitious play.
Quantal Response: Under quantal response (QR) each player chooses next round’s strategy
with a probability proportional to past payoffs of that strategy. Mathematically, this behavior
can be modeled as a probit rule
selection probability of strategy si =
PO(si)ξ∑
j
PO(sj)ξ
(3.4)
or as a logit rule
selection probability of strategy si =
eξPO(si)∑
j
eξPO(sj)
(3.5)
In this thesis I will confine myself to probit rules. Quantal response can be thought of as
noisy best response with a specific noise structure. Goeree and Holt (2001) report a number
of experiments for one-shot games for which QR explains findings that are in contradiction to
perfect rationality.
Like in the case of best response, one can model quantal response as being myopic, with perfect
memory (like fictitious play) or - as an interpolation - with truncated fictitious play or imperfect
memory play.
Replicator Dynamics: The concept of replicator dynamics (RD) originally stems from the
field of evolutionary biology. There, RD is used to model the evolution of species with different
- in general mutually interdependent - fitnesses. RD assumes that on average the population
of a species grows according to its fitness.
In learning theory, RD is used to model social learning where agents learn by observing other
agents. Alternatively, RD can also be seen as the outcome of individual learning by a stimulus-
response model. In such models, species are interpreted as specific behaviors that a player can
adopt and that give rise to different payoffs. Well performing actions are reinforced and so are
more likely to be used again in the future.
It can be shown that under the RD the probability that a specific strategy is played grows
or shrinks exponentially over time. The exponent is proportional to the difference between
the fitness of that strategy and the mean fitness of the population of all strategies. Holland’s
Schema Theorem (see Holland (1992)) proofs that Genetic Algorithms (GAs) give rise to the
same dynamics: Schemata grow exponentially to their relative fitness. Therefore GAs are an
apt tool to simulate RD. I will say a little bit more on GAs and the Schema Theorem in
section 3.4.1. RD can be generalized to various other classes of processes that use some other
payoff-monotone measure to determine the success of individuals. These models qualitatively
all exhibit the same dynamics.
Under RD, any stable state that is the limit of a path that originates in the interior of the
3As opposed to truncated fictitious play that leads to abrupt changes in the information sets that the players
use for strategy updating.
4since the weight of PO(t-i) is λi
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strategy space is a NE.
A concept closely related to RD is that of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Intuitively an
ESS is an equilibrium that is able to repel invaders. This means that if the population is in an
ESS and a small part of the population starts to play a deviating strategy, then the payoff of
the old strategy against the new resulting mixture of strategies is higher than the payoff of the
new strategy against this mixture.
Introspection: None of the above models allows for the fact that players use introspection
to come up with better strategies just to play some response to past play. By introspection
I denote the chain of thinking ”I play the best response to your best response to my best
response to · · · ”. In the context of repeated games the assumption of no introspection can
be justified by assuming that bidders act under severe time constraints (like e.g., traders in
Financial Markets) or that they do not believe in the intelligence of their opponents. Goeree
and Holt (2001) propose to model introspection in one-shot games by assuming iterated quantal
response (since humans make errors) with increasing noise (lower ξ) for higher iterations.
Strategic Reasoning: Most papers in evolutionary game theory don’t allow for strategically
acting players who take into account the consequences of their own actions. Evolutionary
learning focuses only on the past as opposed to strategic reasoning that focuses on the future.
In repeated first-price auctions, for instance, bidding low in the first few rounds - no matter
what the opponent does - could be a feasible strategy since this could lead the opponent to
also bid lower and therefore to larger profits for both in later rounds. Second-price auctions
are even more prone to collusion as it is a NE if the bidder with the highest valuation bids
truthfully and all the others bid 0. However, the highest bidder would have to be determined
in a (presumably illegal) pre-auction. In frequently repeated auctions, there presumably is no
time for meeting secretly and running these pre-auctions.
Evolutionary game theory mostly neglects strategic reasoning by considering models where
players come from a large population and are matched randomly with each other. As the
population size goes to infinity the chance that the same two players will be matched again
goes to zero and therefore this kind of strategic reasoning is not taken into account. Models
where the same players are matched over and over again are referred to as ”repeated matching”.
Evolutionary Learning and Auctions: Most of the literature on evolutionary learning de-
viates in two important aspects from setups that would allow conclusions on repeated auctions.
• First, the literature focuses on games where players can observe their opponents’ strategies
exactly. In auctions, however, bidders can only observe their opponents’ bids but not their
opponents’ strategies, since they have no information on the opponents’ (private) values.
This implies that in repeated auctions, bidders can base their strategy updating only on
the payoffs that their own strategies have reached in the past.
• Second, the literature focuses on games with finitely many strategies (usually 2). In
auctions, however, there are infinitely many possible bidding strategies for each bidder.
Even in the restricted case of linear bidding functions that I will focus on in the thesis,
there is a continuum of feasible bidding strategies namely the interval [0, 1] for 1PAs and
[0,∞) for 2PAs.
In the next section I discuss the sparse literature that exists on auctions under bounded ratio-
nality. Note that most of it doesn’t deal with evolutionary learning.
3.3 Auction Theory under Bounded Rationality
To reconcile auction theory with experimental observations, theory has to be extended to de-
scribe bidders that do not bid according to their equilibrium bidding functions. However,
literature about non-equilibrium bidding in 1PSBAs is sparse.
Most of the literature focuses on deviations from perfect rationality in one-shot auctions.
Battigali and Siniscalchi (2003) investigate the general properties of non-equilibrium bidding
in 1PSBAs. They show that for private or affiliated values every bid below the equilibrium and
some bids above the equilibrium are interim-rationalizable (=consistent with thinking through
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finitely many best responses). The paper argues that bounded rationality may explain the
experimentally observed deviations from NE bidding. The paper makes no attempt to explic-
itly formulate strategy updating rules and investigate their dynamics. The contribution of the
paper is an existence proof that can not be used for quantitative calculations.
Deltas and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2001) investigate common value ascending price auctions –
i.e., English auctions – with entry costs. There are infinitely many fully rational expert bidders
and one non-expert5 bidder. The expert bidders know which questions to ask from the seller
and thereby get to know the exact value of the auctioned asset. The non-expert does not know
how to accurately assess the value and therefore gets her value from a random distribution
with mean v. The authors show that the presence of the non-expert can deter all the infinitely
many rational bidders from entering the auction and leaves positive expected payoff only to
the non-expert. So, in equilibrium, the population of bidders in repeated auctions will partly
consist of non-expert bidders.
In a related paper, Deltas and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2000), the authors investigate again a
common value setting. They show that bidders who don’t fully understand the winners curse
might have more expected payoff than fully rational bidders who do understand it.
The only paper I found about evolutionary learning in repeated auctions is Hon-Snir and Sela
(1998). They investigate repeated 1PSBAs where bidders’ values are determined before the first
round and held constant thereafter. Under a variety of learning rules the outcome is the same
as in a one-shot 1PA where the bidders’ types are commonly known. The results, however, rely
critically on the fact that bidders’ values don’t change between auctions. No result for repeated
auction where valuations change between auctions is derived.
3.4 Simulations
As we saw above, the literature on auctions focuses mainly on equilibrium bidding. This is in
accordance with standard game theoretic assumptions on perfectly rational players. Once we
abandon these assumptions, the analysis becomes cumbersome or simply intraceable.
As an alternative to mathematics, researchers have in the last 20 years increasingly employed
computational methods for the investigation of heterogeneous agents. Computers have turned
out as an indispensable tool to investigate systems that are too complicate to analyze them
analytically (see, e.g., Casti (1997)). In this section I want to give a quick introduction into
market simulations.
3.4.1 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a computational tool to determine the solution to optimization
problems. A good introduction is given in Mitchell (1999). Other introductory books are, e.g.,
Goldberg (1989) and Michalewicz (1999). In the standard setting proposed in Holland (1992),
a genetic algorithm (GA) is a mechanism that determines the evolution of a population of bit
strings.
A bit string is a representation of a number in the binary system. Consider for instance the
16-digit bit string 0110001001001101 and assume, the value of the ith position is 12i where
positions are numbered from 0 to 15. Let j(i) denote the ith bit, i.e., j(i) = 0 or j(i) = 1.
Then the value of this string in real numbers is
∑i=15
i=0 j(i)
1
2i ∼ 0.7697.
The real values encoded in the bit strings are tried as potential solutions to the optimization
problem under consideration. The relative success of the bit string in solving the problem
determines its fitness.6 The fitness is used by the GA to construct a new generation of strategies
from the old one. For this, usually the crossover and the mutation operator are used.
The crossover operator selects two bit strings as parents with probability proportional to their
fitness. Then it constructs a new bit string by cutting both bit strings at the same random
5The authors actually use the term ”inexpert”, however I did not find it in any dictionary.
6E.g., if the problem is to find the argument that maximizes a function, the fitness of a bit string could simply
be defined as the value the function takes at the real value encoded by the string. In computational auctions
bit strings are interpreted as bidding strategies. The fitness of the bit string is then defined as the payoff, the
strategy would have generated in past play.
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position and joining the first part of the first bit string with the second part of the second
bit string. The mutation operator subsequently flips each position in the bit string with a low
probability.
The good performance of bit string GAs is theoretically justified by Holland’s Schema Theorem,
see Holland (1992). The Theorem shows that the success of GAs in solving complex problems
lies in its ability of massive parallel computation:
A schema is a template made up of 0s, 1s and don’t care-symbols ’*’. Each bit string of
length l belongs to 2l schemata.7 By explicitly evaluating the fitness of one bit string, the
GA implicitly evaluates 2l schemata. Given the number of instances of a certain schema in
the current population8, Hollands’ schema Theorem gives a lower boundary on the expected
number of instances in the next generation. The Theorem accounts for the genetic operators
that influence the number of instances. It proves that if a Genetic Algorithm follows a fitness
proportional selection rule, then, the dynamics of instances of a certain schema in the population
of a GA satisfies the following inequality:
E[m(H, t+ 1)] ≥ m(H, t) · f(H, t)
f¯(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection
· (1− pm)O(H)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mutation
· [1− pc
pd(H,t)︷ ︸︸ ︷
L(H)
N − 1(1−
m(H, t)f(H, t)
Mf¯(t)
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Crossover
(3.6)
The variables in (3.6) have the following meaning:
E[m(H, t+ 1)] expected number of strings matching the schema H at generation t+ 1
m(H, t) number of strings matching H at generation t
f(H, t) mean fitness of instances of H at generation t
f¯(t) mean fitness of strings in the population at generation t
pm mutation probability
O(H) order of H (the number of defining bits 6= ∗ in the schema)
L(H) defining length of H (length between the outermost defining bits
in the schema)
pc crossover probability
N length of bit strings in the population
M population size
pd probability of disruption if crossover is applied
The intuition for (3.6) is straightforward: The number of instances of a certain schema H rises
with the relative fitness of its instances, because then the schema is more likely to be selected
for cloning or crossover. The higher the mutation rate is and the more defining bits H has,
the more likely it is to be destroyed under mutation. The probability that the schema gets
destroyed by crossover rises with the crossover probability and also with the defining length.
The longer the bit string is, the more likely it is that crossover happens outside the schema
so that it doesn’t get destroyed. And finally, if crossover happens between two instances of a
schema, the offspring will also be instances of the schema.
Note that (3.6) only gives a lower boundary for E[m(H, t+ 1)]. The reason is that it does not
account for the schemas H that are created by the genetic operators. However, the recombina-
tion of low-order schemata to increasingly fitter high-order schemata by crossover is believed to
be one of the major sources of GA power. This hypothesis is commonly known as the Building
Block Hypothesis. Therefore, (3.6) fails to take into account of one of the main sources of the
power of GAs. Still, the Schema Theorem serves as one of the main foundations for the analytic
investigation of GAs.
One of the immediate predictions of the Theorem is that for infinite population sizes, m(H, t)
will grow at an exponential rate with t9. Under certain assumptions it can be shown that this
behavior implies a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation of the search space that leads
7For example, the bit string 110 belongs to the 8 schemata 110, *10, 1*0, 11*, **0, *1*, 1**, ***.
8i.e., the number of bit strings belonging to that particular schema
9To be precise, m(H, t) grows exponentially as long as f¯(t) is constant.
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to an optimal online performance of GAs.10 In other words, the Schema Theorem ensures us
that the GA works in a way that maximizes the mean fitness of the population over time.
In summary, the instances of a particular schema in the population grow proportionally to the
difference of the fitness of the schema to the average fitness of the population. This property
makes GAs a good tool to simulate the replicator dynamics.
3.4.2 Auction Simulations
Andreoni and Miller (1995) report the outcome of simulations of repeated pure bidder auctions.
They investigate auctions with 4-8 bidders and 40 strategies each. Learning is simulated by GAs
with fitness-proportional selection. This corresponds to QR learning. Each thousand auctions
the GA updates the strategy population according to the cumulated payoffs. So, the simulation
models QR with near to perfect memory. The paper analyzes auctions with private, affiliated
and common values. In all cases, the simulation qualitatively replicates the experimentally
observed behavior of human players. In particular, the simulation results in overbidding for
first- and second-price auctions in an independent private values setting. The paper argues that
usually experimental auctions consist of too few auctions11 to assess many of the interesting
aspects of the long-term behavior.
Dawid (1999) investigates a double auction market (repeated double auctions) where bidders
and sellers have fixed deterministic values/cost that are the same in each auction. This setup
possesses a continuum of equilibria. The question is to which equilibrium the game converges
- if it converges at all. Dawid attacks this problem complementarily: He simulates the market
via GAs and analyzes their convergence properties mathematically by a kind of ”mean field
approach” based on the analysis of the replicator dynamics.
The simulation results show convergence to an equilibrium where bidders’ bids are slightly above
sellers asks. However, the equilibrium selection12 is not unique but depends on the random seed
of the simulation: The price may be in favor of the sellers or the bidders in different simulation
runs.
Note that in this simulation, each bidder is in each round randomly matched with a seller.
Though the title of his paper suggests so, I would say that Dawid does not consider a standard
double auction since in double auctions, bids and asks are ordered by size and then matched.
Therefore, each participants’ optimal strategy depends on all the other participants’ strategies as
well. In Dawid’s model, however, each bidder’s optimal strategy depends only on the population
of sellers but not on the other bidders’ strategies. The same holds true for the sellers. I would
rather interpret his simulation as repeated two-sided ultimatum bargaining than as a model of
a double auction. Note moreover that the simulation does not work with value distributions
but with fixed values that are same among all bidders and all sellers for all rounds.
Another stream of research focuses on the simulation of new auction designs to design them
”optimally” in some specified way. An example is Byde (2002) who proposes a mixture of 1PAs
and 2PAs in order to maximize seller revenue.
3.4.3 Financial Market Simulations
Though financial market simulations are a little bit off-topic in the context of auctions I want to
give here a short overview over this field. The first reason is that this financial markets are one
of the major playgrounds for agent based modeling (ABM) in economics. Therefore it might
give readers who are not so acquainted with ABM an impression of how these models work and
how they are used. Since the Auction Simulator, that I introduce later in the thesis, is also an
ABM this might simplify the understanding of the program philosophy. The second reason is
that in the future I want to couple my simulation of auctions to a financial market simulation
in order to investigate the feedbacks between order book design, technical trading and market
volatility. I will say more on this in the last chapter. Therefore I want to shortly explain the
10Holland derived an analytic solution to the optimal playing strategy for multi-armed bandit problems and
showed that the GA replicates this strategy.
11Usually in the order of 18-30 consecutive auctions
12i.e., the mean of bids and asks
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relevant concepts of financial market simulation here for later reference. The part can be left
out upon first reading.
FM simulations mostly focus on the interaction of few different types of investors. In most
models, there are two flavors of investors: Fundamentalists assess the intrinsic asset value
by some method such as discounted future dividends. Fundamentalists believe that the price
will move into the direction of the fundamental value, so they buy if the price is below the
fundamental value and sell if it is above. In this sense they help to stabilize the market.13
On the other hand, chartists use technical trading rules to exploit past information on price
and volume movements for the prediction of future prices. These traders generate bubbles and
crashes by herding and thus introduce instability into the market. The assumption of traders
who base their trading activities not only on the fundamental value but also on the strategies
of the other traders is empirically justified by the observation that price movements in markets
are often governed by fads which lack any fundamental reason (see, e.g., Shiller (1999)).
The interaction between fundamentalists and chartists generates in these simulations often
realistic features such as leptokurtosis and heteroscedasticity of the time series of returns or
cross-correlation of volatility and volume. The first model of this kind was the Santa Fe Artificial
Stock Market Model (SFASM), see e.g., Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane (1997). Technical trading
is simulated there by classifier systems. Classifiers are descriptors of past states that consist
of sequences of *s, 0s and 1s. Their evolution is closely related to that of a population of
schemata which makes this model a playground for GA modeling. Joshi, Parker, and Bedau
(2002) show that the SFASM operates in two states. The chaotic state qualitatively reproduces
stylized facts of real markets in the return series. It is reached as updating frequencies of GAs
are increased. This is intuitively clear since frequent updating of trading strategies implies
frequent reallocation of capital and thereby more pronounced price movements.
The last ten years have seen the growth of a rich ecology of different financial market simula-
tions. An overview of some of the most important models is given in Lux, Samaindou, Stauffer,
and Zschischang (2004).
Most financial market simulations do not focus too much on the details of the order book. A
notable exception is Chiarella and Iori (2002). They simulate a limit order market where orders
arrive at random times. The matching of orders is explicitly modeled. Demands of traders are
modeled as consisting of three components which are heterogeneous among agents: A funda-
mentalist component (with fixed fundamental value), a chartist component (extrapolating past
returns) and a noise component. The authors are able to replicate realistic market features
such as clustered volatility or cross-correlation between volatility, trading volume and bid-ask
spread.
Another interesting paper is Daniels, Farmer, Gillemot, Iori, and Smith (2003). They focus on
deriving properties of the order book without allowing for strategic acting of agents. Orders
are coming randomly to both sides of the market. The authors define dimensionless charac-
teristic quantities for the number of shares, the price interval and time. By complementary
mathematical analysis for simplified cases (logarithmic prices for limit orders are uniformly
distributed on the interval (−∞,∞)) and simulation for more general setups they are able to
replicate properties of real financial market order books like the concavity of the price impact
function. However, the simulation results also show different power laws for short- and long
term volatility which the authors can not explain by their mathematical model.
13Note that most models assume one fundamental value that is in each time step the same for all investors.
It would probably be more realistic to model them in each time step as value distributions so that fundamental
values differ among investors in each round.
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Chapter 4
Best Response in Open Bid
Auctions
We saw in the last chapters that current auction theory largely fails to capture the effects of
bounded rationality. The main contribution of this thesis is to marry these two research fields.
In the first part of my own research, that starts with this chapter, I analyze mathematically
the behavior of boundedly rational bidders in repeated auctions.
4.1 Structure of this Chapter
In this chapter I investigate the best response dynamics in 2 player open bid auction where
values are drawn anew in each round and come from a uniform value distribution, vi ∼ U(0, 1).
I am in particular interested, whether bidders with initially heterogeneous bidding functions
converge to the Nash Equilibrium in first- and second-price auctions. Note that the analysis
in this chapter focuses on linear bidding strategies bi(vi) = βivi. Near the NE - which is given
in 1PAs and 2PAs by linear strategies - this might be a realistic assumption. In principle we
make it easier for bidders to find the NE by confining their search from the infinite-dimensional
function space of all possible bidding functions b(v) to the one-dimensional space of linear
bidding strategies b(v) = βv that entails the NE. However, it is a simplification. In the next
chapter I will investigate the more general case of nonlinear bidding functions. The current
chapter is organized as follows:
• 4.2 focuses on myopic best response play in first price open bid auctions1 (1POBAs)2.
I quantify the average strategy β¯mBR0 (β1) of player 0 under myopic best response play
against a fixed strategy β1 of bidder 1. As a finger exercise I additionally quantify how a
fixed seller reserve price influences the average bid of a bidder who plays a myopic best
response to a fixed strategy of a second bidder.
• 4.3 quantifies the strategy distributions of bidder 0 against a fixed strategy. Subsequently
I use the result to show that two mutually adapting myopic best response bidders converge
to bidding 0.
• 4.4 identifies the perfect memory best response function βpBR0 (β1) against a fixed strat-
egy β1. This is the best response against a known strategy if neither the own nor the
opponent’s value are known upfront.
• 4.5 analyzes the dynamics of mutually adapting bidders under perfect memory best re-
sponse. It shows that bidders converge to the NE but that it takes them infinitely long
to arrive there.
1By open bid auction I mean that each bidder makes her bid simultaneously and all bidders can observe all
the other participants’ bids.
2All abbreviations are found in the appendix
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• 4.6 analyzes the best response dynamics in second-price auctions. I show that under best
response dynamics each player immediately learns the NE strategy of bidding her true
value.
• 4.7 concludes that the RET emerges after infinite time from the best response dynam-
ics if bidders have infinite memory strength or instantaneously if bidders are infinitely
sophisticated. Under realistic assumptions however the RET breaks down.
4.2 Myopic Best Response to Fixed Strategies in 1POBAs
4.2.1 Payoff Function
Unless explicitly noted, I focus in this thesis on the analysis of linear bidding strategies βi. If
bidder i has a private value vi, her bid is given as bi(vi) = βivi.
Bidder 0 wins an auction, if her bid is higher than that of the opponent. Otherwise, she looses
the auction. Therefore, the probability for player 0 to win a 1POBA is given by
pwin0 =
{
1 if β0v0 > β1v1
0 if β0v0 < β1v1
(4.1)
In closed form, the winning probability can be rewritten as
pwin0 = Θ(β0v0 − β1v1) (4.2)
where the Θ− or unitstep-function Θ(x) assigns a value of 1 to every positive number x and
0 to every negative number. For the value of Θ(0), there exist different conventions such as
Θ(0) = 0, Θ(0) = 1 or Θ(0) = 0.5. For defining the winning probability in auctions with
continuous value distributions it doesn’t matter which particular convention I apply, since the
equality of two bids occurs with probability 0. For details on the Θ function please check
Appendix A.
In a first-price auction, a winning bidder has a payoff of vi − βivi whereas her payoff is 0 if she
looses. Therefore, player 0’s payoff in a 1PA is given as
PO0(β0, β1, v0, v1) = v0(1− β0)Θ(β0v0 − β1v1) (4.3)
Figure 4.1 shows the payoff of player 0 for different choices of β0 when β1, v0 and v1 are fixed.
A bidder maximizes her payoff in a 1PA by bidding just slightly more than her competitor. If
the opponent bids more than her value then all of her feasible strategies3 would have generated 0
payoff and therefore it doesn’t matter, which strategy she chooses. Therefore, the best response
function of player 0 if she knows β1, v0 and v1 is given by
βbr0 (β1, v0, v1) =
{
lim
²→0
β1v1
v0
+ ² = β1v1v0 if
β1v1
v0
< 1
arbitrary ∈ (0, 1) if β1v1v0 > 1
(4.4)
4.2.2 Myopic Best Response to β1
The best response function determines the average strategy of player 0 if she plays in each
round the strategy β0 that would have maximized her last round’s payoff. Here, I stick to the
convention that, if at time t no feasible strategy of player 0 could have won the auction (i.e., if
3The set of feasible strategies in 1PAs is for each player the interval [0, 1]. All strategies > 1 yield negative
expected payoff.
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Figure 4.1: Payoff of Strategies
v
(t)
0 < β1v
(t)
1 ) then she continues to use her previous rounds strategy β
(t)
0 also at time t+ 1.
Therefore player 0s next rounds strategy is given as
β
(t+1)
0 (β
(t)
0 , β1, v
(t)
0 , v
(t)
1 ) =
β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
Θ(v(t)0 − β1v(t)1 ) + β(t)0 Θ(β1v(t)1 − v(t)0 ) (4.5)
Note that this is just a short way for writing
β
(t+1)
0 =

β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
if v(t)0 > β1v
(t)
1
β
(t)
0 if v
(t)
0 < β1v
(t)
1
(4.6)
The expected value of β(t+1)0 , β¯0
(t+1)(β1, v
(t)
1 ) can be found by integrating over v
(t)
0 :
β¯0
(t+1)(β1, v
(t)
1 ) =
1∫
0
dv
(t)
0
β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
Θ(v(t)0 − β1v(t)1 ) + β(t)0
1∫
0
dv
(t)
0 Θ(β1v
(t)
1 − v(t)0 ) =
=
1∫
β1v
(t)
1
dv
(t)
0
β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
+ β(t)0
β1v
(t)
1∫
0
dv
(t)
0 = β1v
(t)
1 (β
(t)
0 − ln(β1v(t)1 )) (4.7)
To understand how I get from the second to the third expression, think through what happens
for different value realizations of v(t)0 . The first integral gets only a positive contribution from
the integrand, if v(t)0 > β1v
(t)
1 . Additionally, the values of v
(t)
0 are restricted between 0 and 1
because of the integration borders. Since 0 < β1 < 1 and 0 < v
(t)
1 < 1, also 0 < β1v
(t)
1 < 1.
In particular, β1v
(t)
1 > 0. Therefore, the values of v
(t)
0 for which the integrand gives a positive
contribution are the ones between β1v
(t)
1 and 1. Similarly, in the second integral, the conditions
v
(t)
0 < β1v
(t)
1 and 0 < v
(t)
0 < 1 lead to the integration between 0 and β1v
(t)
1 because β1v
(t)
1 < 1.
Subsequent integration of (4.7) over v(t)1 yields the expected value of bidder 0’s strategy in
dependence of bidder 1’s strategy:
β¯0
(t+1)(β1) =
1∫
0
dv
(t)
1 β¯0
(t+1)(β1, v
(t)
1 ) =
β1
4
(1 + 2β(t)0 − 2lnβ1) (4.8)
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Now, since in the long-term on average the relation β¯0
(t+1) = β¯0
(t) != β¯0
mBR must hold, I obtain
for the average strategy of bidder 0, β¯0
mBR(β1), the condition
β¯0
mBR(β1) =
β1
4
(1 + 2β¯0
mBR(β1)− 2 lnβ1) (4.9)
By solving for β¯0
mBR, I arrive at the following
Theorem 4.1 Consider a two bidder first price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed strategy β1 and bidder 0 plays in each
round the strategy that would have maximized her payoff in the previous round. If she could not
have won the last round with any feasible strategy β0 ∈ [0, 1], she continues to use the previous
round’s strategy. Then, in the long term her average strategy is given as
β¯0
mBR(β1) =
β1(1− 2 lnβ1)
2(2− β1) (4.10)
In particular, β¯0
mBR(β1) < 12 ∀β1 ∈ [0, 1).
Figure 4.2: Myopic Best Response
Figure 4.2 plots βmBR0 (β1). We see that the average myopic best response against any feasible
strategy β1 ∈ (0, 1) is below the NE of 12 . As β1 → 1, β¯0
mBR(β1) approaches the NE from
below.
The dashed line shows the first median β0 = β1. Since there are two points where the first
median crosses the best response function, (4.10) has two points with β¯0
mBR(β1) = β1. The
first point is β1 = 0 and the second point is β1 ∼ 0.30171. For low strategies of bidder 1,
0 < β1 < 0.30171, bidder 0 bids under myopic best response on average more than β1, since
the best response function is above the first median. For β1 > 0.30171 she bids on average less
than β1.
How can we understand this intuitively? The lower β1, the lower also β1v
(t)
1 and therefore the
smaller the chance that v(t)0 < β1v
(t)
1 . Therefore, the rule β
(t+1)
0 = β
(t)
0 is only seldom applied
and the value of next rounds strategy is basically given as β(t+1)0 =
β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
. This is on average
bigger than β14.
4If the rule β
(t+1)
0 = β
(t)
0 would never be applied, the expected value of β
(t)
0 would be given as∫ 1
0 dv
(t)
0
∫ 1
0 dv
(t)
1
β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
= ”∞” > β1.
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As β1 increases, the rule β
(t+1)
0 = β
(t)
0 gets applied increasingly often. This prevents some
strategy increases of player 0 but puts no restriction on decreases of her strategy. Therefore
this rule lowers the average strategy of bidder 0.
If (4.10) was of the form β0 = f(β1), such a constellation where the best response to a low
strategy is higher than the opponents’ strategy and but lower for a high strategy of the opponent
would mean that the strategy combination (β0 = 0.30171, β1 = 0.30171) is an attracting fixed
point where mutually adapting bidders converge to. However, (4.10) just quantifies the average
strategy of bidder 0 and not the strategy itself. For a fixed strategy of the opponent, the
strategy of the respondent permanently fluctuates around the mean that is determined by
(4.10). Therefore, to assess the long term behavior of bidders under mutual adaptation, one
needs to determine the distribution of these fluctuations and then quantify the interplay between
the strategy distributions of two players. In section 4.3 I will follow this route to assess the
long term behavior of mutually adapting bidders under myopic best response.
4.2.3 Myopic Best Response with Seller Reserve Price
This subsection is not necessary to understand the remainder of the thesis. It can be left out
upon first reading. I extend the above auction setup by allowing the seller to participate in the
auction:
Still, bidder 1 plays the fixed strategy β1 whereas bidder 0 plays in each round the strategy
that would have maximized her last round’s payoff. In addition, the seller posts a fixed reserve
price ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that the item is only sold to bidder 0 if her bid is – in addition to being
bigger than bidder 1s bid – also bigger than ρ. Player 0s next round strategy is therefore given
as
β
(t+1)
0 (β
(t)
0 , β1, v
(t)
0 , v
(t)
1 , ρ) =

max(β1v
(t)
1 ,ρ)
v
(t)
0
if v(t)0 > max(β1v
(t)
1 , ρ)
β
(t)
0 if v
(t)
0 < max(β1v
(t)
1 , ρ)
(4.11)
where max(β1v
(t)
1 , ρ) = ρ+Θ(β1v
(t)
1 − ρ)(β1v(t)1 − ρ) < 1. (see Appendix A)
Integration over v(t)0 yields the expected strategy of bidder 0, still dependent on v
(t)
1 ,
β¯0
(t+1)(β(t)0 , β1, v
(t)
1 , ρ) =
1∫
ρ+Θ(β1v
(t)
1 −ρ)(β1v(t)1 −ρ)
dv
(t)
0 (ρ+Θ(β1v
(t)
1 − ρ)(β1v(t)1 − ρ))
1
v
(t)
0
+
+β(t)0
ρ+Θ(β1v
(t)
1 −ρ)(β1v(t)1 −ρ)∫
0
dv
(t)
0 =
= · · · = ρ(β(t)0 − ln ρ) + Θ(β1v(t)1 − ρ)(β(t)0 − ρ− lnβ1v(t)1 )(β1v(t)1 − ρ) (4.12)
Regrouping and integration over v(t)1 yields the expected strategy
β¯0
(t+1)(β(t)0 , β1, ρ) =
1∫
0
dv
(t)
1 Θ(
ρ
β1
− v(t)1 )(β(t)0 ρ− ρ ln ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+
1∫
0
dv
(t)
1 Θ(v
(t)
1 −
ρ
β1
)(β(t)0 β1v
(t)
1 − β1v(t)1 lnβ1v(t)1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
(4.13)
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In expression (I), the integrand is only non-zero if v(t)1 < min(1,
ρ
β1
) = 1−Θ(1− ρβ1 )(1−
ρ
β1
) < 15.
Therefore, the integral is given as
(I) =
1−Θ(1− ρβ1 )(1−
ρ
β1
)∫
0
dv
(t)
1 (β
(t)
0 ρ− ρ ln ρ) = β(t)0 ρ− ρ ln ρ−Θ(β1 − ρ)(1−
ρ
β1
)(β(t)0 ρ− ρ ln ρ)
(4.14)
In expression (II), the integrand is only non-zero if v(t)1 >
ρ
β1
and if v(t)1 < 1. Therefore, the
integral is given as6
(II) = Θ(1− ρ
β1
)
1∫
ρ
β1
dv
(t)
1 (β
(t)
0 β1v
(t)
1 − β1v(t)1 lnβ1v(t)1 ) =
= · · · = Θ(β1 − ρ)β
2
1 + 2β
(t)
0 β
2
1 − ρ2 − 2β(t)0 ρ2 − 2β21 lnβ1 + 2ρ2 ln ρ
4β1
. (4.15)
The prefactor Θ(1 − ρβ1 ) guarantees that for
ρ
β1
> 1, the integral doesn’t give a negative
contribution.
In summary, I obtain the expected strategy of bidder 0 as
β¯0
(t+1)(β(t)0 , β1, ρ) = (I) + (II) = ρ(β
(t)
0 − ln ρ)−Θ(β1 − ρ)(1−
ρ
β1
)(β(t)0 ρ− ρ ln ρ)+
+Θ(β1 − ρ)β
2
1 + 2β
(t)
0 β
2
1 − ρ2 − 2β(t)0 ρ2 − 2β21 lnβ1 + 2ρ2 ln ρ
4β1
. (4.16)
To determine the average behavior, I set - like in the previous section - β¯0
(t+1) = β¯0
(t) != β¯0
mBR
and solve for β¯mBR0 . For β1 < ρ this yields the solution
β¯0
mBR(β1, ρ) =
ρ
ρ− 1 ln ρ . (4.17)
For β1 > ρ the solution is
β¯0
mBR(β1, ρ) =
ρ2 − β21 + 2β21 lnβ1 + 2ρ2 ln ρ
2(ρ2 + β21 − 2β1)
. (4.18)
In summary I arrive at
Theorem 4.2 Consider a first price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies and vi ∼
U(0, 1). Two bidders and one seller participate in the auction. Assume that bidder 1 plays in
each round a fixed strategy β1 and the seller has a fixed reserve price ρ. Bidder 0 follows a
myopic best response strategy updating rule. Then, in the long term, her average strategy is
given as
β¯0
mBR(β1, ρ) = Θ(ρ− β1)ρ ln ρ
ρ− 1 + Θ(β1 − ρ)
ρ2 − β21 + 2β21 lnβ1 + 2ρ2 ln ρ
2(β21 + ρ2 − 2β1)
+ (4.19)
Figure 4.3 plots the average strategy of bidder 0 in dependence of bidder 1s strategy for different
reservation prices of the seller as given by equation (4.19). What is the intuition behind the
behavior of bidder 0?
(4.19) consists of two parts. The first part describes the average strategy of bidder 0 if the
5v
(t)
1 has to be < 1 because of the upper integration border. On the other hand, the Θ− function is nonzero
only for v
(t)
1 <
ρ
β1
.
6The term Θ(1 − ρ
β1
) in front of the integral ensures that in the case of ρ
β1
> 1 the integral doesn’t give a
negative contribution.
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Figure 4.3: Myopic Best Response with Reserve Price
sellers reservation price is bigger than bidder 1s strategy. Then, the strategy depends only on
the sellers reservation price. This is intuitively clear. Bidder 0 has to bid above both, the
seller reservation price and bidder 1s bid to make positive payoff. If β1 < ρ than because of
b1 = β1v
(t)
1 < β1 < ρ, the seller reservation price is always above bidder 1s bid. Therefore
bidder 0s strategy must be completely independent of bidder 1s strategy. In Figure 4.2, the
parameter combinations where ρ > β1 are represented by the horizontal line at the left hand
side of graphs with ρ > 0.
If, however, bidder 1s strategy is higher than the seller reservation price, then, at least for some
value realizations v1, bidder 1s bid is above the reserve price. Therefore, bidder 1s bids have
an impact on bidder 0s best response. The higher bidder 1s strategy is, the more will bidder 0
bid on average. This is the second term of (4.19) which corresponds to the monotonic increase
at the right side of the graphs.
Note that for ρ = 0, equation (4.19) reduces to the equation for myopic best response without
reserve price, (4.10), just as it has to be.
4.3 Mutual Myopic Best Response Adaptation
In this section I want to investigate the dynamics of 1POBAs with two myopic best response
bidders. In the first part I derive the strategy distribution of 1 bidder who plays a myopic
best response against a fixed strategy of her opponent. Subsequently I use this result to derive
the strategy distributions of two mutually adapting bidders. Finally I derive the outcome
of 1POBAs with two mutually adapting bidders under myopic best response dynamics. The
surprising result is that this learning rule leads both bidders to bid 0.
4.3.1 Strategy Distribution under Myopic Best Response
I assume that the strategy fluctuations follow a stationary distribution if a bidder uses myopic
best response strategy updating against a fixed strategy of her opponent. In the end of this
derivation we will see that the distribution indeed exists. Without loss of generality I assume
that bidder 1 always bids according to the strategy β1 and bidder 0 is the adapting bidder.
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The updating rule of bidder 0 is
β
(t+1)
0 =

β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
if β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
< 1
β
(t)
0 if
β1v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
> 1
(4.20)
For the sake of notational compactness, I drop from now on the time indices and write v0 for
v
(t)
0 and v1 for v
(t)
1 . The cumulated distribution function (CDF) of bidder 0s new strategy, i.e.,
the probability that bidder 0’s strategy is between 0 and β˜ after the updating, is given as
F (β˜) =
= P (0 < βnew0 < β˜) = P (
β1v1
v0
< 1)P (
β1v1
v0
< β˜ | β1v1
v
(t)
0
< 1) + P (
β1v1
v
(t)
0
> 1)P (0 < βold0 < β˜) =
= P (
β1v1
v0
< 1)
P (β1v1v0 < β˜)
P (β1v1v0 < 1)
+ (1− P (β1v1
v
(t)
0
< 1))F (β˜) =
= P (v1 <
v0β˜
β1
) + F (β˜)− P (v1 < v0
β1
)F (β˜) . (4.21)
By canceling the term F (β˜) from both sides I obtain the equation for the CDF
P (v1 <
v0
β
)F (β˜) = P (v1 <
v0β˜
β1
) . (4.22)
For uniform value distributions, the pertinent probabilities can be calculated as
P (v1 <
v0
β1
) = min(1,
v0
β1
) = 1−Θ(1− v0
β1
)(1− v0
β1
) = 1−Θ(β1 − v0)(1− v0
β1
)
P (v1 <
v0β˜
β1
) = min(1,
v0β˜
β1
) = 1−Θ(1− v0β˜
β1
)(1− v0β˜
β1
) = 1−Θ(β1
β˜
− v0)(1− v0β˜
β1
) .
(4.23)
Therefore I obtain by integration of (4.22) over v0 the condition for the CDF
F (β˜)
1∫
0
dv0{1−Θ(β1 − v0)(1− v0
β1
)} =
1∫
0
dv0{1−Θ(β1
β˜
− v0)(1− v0β˜
β1
)} (4.24)
This is equivalent to
F (β˜){
β1∫
0
dv0
v0
β1
+
1∫
β1
dv0} =
1−Θ(1− β1
β˜
)(1− β1
β˜
)∫
0
dv0
v0β˜
β1
+
1∫
1−Θ(1− β1
β˜
)(1− β1
β˜
)
dv0 (4.25)
because min(1, β1
β˜
) = 1−Θ(1− β1
β˜
)(1− β1
β˜
). Integrating this out yields
F (β˜){ v
2
0
2β1
|β10 +(1− β1)} =
v20 β˜
2β1
|1−Θ(β˜−β1)(1−
β1
β˜
)
0 +Θ(β˜ − β1)(1−
β1
β˜
) (4.26)
and therefore
(1− β1
2
)F (β˜) =
β˜
2β1
[1−Θ(β˜ − β1)(1− β1
β˜
)]2 +Θ(β˜ − β1)(1− β1
β˜
) . (4.27)
Solving this for F (β˜) yields
F (β˜) =
2{ β˜2β1 [1−Θ(β˜ − β1)(1−
β1
β˜
)]2 +Θ(β˜ − β1)(1− β1β˜ }
2− β1 (4.28)
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so
F (β˜) =

2β˜−β1
β˜(2−β1) if β1 < β˜
β˜
β1(2−β1) if β1 > β˜
(4.29)
The PDF f(β˜) is the derivative of the CDF F (β˜) with respect to β˜. Therefore it is given by
f(β˜) =
{
β1
(2−β1)β˜2 if β1 < β˜
1
β1(2−β1) if β1 > β˜
(4.30)
So I arrive at the following
Theorem 4.3 Consider a two bidder first price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed strategy β1 and bidder 0 follows a myopic
best response strategy updating rule. Then, in the long term, her strategy distribution is given
as
f(β0) =
β1
(2− β1)β20
Θ(β0 − β1) + 1
β1(2− β1)Θ(β1 − β0) (4.31)
Figure 4.4 shows the strategy distribution of player 0 against a fixed β1 = 0.3. The figure shows
Figure 4.4: Strategy PDF under mBR against β1 = 0.3
that, on average, bidder 0 plays all strategies that are lower than the strategy of her opponent
with equal probability. Strategies above the opponent’s strategy are played less often and the
higher the strategy, the less frequently it is played.
As a short double-check of the correctness of this result I calculate the average bid:
1∫
0
dβ˜β˜f(β˜) =
β1∫
0
β˜
β1(2− β1)dβ˜ +
1∫
β1
β1
(2− β1)β˜
dβ˜ = (4.32)
=
1
β1(2− β1)
β21
2
− β1
(2− β1) lnβ1 =
β1(1− 2 lnβ1)
2(2− β1) (4.33)
which is in accordance with Theorem 4.1.
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4.3.2 Convergence under Myopic Mutual Adaptation
In the next step I want to derive the strategy distribution of two mutually adapting bidders
who follow a myopic best response strategy updating rule. Again I assume initially that the
strategy distribution exists. However, we will see in the course of the derivation that this is only
true if bidders have a lowest strategy ² in their strategy set that is positive. The degenerate
distribution in the case of βi ∈ [0, 1] is then found by taking lim ²→ 0.
We know from the last theorem the strategy distribution of bidder 0 if bidder 1 plays a fixed
strategy β1. If bidder 1 plays instead a mixed strategy with PDF f1(β1) then the probability
that bidder 0 plays a certain strategy β˜0 is given by the integral over all probabilities that
player 1 plays a certain strategy β1, f1(β1), times the probability that bidder 0 responds to β1
with the strategy β˜0 which is known from Theorem 4.3. Therefore the strategy distribution of
bidder 0 against a strategy distribution f1(β1) is given by
f0(β˜0) =
1∫
0
dβ1f1(β1)(f0(β˜0) | β1) = (4.34)
=
β˜0∫
0
dβ1f1(β1)
β1
(2− β1)β˜2
+
1∫
β˜0
dβ1f(β1)
1
β1(2− β1) . (4.35)
For mutually adapting bidders the situation is symmetric. I assume that there exists a common,
differentiable strategy distribution. Denoting this common strategy distribution by f0 = f1
!= f
and relabeling the variables, f must satisfy
f(β˜) =
β˜∫
0
dβ f(β)
β
(2− β)β˜2 +
1∫
β˜
dβ f(β)
1
β(2− β) . (4.36)
To simplify the notation, I denote by I1(β) the primitive (=antiderivative) of f(β) β(2−β) and
by I2(β) the primitive of f(β) 1β(2−β) . Then the condition for the symmetric distribution can
be written as
f(β˜) =
1
β˜2
[I1(β˜)− I1(0)] + [I2(1)− I2(β˜)] . (4.37)
Differentiation yields
f ′(β˜) = − 2
β˜3
[I1(β˜)− I1(0)] + 1
β˜2
{f(β˜) β˜
2− β˜ − 0}+ f(1)− f(β˜)
1
β˜(2− β˜) =
= − 2
β˜3
[I1(β˜)− I1(0)] + f(1) . (4.38)
This equation can be transformed so that the primitives stand on one side:
− β˜
3
2
f ′(β˜) +
β˜3
2
f(1) = I1(β˜)− I1(0) . (4.39)
Differentiating again and using the fact that the derivative of the primitive I1 at β˜ gives the
original function f(β˜) β˜
2−β˜ yields the second order differential equation
−3β˜
2
2
f ′(β˜)− β˜
3
2
f ′′(β˜) +
3β˜2
2
f(1) = f(β˜)
β˜
2− β˜ (4.40)
The solution to this differential equation is given by Mathematica as
f(β˜) =
−8C1 + 4β˜C1 − 2C2 − 4β˜f(1) + 4β˜2f(1)− (β˜ − 2)(C2 − 4f(1)) ln(β˜ − 2) + (β˜ − 2)C2 ln β˜
4β˜
(4.41)
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What remains is to determine the three constants C1, C2 and f(1).
First notice that β˜ − 2 < 0 ∀β˜ ∈ (0, 1) and therefore ln(β˜ − 2) in the next to last term is a
complex number. Since f(β˜) is a (real valued) probability density, the prefactor of ln(β˜ − 2)
has to be equal to 0. This yields the condition C2 = 4f(1). Therefore the expression for f(β˜)
reduces to
f(β˜) =
−8C1 + 4β˜C1 − 8f(1)− 4β˜f(1) + 4β˜2f(1) + 4f(1)(β˜ − 2) ln β˜
4β˜
(4.42)
Since the equation has to be satisfied in particular for β˜ = 1, I obtain the condition
f(1) =
4C1 − 8C1 − 8f(1)
4
= −C1 − 2f(1) (4.43)
and therefore
f(1) = −C1
3
(4.44)
Substituting this back yields
f(β˜) = · · · = 4β˜C1 − 4C1 − β˜
2C1 − C1(β˜ − 2) ln β˜
3β˜
(4.45)
To obtain C1 I use the scaling condition that the integral over a probability density must yield
1. Therefore
1 !=
1∫
0
dβ˜f(β˜) = C1
1∫
0
dβ˜
4β˜ − 4− β˜2 − (β˜ − 2) ln β˜
3β˜
(4.46)
This integral doesn’t converge. In effect this means that there doesn’t exist a differentiable
strategy distribution for bidders under myopic best response. Therefore I construct now a
series of differentiable distribution functions that converges towards this distribution: Assume
that the lowest strategy in the players’ strategy set is ² > 0. Then, the condition
1∫
²
dβ˜f(β˜) = C1
1∫
²
dβ˜
4β˜ − β˜2 − (β˜ − 2) ln β˜
3β˜
= C1
1
6
(9−10²+²2+8 ln ²+2² ln ²−2 ln2 ²) (4.47)
yields the constant C1 as
C1 =
6
9− 10²+ ²2 + 8 ln ²+ 2² ln ²− 2 ln2 ² . (4.48)
In conclusion, mutually adapting bidders with a strategy set βi ∈ [², 1] bid according to a
continuous, differentiable strategy distribution that is defined by equations (4.45) and (4.48).
This distribution puts most of the mass to the lowest strategy and dies out exponentially for
higher strategies. As ² → 0, i.e., if bidders can use all strategies in the interval [0, 1], bidders
end up using the degenerate distribution f(β˜) = δ(β˜) that puts all the weight on the strategy
07. In other words, the only strategy that bidders use is β0 = β1 = 0.
The average strategy is given by
β¯ =
∫ 1
²
dβ˜β˜f(β˜) =
6
9− 10²+ ²2 + 8 ln ²+ 2² ln ²− 2 ln2 ²
1∫
²
dβ˜
4β˜ − 4− β˜2 − (β˜ − 2) ln β˜
3
=
=
72²− 27²2 + 4²3 − 24² ln ²+ 6²2 ln ²− 49
6(9− 10²+ ²2 + 8 ln ²+ 2² ln ²− 2 ln2 ²) (4.49)
Letting ² → 0, the denominator grows because of the term ln2 ² faster towards ∞ than the
numerator, so the average strategy converges to 0. Formally I obtain this result by applying
de’l Hospital’s rule.
Summarizing these results gives
7For the definition of the δ-function see Appendix A
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Theorem 4.4 Consider a two bidder first price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that both bidders mutually adapt by following a myopic best response
updating rule. Then, in the long term, strategies and bids converge to 0.
At first sight, this result seems to be in contradiction to Theorem 4.1. There, equation 4.10
predicted that if one bidder plays a strategy between 0 and 0.30171, the opponent answers on
average with a strategy that is higher than her strategy. So, how can it be that strategies still
converge to 0?
The answer can be found by looking at the CDF of the strategy distribution that is given by
equation (4.29). The probability that the updating bidder’s strategy is below the opponent’s
strategy β is given by F (β) = ββ(2−β) =
1
2−β >
1
2 ∀β ∈ [0, 1]. So, the updating bidder’s
strategy will more often be below the opponent’s strategy than above it. In other words, the
median of the updating bidder’s strategy is below the opponent’s strategy. But the strategies
above the opponent’s strategy are sufficiently high to raise the mean above the opponent’s
strategy.
So, the dynamics of mutually adapting myopic best response bidders is governed by two forces.
On the one hand, strategies can in each time step get arbitrarily large – as long as they stay
below one. This is since – considering for the sake of clarity bidder 0 who updates against the
strategy of bidder 1 – bidder 0s strategy in the next round is given by
β
(t+1)
0 =
β
(t)
1 v
(t)
1
v
(t)
0
(4.50)
and as long as bidder 1 plays a strategy β(t)1 > 0, there can always be value combinations that
make bidder 0s strategy arbitrarily large: Any strategy β(t+1)0 ∈ (0, 1) can be reached from
any strategy β(t)1 and any value v
(t)
1 , if bidder v0s value is β
(t)
1 v
(t)
1 /β
(t+1)
0 . However, the lower
bidder 1s strategy, the smaller is the chance that bidder 0s value is such that a given strategy
magnitude is reached.
On the other hand, as noted above, the updating bidder’s strategy is more often below the
opponent’s strategy than above it This induces in general a decrease of strategies. The speed
of decrease gets ever lower, the nearer strategies are to 0 since then F (β) → 0.5. So, what we
can expect for the dynamics is a general drift of strategies towards 0 that is interrupted by
occasional breakouts towards higher strategies. The lower the strategies of the bidders are, the
lower is the chance for such breakouts. However, the lower the strategies are, the slower is also
the speed of their decrease. So, the question is which of the two forces dominates in the long
run: Will the breakouts be sufficiently strong and sufficiently often that the strategies never
converge to 0? Or will strategies converge sufficiently fast to 0 such that they don’t break away
anymore?
What Theorem 4.4 tells us is that in the case of continuous strategies, the downward drift of the
strategies is the dominating force. It is sufficient to compensate for the occasional break-outs of
strategies such that the strategies die out over time. Below we will see in the simulations that
the existence of a smallest strategy ² > 0 changes the dynamics fundamentally. Then, strategies
involve in breakouts to arbitrarily high strategies (compare Figure 10.3). These breakouts occur
with a fixed frequency that depends on the lowest strategy and doesn’t decrease over time.
4.4 Perfect Memory Best Response to Fixed Strategies in
1POBAs
In the previous section I assumed that players update in each round their strategy as the best
response to the previous round. In this section, in contrast, I consider fictitious play (perfect
memory best response): Bidders choose in each round the strategy that would have obtained
the highest payoff in the whole game up to that particular round. The basic idea in the analysis
of perfect memory best response is that - if the opponent plays a fixed strategy and the game
has been going on infinitely long - choosing the strategy that wold have maximized past payoff
is the same as maximizing expected payoff against this fixed strategy: If bidder 1 plays a fixed
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strategy, bidder 0 is able to estimate bidder 1s strategy accurately after infinitely many rounds.
Therefore, the best response based on expected payoffs that I derive here is just the same as
perfect memory best response.
4.4.1 Expected Payoff Function
The expected payoff EPO0(β0, β1, v0) for v1 ∼ U(0, 1) is obtained by integrating (4.3) over v1:
EPO0(β0, β1, v0) =
∫ 1
0
dv1PO0(β0, β1, v0, v1) =
1∫
0
dv1Θ(
β0v0
β1
− v1)v0(1− β0) . (4.51)
The Θ-function is 0 for v1 > β0v0β1 , so the integrand takes non-zero values only for v1 <
β0v0
β1
.
Additionally, the restriction v1 < 1 is imposed from the upper limit of the integral. So, the
integrand only takes non-zero values for
v1 < min(1,
β0v0
β1
) = 1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
) (4.52)
and therefore the integral transforms into
EPO0(β0, β1, v0) =
=
1−Θ(1− β0v0β1 )(1−
β0v0
β1
)∫
0
dv1v0(1− β0) = [1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
)]v0(1− β0) . (4.53)
Figure 4.5 shows the expected payoff for player 0 for a fixed value v0 = 0.8 and different
strategies β1 of player 1. Note that for all β1 < 0.4 = v02 , player 0 maximizes her expected payoff
by playing less than the NE strategy β0 = 12 . For all β1 > 0.4, player 0 maximizes her expected
payoff by playing the NE strategy. In the following I will determine the optimal response
Figure 4.5: Expected Payoff in First-Price Auction for Fixed v0
function βpBR0 (β1), if both values v0 and v1 are drawn from a uniform random distribution.
This tells us how player 0 would optimally play if she knows player 1s strategy but not next
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round’s realizations of v0 and v1. For this I have to determine the expected payoff EPO0(β0, β1)
if both values are unknown.
Using (4.53), the expected payoff is given by
EPO0(β0, β1) =
=
1∫
0
dv0EPO(β0, β1, v0) =
1∫
0
dv0[1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
)]v0(1− β0)
=
1∫
0
dv0v0(1− β0)−
1∫
0
dv0Θ(
β1
β0
− v0)(1− β0v0
β1
)v0(1− β0) . (4.54)
The integrand of the second integral only takes on positive values if v0 < β1β0 and if v0 < 1.
Therefore, rewriting the integration border
v0 < min(1,
β1
β0
) = 1−Θ(1− β1
β0
)(1− β1
β0
) = 1−Θ(β0 − β1)(1− β1
β0
) (4.55)
yields
EPO0(β0, β1) =
1
2
(1− β0)−
1−Θ(β0−β1)(1− β1β0 )∫
0
dv0(1− β0v0
β1
)v0(1− β0) =
=
1
2
(1− β0)− (1− β0){12 [1−Θ(β0 − β1)(1−
β1
β0
)]2 − β0
3β1
[1−Θ(β0 − β1)(1− β1
β0
)]3} =
= (1− β0){Θ(β0 − β1)(12 −
β21
6β20
− β0
3β1
) +
β0
3β1
} . (4.56)
Figure 4.6 shows the expected payoff of player 0 for different strategies β1 of player 1. Note
that for all β1 ≥ 0.5, player 0 maximizes her payoff by playing her NE strategy β0 = 12 . For all
β1 < 0.5, player 0s best response is also smaller than the NE.
Figure 4.6: Expected Payoff in First-Price Auction for v0, v1 ∼ U(0, 1)
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4.4.2 Perfect Memory Best Response to β1
To analytically derive the optimal response function βpBR0 (β1), I have to distinguish the cases
β0

> β1
< β1
= β1
(4.57)
For β0 > β1, Θ(β0 − β1) = 1, therefore (4.56) reduces to
EPO0(β0, β1) = (1− β0){12 −
β21
6β20
} (4.58)
so that the first order condition
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1)
!= 0 =
β21
3β30
− β
2
1
6β20
− 1
2
(4.59)
yields
βpBR0 (β1) =
β
4
3
1 − β
2
3
1 (
√
81 + β21 − 9)
2
3
3(
√
81 + β21 − 9)
1
3
(4.60)
as the only real solution. Plugging the solution back into the condition β0 > β1 shows that this
solution satisfies the condition as long as β1 ≤ 12 .
For β0 < β1, Θ(β0 − β1) = 0 and therefore (4.56) reduces to
EPO0(β0, β1) = (1− β0) β03β1 (4.61)
The first order condition yields the solution βpBR0 =
1
2 . Plugging this back into the condition
β0 < β1 shows that this solution is valid for β1 > 12 .
For the symmetric solution β0 = β1 I can’t proceed straight forward because the first derivative
of EPO0(β0, β1) is discontinuous in β0 = β1. Instead, I use the fact that the first derivative to
the left of a maximum of a continuous function has to be positive whereas right of the maximum
it has to be negative. Therefore I look for the solution to the two inequalities
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1)
{
> 0 for β0 = β1 − ²
< 0 for β0 = β1 + ²
(4.62)
For β0 = β1 − ² I obtain
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1) =
1− 2β0
β1
!
> 0 . (4.63)
The expression is > 0 if 2β0 < 1. Resubstituting β0 = β1 − ² and taking lim
²→0
I arrive at
β1
!≤ 1
2
. (4.64)
For β0 = β1 + ² I obtain
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1) =
β21
3β30
− β
2
1
6β20
− 1
2
!
< 0 . (4.65)
Resubstituting β0 = β1 + ² and taking lim
²→0
, I arrive at
β1
!≥ 1
2
. (4.66)
In conclusion, the NE β0 = β1 = 12 is the only symmetric solution.
The results are summarized in
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Theorem 4.5 Consider a two bidder first price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed strategy β1 and bidder 0 follows a perfect
memory best response updating rule. Then, in the long term her strategy is given as
βpBR0 (β1) =
β
4
3
1 − β
2
3
1 (
√
81 + β21 − 9)
2
3
3(
√
81 + β21 − 9)
1
3
for β1 <
1
2
βpBR0 (β1) =
1
2
for β1 >
1
2
(4.67)
In particular, βpBR0 (β1) satisfies
β1 < β
pBR
0 (β1) <
1
2
for β1 <
1
2
βpBR0 (β1) =
1
2
≤ β1 for β1 ≥ 12
(4.68)
Figure 4.7 plots the best response function βpBR0 (β1) against β1. As stated in Theorem 4.5, for
β1 <
1
2 , the best response function satisfies β1 < β
pBR
0 (β1) <
1
2 - as can easily be seen, since
the function plot in this interval is always above the first median - the dashed line - and below
1
2 . It can be seen immediately from the Figure that β
∗
0 = β
∗
1 =
1
2 is an NE for the 1POBA: If
Figure 4.7: Perfect Memory Best Response in First-Price Auction
player 1 plays β1 = 12 , player 0s best response is β
pBR
0 (β
∗
1) =
1
2 and vice versa.
However, if player 0 is unsure wether her opponent plays according to the NE, she will play the
NE only if she estimates the opponent’s strategy too high. If she estimates it too low, she plays
below the NE. So, uncertainty reduces the average bid. The next section explores behavior
around the NE in more detail.
4.5 Mutual Perfect Memory Best Response Adaptation
Let me now investigate 2 player 1POBAs under mutual adaptation. Players don’t know their
opponents strategy for sure. Instead, they have to use previously observed bids to estimate
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their opponents strategy and play their best response against this estimate.
For a start let us imagine that player 1 always plays the fixed strategy β1. But player 0 doesn’t
know β1. How would bidder 0 come up with a estimate of β1?
Assume that bidder 0 updates her strategy every R rounds. Then she can use the R last bids of
player 1 to estimate β1 as
β˜1 =
E[b1]
E[v1]
=
1
R
R∑
t=1
b
(t)
1
0.5
(4.69)
since she knows that the values are distributed according to v(t)1 ∼ U(0, 1). Her estimate β˜1 from
different blocks a´ R rounds will be distributed normally around the true value β1. Therefore,
her best response βpBR0 (β˜1) will in general deviate from the true best response β
pBR
0 (β1).
Note that even if bidder 1 always plays the NE strategy β1 = 12 , bidder 0 plays according to
the NE only half the time: If her estimate of bidder 1s strategy is above the NE, β˜1 > 12 , her
best response is according to Theorem 4.5 also to play the NE strategy β0 = 12 . If she estimates
however β˜1 < 12 , her best response is according to Theorem 4.5 below the NE.
By increasing the number of rounds that player 0 uses for estimating β1, her estimate of β1 gets
ever more accurate - provided that bidder 1 indeed doesn’t change her strategy. In the limit
of infinitely many rounds between updating, her play therefore converges to the best response
function βpBR0 (β1).
Now I drop the assumption that player 1 always sticks to the same strategy β1 but instead
consider mutually adapting players. To investigate wether heterogeneous bidders converge to
the NE, I first consider truncated fictitious play. Players use a strategy for a certain number of
rounds, after which they simultaneously update their strategy to the best response against their
estimate of the opponent’s play. As argued above, even if both bidders start in the NE, each
bidder has only a chance of 12 that she also bids according to the NE after the first updating.
So, after one updating, there is a 34 chance that at least one bidder bids less than the NE
8. And
if one bidder bids less than the NE, then the chance that the opponent bids less than the NE
after the next updating is even higher than 12 . So, bidders under truncated fictitious play will
not stay in the NE but underbid on average. This underbidding is the less severe, the more
rounds bidders consider for strategy updating.
What, if bidders didn’t start in the NE? If a bidder - say bidder 0 - starts sufficiently above the
NE, the opponent’s strategy estimate will be above the NE and therefore, her best response will
be - according to Theorem 4.5 - the NE strategy. With the opponent playing the NE strategy
after the first updating, the strategy of bidder 0 will move below the NE in subsequent rounds
as argued above and both strategies will permanently fluctuate.
If a bidder starts sufficiently below the NE, then her opponent will typically use a higher strategy
after the updating:
She will use a higher strategy than β1 if her estimate β˜1 is ≥ β1 or even below β1 but satisfies
β˜1 ≥ (βpBR0 )−1(β1) where (βpBR0 )−1(β1) denotes the inverse function of βpBR0 . Since the estimate
β˜1 of β1 is symmetric around the true value β1, the opponent will therefore use in general a
higher strategy. So, if both bidders start below the NE, strategies will increase towards the NE.
However, the strategies do not converge into the NE but instead permanently fluctuate below
it.
In summary, no matter where the bidders start under truncated fictitious play, they end up in
permanent mutual strategy updating below the NE. In the long term, the strategy distribution
of these fluctuations depends merely on the number of rounds between strategy updating: The
more auctions are conducted between the strategy updating, the closer the strategies move to
the NE and the narrower the strategy distribution gets. However, for finite time, the strategies
do not settle down in the NE and if we allow infinite time between updating, strategies do not
change at all. So we see that under truncated fictitious play, strategies don’t settle down in the
NE.
Fictitious play (perfect memory best response), on the other hand, also doesn’t settle down in
the NE: Under FP, bidders use all the bids played in the game so far to assess the opponent’s
strategy and play their best response against the estimated average strategy. Therefore, as
soon as a player uses a strategy below the NE9, this is never forgotten by the opponent who
8Note that this probability of 3
4
to move out of the NE is independent of the number of rounds between
updating.
9In the beginning of the game, players underbid since the dynamics there is still very close to myopic play.
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calculates the average of all opponent strategies. Since each bidders best response is above the
opponent’s average strategy, strategies gradually approach the NE from below. However, they
never reach the NE, since strategies below the NE are never forgotten.
Up to now I assumed that bidders use their estimate of the opponent’s strategy and calculate
their best response to it. This requires bidders to know the number of bidders in the auction
and the underlying value distribution. Note however, that the same result would hold true
if bidders only observe their own strategies and play the strategy that would have generated
the highest payoff, had it been the active strategy in the last R rounds. If R is sufficiently
high, the strategy that generated the highest payoff will be very close to the true best response
against the opponent’s strategy. However, for finite R, the random value realizations might not
lead the bidder to play her true best response. Due to the concave shape of the best response
function, deviations to lower strategies are more severe than deviations to high strategies so
that – by a similar argumentation as above – bidders involve in permanent mutual adaptation
below the NE. Note that this result is somewhat more general since it describes the behavior
of bidders who don’t have to know the underlying value distribution or the number of bidders
who participate in the auction. The only information that each bidder uses is how much payoff
her strategies generate in response to the environment that she faces.
In summary, I arrive at
Theorem 4.6 Consider a two bidder first price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that each bidder estimates her opponent’s strategy in regular intervals
from the last R observed bids and revises her strategy as the best response against this estimate.
Alternatively, assume that bidders play the strategy that would have generated the highest payoff,
had it been the active one in the last R rounds.
Both models yield qualitatively the same dynamics: For infinite R, strategies converge to the NE
from below. However they reach it only after an infinitely long time. For finite R the process leads
to underbidding when compared with NE play. This deviation from the NE is accompanied by a
permanent fluctuation of bidders’ strategies. The lower R, the more pronounced are underbidding
and strategy fluctuations.
4.6 Second-Price Auctions
The payoff-maximizing bidding strategy in second-price open and closed bid auctions is always
bidding the true value. This result is well established in the literature and holds for any number
of participants and all kinds of risk aversion.
This section rederives this result using the methodology of the previous sections. It serves
mainly as a finger-exercise and a double-check for the mathematical methodology.
In a second-price auction the payoff for player 0 is given by
PO0(β0, β1, v0, v1) = (v0 − β1v1)Θ(β0v0
β1
− v1) (4.70)
The expected payoff for a fixed v0 and v1 ∼ U(0, 1) can be calculated as
EPO0(β0, β1, v0) =
1∫
0
dv1(v0 − β1v1)Θ(β0v0
β1
− v1) . (4.71)
The integrand takes positive values if
v1 < min(1,
β0v0
β1
) = 1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
) = 1−Θ(β1 − β0v0)(1− β0v0
β1
) . (4.72)
Therefore the integral transforms to
EPO0(β0, β1, v0) =
1−Θ(β1−β0v0)(1− β0v0β1 )∫
0
dv1(v0 − β1v1) =
There, as I have shown above, on average the myopic best response against any strategy of the opponent is
below the NE.
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= v0[1−Θ(β1 − β0v0)(1− β0v0
β1
)]− β1
2
[1−Θ(β1 − β0v0)(1− β0v0
β1
)]2 . (4.73)
To obtain the expected payoff for v0 ∼ U(0, 1), I integrate this expression over v0:
EPO0(β0, β1) =
1∫
0
dv0{v0[1−Θ(β1
β0
−v0)(1− β0v0
β1
)]− β1
2
[1−Θ(β1
β0
−v0)(1− β0v0
β1
)]2} . (4.74)
There are two cases for the integral that I have to distinguish: Either β0 > β1 or β0 < β1.
Case 1:
β1 > β0 ⇒ β1
β0
> 1⇒ Θ(β1
β0
− v0) = 1 ∀v0 ∈ (0, 1) (4.75)
Then, the integral transforms into
EPO0(β0, β1) =
1∫
0
dv0v
2
0{
β0
β1
− β
2
0
2β1
} = β0
3β1
− β
2
0
6β1
(4.76)
Case2:
β1 < β0 ⇒ β1
β0
< 1⇒ Θ(β1
β0
− v0) =
{
1 ∀v0 ∈ (0, β1β0 )
0 ∀v0 ∈ (β1β0 , 1) .
(4.77)
Then,
EPO0(β0, β1) =
β1
β0∫
0
dv0v
2
0(
β0
β1
− β
2
0
2β1
) +
1∫
β1
β0
dv0v0 − β12 =
β21
3β0
− β
2
1
6β20
+
1
2
− β1
2
. (4.78)
Combining the two cases yields the general expression for the expected payoff in second-price
auctions:
EPO0(β0, β1) = Θ(β0 − β1)( β
2
1
3β0
− β
2
1
6β20
+
1
2
− β1
2
) + Θ(β1 − β0)( β03β1 −
β20
6β1
) . (4.79)
Figure 4.8 shows the expected payoff of bidder 0 for different strategies of bidder 1. Graphical
inspection shows that this payoff function has its maximum in β0 = 1 for all values of β1 in the
interval (0, 1). For low values of β1 the payoff-function is quite flat to the right of the maximum,
so the reduction in expected payoff when bidding above the optimal strategy β0 = 1 is small
for even large deviations.10
This intuitively clear. Imagine that bidder 1 plays according to the NE, β1 = 1. Expected payoff
is for every nonnegative bid β0 > 0 positive: Even lim
β0→∞
EPO(β0, β1) = 0+, since if player 0
bids infinitely much, she obtains in each round the payoff v0 − v1. Since v0, v1 ∼ U(0, 1) the
probabilities of winning and losing sum up to 0.
To analytically calculate the maximum of this function, I derive the FOCs for (4.79):11
0 !=
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1) = δ(β0 − β1)( β
2
1
3β0
− β
2
1
6β20
+
1
2
− β1
2
)+
+Θ(β0 − β1)( β
2
1
3β30
− β
2
1
3β20
)− δ(β1 − β0)( β03β1 −
β20
6β1
) + Θ(β1 − β0)( 13β1 −
β0
3β1
) (4.80)
Like in the case of the 1POBA, I distinguish the cases β0 > β1, β0 < β1 and β0 = β1.
For β0 > β1, 4.6 transforms to
β21
3β30
=
β21
3β20
(4.81)
10Compare this to the experimental observation that inexperienced bidders bid above the NE also in 2PAs.
11Remember that the derivative of the Θ−function is the δ−function; see Appendix A.
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Figure 4.8: Expected Payoff in Second-Price Auction
with the solution β0 = 1.
For β0 < β1, equation 4.6 transforms to
1
3β1
=
β0
3β1
(4.82)
also with the solution β0 = 1.
The case β0 = β1 has to be investigated by looking at the sign of the first derivative left and
right of the point β0 = β1:
The condition
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1) |β0=β1−²=
1
3β1
− 1
3
+
²
β1
!
> 0 (4.83)
transforms by taking lim
²→0
into the condition β1
!≤ 1.
The condition
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1) |β0=β1+²=
β21
3(β1 + ²)3
− β
2
1
3(β1 + ²)2
!
< 0 (4.84)
likewise transforms by taking lim
²→0
into the condition β1
!≥ 1.
So we see that the only symmetric solution is β0 = β1 = 1. The findings of this section therefore
reestablish the following
Theorem 4.7 The perfect memory best response βpBR0 (β1) against any bidding strategy β1 in
a private value second-price auction with risk neutral bidders and private values v0, v1 ∼ U(0, 1)
is given by
β0 = 1 ∀β1. (4.85)
4.7 Revenue Equivalence Revisited
In all considerations up to now I have implicitly assumed that each player believes that her
opponent will keep her strategy unchanged for the next R auctions. This assumption is crucial.
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A player who knows that the other player may change her strategy plays different than a player
who assumes that her opponent will stick to her strategy.
To investigate the consequences of strategic sophistication, consider player 0 in a 1PA who
starts with some bid β(0)0 . Instead of assuming after the first R auctions that player 1 will stick
to her initial strategy β(0)1 , player 0 now assumes player 1 to switch to the best response against
her estimate of player 0s strategy β(1)1 = β
pBR
1 (E[β
(0)
0 ]). Here, E[β
(0)
0 ] denotes the estimate
of player 0s strategy by player 1.12 Player 0s best response is now to play βpBR0 (β
(1)
1 ) =
βpBR0 (β
pBR
1 (E[β
(0)
0 ])).
Taking this iteration a step further, player 1 would also foresee this behavior of player 0 and
therefore herself play her best response against this new β0. This process can be taken further
and further ad libitum. Since
β0 < β
pBR
1 (β
(0)
0 ) < β
pBR
0 (β
pBR
1 (β
(0)
0 )) < · · · <
1
2
(4.86)
we see that this chain converges to the NE. So, if best response bidders have an infinite foresight
horizon H, the process converges to the NE within one round:
lim
H→∞
β
(t)
0 = lim
H→∞
β1 =
1
2
∀t (4.87)
This is intuitively clear: The infinitely iterated process describes perfectly rational bidders who
assume that their opponents are also perfectly rational and that their opponents also assume
that they are perfectly rational. Therefore, they bid according to the NE. However, if bidders
have limited foresight, i.e., they think this process through for a finite number of rounds only,
repeated 1POBAs will move closer to the NE than in the case of unsophisticated players but
they will still persistently fluctuate below the NE.
In summary I arrive at
Theorem 4.8 Consider a two bidder open bid auction with vi ∼ U(0, 1). Bidders with a limited
foresight horizon H adapt each R rounds their strategies to the best response to the Hth-order
best response of their opponent.
Then, a repeated first-price open bid auction gives lower expected seller revenue and higher
earnings volatility than a second-price open bid auction. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem
emerges under the best response dynamics as lim
H→∞
or lim
R→∞
and lim
t→∞.
12In the case of vi ∼ U(0, 1) this is simply
R∑
i=1
2b0
R
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Chapter 5
Addenda to the Best Response
Dynamics
This chapter deals with additional aspects of the best response dynamics which complicate mat-
ters further but yield no significant new conclusions. The basic result that first-price auctions
do not converge to the NE still holds in the extended models.
In the first section I investigate the consequences of allowing bidders under perfect memory
best response to have non-linear bidding functions. It turns out that the best response function
then is different. However, bidders in first-price auctions again don’t converge to the NE.
In the second section, I consider a more sophisticated version of myopic best response where
bidders use the last observed bid and their knowledge of the common value distribution to
determine their opponent’s strategy. Also under this assumption, play doesn’t converge to the
NE – even not on average.
In the third section I qualitatively argue that bidders in sealed bid first-price auctions will even
less converge to the NE than in the open bid case because bidders get less information about
their opponent.
5.1 Value Dependent Perfect Memory Best Response
So far I have assumed that bidders use linear bidding functions. This means that they always bid
bi(vi) = βivi with the same βi, no matter what their value is. Mathematically this corresponded
to the integration of player 0’s values over the interval [0, 1] in equation 4.54 before we take the
derivative to determine the maximum.
In general, this will be an unrealistic assumption: Bidders with a value close to 1 who bid
against an unknown β1 may bid less aggressively since their chance of acquiring the object is
already very high and so they will try to increase their payoff by bidding less.
In this section I explore the consequences of allowing nonlinear bidding functions. I will look
for best responses βpBR0 (β1, v0) where player 0 takes into account her own value v0. Note that
I still assume that bidder 1 plays a linear β1 strategy here.
How can I proceed mathematically? From equation 4.53 I know that
EPO0(β0, β1, v0) = [1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
)]v0(1− β0) (5.1)
I determine the value-dependent best response function βpBR0 (β1, v0) by maximizing EPO0(β0, β1, v0):
0 !=
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, β1, v0) =
= {−δ(1− β0v0
β1
)(− v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
)−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(− v0
β1
)}v0(1− β0)−
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−{1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
}v0 , (5.2)
which can be further transformed to
v0
β1
{δ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
) +Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)}(1− β0)−{1−Θ(1− β0v0
β1
)(1− β0v0
β1
)} != 0 . (5.3)
Figure 5.1 shows the first derivative of the expected payoff for a value of v0 = 0.8. Note that
for β1 ≥ v0/2, the FOC yields a best response of 0.5, i.e., of the NE. For β1 < v0/2, however,
the best response is below the NE.
Figure 5.1: First Order Condition in First-Price Auction for Fixed v0
To find the closed-form solution to (5.3), I have to distinguish three cases
β0v0
β1

< 1
> 1
= 1
(5.4)
since the values of the Θ and the δ function depend critically on this quotient.
If β0v0β1 < 1, then Θ(1−
β0v0
β1
) = 1 and δ(1− β0v0β1 ) = 0. Therefore, (5.3) is transformed into
v0
β1
(1− β0) = β0v0
β1
(5.5)
with the unique solution
β0 =
1
2
. (5.6)
Plugging this back into the condition β0v0β1 < 1 shows that this is a valid solution only for
v0 < 2β1.
If β0v0β1 > 1, then Θ(1−
β0v0
β1
) = δ(1− β0v0β1 ) = 0, so (5.3) reduces to
0 = 1 , (5.7)
so there exist no solutions with β0v0β1 > 1.
To check for solutions with β0v0β1 = 1, I can not directly solve equation (5.3), since the value of
δ(0) · 0 is not defined. Intuitively, the reason is that EPO0(β0, β1, v1) has a kink at β0 = β1v0 so
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that its first derivative is not uniquely determined there. As a workaround, as above, I evaluate
the derivative (5.3) at the points β0 = β1v0 ± ² and keep in mind that
β0 =
β1
v0
is a maximum ⇐⇒
{
∂
∂β0
EPO(β1v0 − ², β1, v0) > 0 (condition 1)
∂
∂β0
EPO(β1v0 + ², β1, v0) < 0 (condition 2) .
(5.8)
If β0 = β1v0 − ² then Θ(1−
β0v0
β1
) = 1 and δ(1− β0v0β1 = 0), so condition 1 yields
v0
β1
(1− β1
v0
+ ²)− 1 !> 0 (5.9)
With ²→ 0 I obtain
v0
β1
!≥ 2 , (5.10)
so β0 = β1v0 is a solution for
v0 ≥ 2β1 , (5.11)
Similarly, condition 2 leads to
v0
β1
0(1− β1
v0
+ ²)− 1 < 0 (5.12)
which is always satisfied. Collecting these results, I arrive at the following
Theorem 5.1 Consider a two bidder first-price open bid auction with value-dependent strate-
gies and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed linear strategy β1 and bidder 0 follows
a perfect memory best response strategy updating rule. Then, in the long term her strategy is
given as
β0(β1, v0) =
1
2
for v0 ≤ 2β1
β0(β1, v0) =
β1
v0
for v0 ≥ 2β1 .
(5.13)
Figure 5.2 shows the best response βpBR0 (β1) in dependence of v0 for different values of β1.
Figure 5.2: Nonlinear Best Responses for Fixed β1
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The main question of interest in this section is of course, whether the value-dependent bidding
functions can lead mutually adapting bidders to NE bidding. Imagine, we start in the NE
β
(0)
0 = β
(0)
1 =
1
2 and we run sufficiently many auctions that bidders can identify their opponent’s
strategy correctly. After bidders choose their strategies for the next round. Then, for any value
the best response is β(1)0 = β
(1)
1 =
1
2 . So bidders stay in the NE forever.
But – like in the last chapter – what happens if bidders didn’t start in the NE or if bidders
have some uncertainty about the strategy their opponent pursues1? If β1 < 12 then there exist
always values v0 ∈ (2β1, 1) where the best response βBR0 is also a strategy that is smaller than
1
2 . Consequently, the average best response strategy against any strategy <
1
2 is <
1
2 but bigger
than the strategy of the opponent. The same is of course true for bidder 1. So, the situation is
qualitatively completely analogous to the case of linear bidding strategies. In summary I arrive
at the following
Theorem 5.2 Consider a 1POBA where bidders bid according to value-dependent bidding func-
tions. Then, the same conclusions as in the case of linear bidding functions hold. In particular,
it takes bidders infinitely long to reach the NE if the pursue fictitious play and they involve in
permanent mutual adaptation below the NE if they pursue truncated fictitious play.
5.2 Probability-Weighted Myopic Best Response Play
My previous model of myopic play was a bit unsatisfactory. After all, player 0 should be so-
phisticated enough to take into account that the best response in last round’s auction depended
on the last rounds realization of v(t-1)0 and v
(t-1)
1 . But by playing at time t the last rounds best
response βpBR; (t-1)0 (β1, v
(t-1)
0 , v
(t-1)
1 ) she implicitly would assume that next rounds’ realizations
of v(t)0 and v
(t)
1 are the same as at time (t− 1).
As a more sophisticated alternative I assume now that player 0 calculates her strategy β(t)0 from
last rounds’ observed play b(t-1)1 = β
(t-1)
1 v
(t-1)
1 as follows:
• In the first step, player 0 estimates from b(t-1)1 the strategies that player 1 might have used
at time (t − 1). This gives rise to a probability distribution f b1=β1vold1 (β˜1) for player 0s
estimate of player 1s active strategy given the observed bid. Here, β1 is the strategy that
player 1 actually uses, β˜1 runs through player 1s strategy set, f b1(β˜1) is the probability
density that player 0 assigns to each strategy β˜1 given the observed bid b1 and vold1 is the
last rounds’ realization of player 1s value
• In the second step, player 0 uses the probability distribution f(β˜) to maximize her ex-
pected payoff at time t by choosing an appropriate probability-weighted myopic best
response βpmBR0 (β1).
Note that the rather complicated estimation of the opponent’s strategy is only necessary under
(near to) myopic play. Under perfect memory play (or truncated fictitious play with sufficiently
long updating intervals), as players observe bids from many rounds they can directly derive the
opponent’s strategy as β˜1 =
numRounds∑
t=1
2b
(t)
1
numRounds if v1 ∼ U(0, 1). This estimate is asymptotically
normally distributed around the true value of β1 and gets more accurate, the higher the number
of considered rounds.
5.2.1 Strategy Estimation from Observed Bids
From b1 = β1v1 it follows that β1 = b1v1 . But since player 0 doesn’t know v1, she can only
derive a probability distribution f b1(β˜1) for the possible values of β1. In this section I derive
this distribution via Bayesian updating.2
1Such that they give positive probabilities to values above and below the true strategy of their opponent
2A special thanks to Prof. Lux for the hints for this section.
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A priori, bidder 0 doesn’t know anything about the value or the strategy of her opponent.
Therefore, her priors are β1 ∼ U [0, 1] and v1 ∼ U [0, 1]. To calculate the probability density
f b1(β1) if bidder 0 observes the bid b1, I use the Bayesian formula for the posteriori distribution
f b1(β1) = f(β1 | b1) = f(b1 | β1)f(β1)∫
dβ˜1f(β˜1)f(b1 | β˜1)
. (5.14)
Since a priori bidder 0 assumes all strategies of her opponent to be equally likely on the interval
[0, 1], I set f(β1) = 1.
Moreover, if player 1 plays strategy β1, her bids will be uniformly distributed on (0, β1) because
v1 ∼ U [0, 1]. Therefore
f(b1 | β1) =
{
1
β1
for b1 ≤ β1
0 for b1 ≥ β1 ,
(5.15)
or in closed form
f(b1 | β1) = 1
β1
Θ(β1 − b1) . (5.16)
The integral in the denominator is given by
1∫
0
dβ˜1f(β˜1)f(b1 | β˜1) =
1∫
0
dβ˜11
1
β˜1
Θ(β˜1 − b1) =
1∫
b1
dβ˜1
1
β˜1
= − ln b1 . (5.17)
Putting all this together, the posteriori distribution is given by the following
Theorem 5.3 Consider a two bidder first-price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed strategy β1 and bidder 0 observes in each
round the bid β1v1 that bidder 1 is placing. Then, player 0 derives the PDF that player 1
strategy is β˜1 if she observes the bid β1v1 as
fβ1v1(β˜1) = − 1
β˜1 ln b1
Θ(β˜1 − b1) . (5.18)
Figure 5.3 shows the strategy distribution that bidder 0 derives from different bids of bidder 1.
5.2.2 Probability-Weighted Myopic Best Response Play
In this subsection I analyze a more sophisticated version of myopic best response than in the
last chapter. In the derivation of Theorem 4.1 I assumed that player 0 plays in each round the
strategy that would have maximized her payoff in the last round. This neglected the influence
of the randomness bidder 1s values v1.
Instead, I assume now that player 0 uses her observation of player 1s last rounds bid to estimate
player 1s strategy and maximizes based on this distribution her expected payoff. According to
Theorem 5.3 she can calculate the distribution fβ1v
old
1 (β˜1) of player 1s true strategy β1 that
depends on the realization of player 1s value in the previous round, vold1 . If player 0 knew player
1s strategy β1 for sure, she could calculate her expected payoff EPO0(β0, β1) by equation (4.56).
However, player 0 doesn’t know β1 for sure but instead has to weight the expected payoffs with
the according probabilities fβ1v
old
1 (β˜1) for bidder 1’s expected strategy,
EPO
β1v
old
1
0 (β0, b1) =
1∫
0
dβ˜1f
β1v
old
1 (β˜1)EPO0(β0, β˜1) , (5.19)
where
EPO0(β0, β1) = (1− β0){Θ(β0 − β1)(12 −
β21
6β20
− β0
3β1
) +
β0
3β1
} =
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Figure 5.3: Strategy PDF Derived from Observed Bids
=
{
(1− β0) β03β1 for β0 < β1
(1− β0)( 12 − β
2
1
6β20
) for β0 > β1
(5.20)
and
fβ1v
old
1 (β˜1) = − 1
β˜1 ln b1
Θ(β˜1 − b1) . (5.21)
For the analysis I treat the two cases β0 < b1 and β0 > b1 separately:
If β0 < b1 then certainly also β0 < β1 and therefore the Θ-function in the expression for
EPO0(β0, β1) is zero. Therefore the probability-weighted expected payoff is given as
EPOb10 (β0, b1) =
1∫
b1
dβ˜1(− 1
β˜1 ln b1
)(1− β0) β0
3β˜1
=
(1− β0)β0(1− b1)
3b1 ln b1
(5.22)
for β0 < b1.
If β0 > b1 then β0 might be bigger or smaller than β1. Therefore, the expression for the expected
payoff consists in this case of two parts,
EPOb10 (β0, b1) =
β0∫
b1
dβ˜1(− 1
β˜1 ln b1
)(1− β0)(12 −
β21
6β20
) +
1∫
β0
dβ˜1(− 1
β˜1 ln b1
)(1− β0) β0
3β˜1
=
=
(1− β0)(4β30 + 6β20 ln b1 − 3β20 − b21 − 6β20 lnβ0)
12β20 ln b1
. (5.23)
In summary, the expected payoff of bidder 0 if she observes bidder 1 bidding b1 and answers
with β0 is given as
EPOb10 (β0, b1) =
(1− β0)β0(1− b1)
3b1 ln b1
Θ(b1 − β0)+
+
(1− β0)(4β30 + 6β20 ln b1 − 3β20 − b21 − 6β20 lnβ0)
12β20 ln b1
Θ(β0 − b1) . (5.24)
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Next I derive the best response function by maximizing the expected payoff. If β0 < b1 then
EPOb10 (β0, b1) =
(1− β0)β0(1− b1)
3b1 ln b1
(5.25)
The FOC is given by ∂∂β0EPO0
!= 0 and yields
1− 2β0(1− b1)− b1
3b1 ln b1
!= 0⇒ β0 = 12 . (5.26)
Plugging this back into the condition β0 < b1 shows that this solution is valid for all b1 > 12 .
This is intuitively clear: If the bid is bigger than 12 , then certainly also the strategy is bigger
than 12 and therefore the estimated strategy distribution has support only above the NE. Since
the best response against any strategy > 12 is
1
2 , the best response against a distribution that
consists only of strategies bigger than 12 must also be
1
2 .
If β0 > b1, then
EPOb10 (β0, b1) =
(1− β0)(4β30 + 6β20 ln b1 − 3β20 − b21 − 6β20 lnβ0)
12β20 ln b1
. (5.27)
The FOC yields
6β20 − 13β30 + 8β40 − 2b21 + β0b21 − 6β30 lnβ0 + 6β30 ln b1 != 0 . (5.28)
Unfortunately there is no closed-form solution to this logarithmic equation. Instead I use
Mathematica to solve the FOC numerically. Figure 5.4 shows the probability weighted myopic
best response of bidder 0 if she observes the bid b1 of her opponent. The graph is qualitatively
Figure 5.4: Probability Weighted Myopic Best Response Against Observed Bids
the same as Figure 4.7, only that now the x-axis consists of bidder 1s bid instead of her strategy.
Note that the left part of the plot is higher than the corresponding part in Figure 4.7. This
is intuitively clear: Bidder 0s estimate of bidder 1s strategy based on the bid b1 puts positive
probability on every strategy between b1 and 1. Since the best response against higher strategies
is also higher, this pushes the best response function up. Completely analogous to the discussion
in the case of perfect memory best response, follows
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Theorem 5.4 Consider a two bidder first-price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that both bidders revise their strategies according to probability-
weighted myopic best response: After each round they calculate from their opponent’s bid a
probability distribution of her strategy. Then they use this distribution to calculate their own
best strategy to maximize next round’s expected payoff.
The dynamics of this game leads to persistent underbidding and does not converge to the NE.
Note that it is crucial for probability-weighted myopic best response that bidders know exactly,
how many bidders participate in the auction and the underlying value distribution. Otherwise
the bidders could not calculate the expected payoff. There is no simple learning rule that gives
rise to probability-weighted myopic best response. Therefore it is mainly of academic interest
but will in general not be very relevant for real auctions.
5.3 Sealed Bid Auctions
So far, I have only considered open bid auctions where each bidder can observe her opponent’s
bid, no matter whether she has won or lost.
Many auction formats, however are sealed bid. This means that only the winning bid but not
any losing bid is published. How would this influence the outcome of repeated auctions? The
main problem here is that I have to define a rule that specifies, how winning bidders behave
that get no new information about their opponent’s strategies.
The first intuition could be to define a rule analogous to myopic best response that says: ’If the
bidder gets no new information, she sticks with the same strategy. If she gets new information,
she plays her best response.’
This rule sounds straight forward but it is completely infeasible: A losing bidder who ob-
serves the winning bid and updates her strategy always increases her strategy to a higher level.
However, winning bidders get no new information. Therefore, winning bidders stick to their
strategies and strategies will never move down again. Consequently, this updating rule will lead
over time both bidders to bid exactly their true value. This behavior would be the outcome
of all updating schemes considered in this thesis: Myopic and Perfect Memory Best or quantal
response3 all lead to bidding the true value in 1PSBAs, leaving no payoff to the bidders.
Clearly, this is not a realistic result.
Consequently, the only plausible assumption is that winning bidders decrease their strategy in
order to try to get more payoff in the future. But by how much? There is no endogenous rule
that tells us wether winning bidders discount each time 1%, 5% or 10%. Or do bidders decrease
their strategies the more, the more often the strategy has consecutively won? Another possi-
bility would be that winning bidders calculate a probability distribution for their opponents’
strategies that takes into account the information that they have not won the auction. Again,
like in the case of probability-weighted myopic best response, this rule would depend crucially
on the assumption that the participants know the underlying value distribution and the number
of participants.
These considerations show that in first-price sealed bid auctions bidders will have even less
chance to find the NE than in first-price open bid auctions. In second-price auctions, however,
also in the sealed bid case, bidding the true value is the dominant strategy and the best response
dynamics converges to that equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Note that the differences between information structures of open and sealed bid auctions dimin-
ish as the number of participants in the auction increases: The only difference between these
two formats lies in the information that the winning bidder gets. The relevant information for
the remaining (N−1) bidders – namely the highest bid – is in both cases published. As N →∞
therefore the information structures converge. Of course, this is just a rough argument because
it assumes that the losing bidders are completely uninfluenced by the other losing bidders’s
bids and it implicitly also assumes that as N → ∞, in each auction another bidder wins. But
the underlying intuition should be correct.
3I investigate QR in detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Quantal Response in Open Bid
Auctions
Best response play is an arguable model for companies with specialized analytic departments
like banks or insurances: Agents who face decisions where particularly much money is at stake
might devote a lot of effort to collecting data about competitors and evaluating historical data.
However, best response is in general not an apt model for the investigation of auctions with
inexperienced bidders and low payoffs like they are typically found in auction experiments.
Moreover, if bidders face time constraints, even experienced bidders might not be able to find
the best response in the time given to them.
In this chapter I investigate a one-parameter family of alternative models for the formation of
bidders beliefs. As I will show, this family encloses the best response dynamics as an extreme
case. Under quantal response dynamics players keep track of how much payoff each of their
own strategies could have generated in past play. The payoff of each strategy determines the
probability of choosing the strategy for play in the next round. Like under best response, play
can be myopic where bidders consider only last round’s payoffs or it can be with perfect memory
where bidders consider payoff information from the whole game.
6.1 Myopic Quantal Response to Fixed Strategies in 1POBAs
6.1.1 Payoff-Linear Myopic Quantal Response
For a start, I assume that players have only a finite set1 of strategies βi0 and that they choose
strategies for their play by observing how much payoff each of them has generated in the last
round. Myopic quantal response (mQR) in its simplest version is defined in the following way:
• Each bidder starts with some initial bid
• Bidder i observes the outcome of the auction
• Denote the set of feasible strategies of player 0 that would have won last round’s auction
by B0 = {βold0 | βold0 vold0 > βold1 vold1 , 0 < βold0 < 1}
• Bidders select a strategy for the next round from B with a probability that is linearly pro-
portional2 to that strategy’s payoff in the last round’s auction: The selection probability
for a specific strategy β is given as
PO(β)
1∫
0
dβ˜ PO(β˜)
(6.1)
1e.g., one could think of the 100 strategies β = 0.00, 0.01, · · · 0.99
2Below, I will generalize this assumption.
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• If B0 = ∅, the bidder keeps her current strategy unchanged in the next round
Mathematically I can capture mQR in the following way:
The payoff of bidder 0 conditional on that she could have won the auction with some feasible
strategy, i.e., conditional on B0 6= ∅ can be calculated according to the Figure 6.1: If there is
Figure 6.1: Payoff of Strategies
some feasible strategy β0 that would have won the auction (and therefore would have generated
positive payoff) that strategy β0 satisfies β0v0 > β1v1 and therefore β0 > β1v1v0 . The payoff at
β0 = β1v1v0 + ² is given as v0 − b0 = v0(1− β0) = v0(1−
β1v1
v0
).
The selection density for some strategy β0 > β1v1v0 conditioned on B0 6= ∅, i.e. on v0 > β1v1, is
given by
f(β0, β1, v0, v1) =
PO0(β0, β1, v0, v1)
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0PO0(β˜0, β1, v0, v1)
=
(1− β0)v0
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0(1− β˜0)v0
(6.2)
The expected value of β0, denoted by β¯
mQR
0 , still conditioned on B0 6= ∅ is given by
β¯mQR0 (β1, v0, v1) =
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0f(β˜0, β1, v0, v1)β˜0 =
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0β˜0(1− β˜0)v0
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0(1− β˜0)v0
= (6.3)
β20
2 − β
3
0
3 |1β1v1
v0
β0 − β
2
0
2 |1β1v1
v0
=
v0 + 2β1v1
3v0
(6.4)
Next I calculate for illustrative purposes the average bid for all possible values v0 conditioned
on B0 6= ∅.
A strategy β0 ∈ B0 satisfies β0v0 > β1v1. Since v0 > β0v0 for β0 ∈ (0, 1), B0 can only be
non empty if v0 > β1v1. Therefore I integrate v0 not from 0 to 1 but only from β1v1 to 1.
Simultaneously I divide by the length of the integration interval, (1 − β1v1), to obtain the
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expected value of β0:
β¯mQR0 (β1, v1) =
1
1− β1v1
1∫
β1v1
dv0
v0 + 2β1v1
3v0
=
β1v1 + 2β1v1ln(β1v1)− 1
3(β1v1 − 1) (6.5)
To obtain β¯mQR0 (β1) I can not simply integrate β¯
mQR
0 (β1, v1) over v1 from 0 to 1. The reason is
that taking the average to obtain the expected value of β0 - as I did when I divided by 1−β1v1
- is an operation that may only be performed in the end of a calculation.3
Therefore, I have to go back to equation (6.4) and calculate
β¯mQR0 (β1) =
1
1− β12
1∫
0
dv1
1∫
β1v1
dv0
v0 + 2β1v1
3v0
=
2
3
1− β1lnβ1
2− β1 (6.6)
The integration borders in the integration over v0 are justified again since I condition on the
event that at least some strategies in player 0s strategy set could have won against player 1’s
bid of β1v1.
The prefactor 1
1− β12
is the equivalent of the prefactor 11−β1v1 that I used in the derivation
of β¯mQR0 (β1, v1). Here I additionally I used v1 ∼ U(0, 1) which gives an average value of 12 .
Figure 6.2 shows the average strategy of bidder 0 under linear myopic quantal response play
in response to a fixed strategy of bidder 1. Note that the myopic quantal response against the
NE is above the NE: β¯mQR0 (
1
2 ) ∼ 0.6. So far I have considered only the events where bidder 0
Figure 6.2: Myopic Quantal Response Play against fixed β1
has at least one feasible strategy in B0 that could have won the auction. However, the above
calculated β¯mQR0 (β1) is the same if bidders keep using the same strategy as long as they get no
new information. The result is even the same if we allow bidders to select new strategies each
round according to the payoff-proportional distribution of β0s they calculated in the last round
where their value satisfied v0 > β1v1.
3For a more intuitive example consider the computation of the expected value of the squares of three numbers,
e.g., 2, 3 and 4. It is given by 1
3
(22+32+42) = 9 2
3
. This is different from first taking the average 1
3
(2+3+4) = 3
and then squaring it to a result of 9.
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The trick is to see that the probability that a strategy stays another round active is independent
of the strategy value:
The active strategy β0 is left unchanged if v0 ≤ β1v1 because then no new payoff distribution
on the strategy space (0, 1) is generated. This condition is independent of the currently active
β0. So, the strategies that stay another round on average have exactly the same distribution
as the strategies that are selected in rounds where new information is generated.
Therefore the above calculated β¯mQR0 (β1) gives the expected value of β0 under myopic quantal
response for a wide range of possible updating rules if the last auction generated no payoff-
distribution on the strategy space (0, 1). This consideration gives rise to the following
Theorem 6.1 Consider a two bidder first-price open bid auction with linear bidding strategies
and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed strategy β1 and bidder 0 follows a myopic
payoff-linear quantal response updating rule:
• if one or more strategies in her set could have generated positive payoff at time t, she
selects one among them with probability proportional to their payoff
• if no strategy could have generated positive payoff at time t, she either
– keeps the strategy she used at time t or
– selects another strategy with probability proportional to the payoff the strategy would
have obtained in the last round
Then, in the long term, her average strategy is given by
β¯mQR0 (β1) =
2
3
1− β1 lnβ1
2− β1 (6.7)
6.1.2 Payoff-Exponential Myopic Quantal Response
In the last section I assumed that players play a strategy in the next round with a probability
that is directly proportional to the payoff that strategy generated in the last round. In the
following I generalize this rule. I investigate what happens if player select a strategy βi with
a probability that is proportional to [PO(βi)]ξ where ξ is a parameter that can take values
between 0 and ∞. For ξ → ∞, myopic quantal response converges to myopic best response
since then the strategy that generated the highest payoff in the last round is chosen in the next
round with probability 1. For ξ = 0 we obtain essentially random play. ξ = 1 corresponds to
payoff-linear QR considered above.
The probability that β0 is chosen for next rounds play if the parameters of the last round were
β1, v0 resp v1, is given by
f(β0, β1, v0, v1, ξ) =
POξ0(β0, β1, v0, v1)
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0PO
ξ
0(β˜0, β1, v0, v1)
=
[(1− β0)v0]ξ
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0[(1− β˜0)v0]ξ
. (6.8)
Therefore, the average strategy of player 0 conditional on v0 and v1 is given as
β¯0
mQR(β1, v0, v1, ξ) =
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0β˜0f(β˜0, β1, v0, v1) =
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0β˜0[(1− β˜0)v0]ξ
1∫
β1v1
v0
dβ˜0[(1− β˜0)v0]ξ
=
=
(v0−β1v1)ξ+1(v0+β1v1(ξ+1))
v20(2+3ξ+ξ
2)
(v0−β1v1)ξ+1
v0(1+ξ)
=
v0 + β1v1(ξ + 1)
v0(ξ + 2)
. (6.9)
By setting ξ = 1 this reduces to the pertinent equation (6.4) of the last subsection.
To calculate β¯0
mQR(β1, ξ) I proceed exactly as in the last subsection.
β¯0
mQR(β1, ξ) =
1
1− β12
1∫
0
dv1
1∫
β1v1
dv0
v0 + β1v1(ξ + 1)
v0(ξ + 2)
=
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2
2− β1
1∫
0
dv1
−1 + β1v1 + β1(ξ + 1)v1 ln(β1v1)
ξ + 2
= · · · = β1(ξ − 1)− 2β1(ξ + 1)lnβ1 + 4
2(2− β1)(ξ + 2) (6.10)
So I arrive at the following
Theorem 6.2 Consider a two bidder first-price open bid auction with the same assumptions as
in Theorem 6.1. The only difference is that the selection of new strategies is with a probability
proportional to POξ where the exponential factor ξ is a measure for the importance that bidders
give to the payoff differences they obtain by using different strategies. Then, in the long term,
the average strategy of player 0 is given as
β¯0
mQR(β1, ξ) =
β1(ξ − 1)− 2β1(ξ + 1) lnβ1 + 4
2(2− β1)(ξ + 2) (6.11)
For ξ →∞, β¯0mQR(β1, ξ) converges to myopic best response play.
Note that substitution of ξ = 1 rederives the prediction of Theorem 6.6 for β¯0
mQR(β1).
For ξ → ∞ I use that ξ − 1 ∼ ξ + 1 ∼ ξ + 2 and therefore can cancel the ξ terms from the
fraction. This yields the expression
β¯0
mQR(β1, ξ =∞) = β1(1− 2 lnβ1)2(2− β1) (6.12)
This is exactly the expression for the average myopic best response strategy against a fixed
strategy from Theorem 4.1. This is no coincidence as noted above since ξ →∞ means that we
always take for sure the strategy with the best payoff. So the parameter ξ can be interpreted
as an indicator of the importance that players give to the payoff.
6.2 Perfect Memory Quantal Response to Fixed Strate-
gies in 1POBAs
6.2.1 Payoff-Linear Perfect Memory Quantal Response
Under perfect memory quantal response, like with mQR, bidders choose the strategies for their
play by observing how well their individual strategies have behaved in the past. However, they
base their selection on the accumulated payoff the strategy generated in the entire game as
opposed to looking only at the last round.
Under the assumption of v0, v1 ∼ U(0, 1), the expected payoff of any strategy β0 against a
strategy β1 is given by equation 4.53:
EPO0(β0, β1) = (1− β0){Θ(β0 − β1)(12 −
β21
6β20
− β0
3β1
) +
β0
3β1
} (6.13)
If the game has been going on for long enough, the cumulated payoff of that strategy since the
start of the game converges to the expected payoff.
With payoff-proportional strategy selection, the expected value of β0 is the weighted mean of
all possible β0s. The weights are proportional to the payoff that the pertinent strategies have
generated in the past. The expected value β¯pQR0 (β1) is therefore given by:
β¯pQR0 (β1) =
1∫
0
dβ˜0f(β˜0, β1)β˜0 =
1∫
0
dβ˜0
EPO0(β˜0, β1)
1∫
0
dβ˜0EPO0(β˜0, β1)
β˜0 =
1∫
0
dβ˜0EPO0(β˜0, β1)β˜0
1∫
0
dβ˜0EPO0(β˜0, β1)
(6.14)
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The evaluation of the integrals is straight forward:
The numeraire is given by:
1∫
0
dβ˜0EPO0(β˜0, β1)β˜0 =
β1∫
0
dβ˜0(1− β˜0) β˜
2
0
3β1
+
1∫
β1
dβ˜0(β˜0 − β˜20)(
1
2
− β
2
1
6β˜20
) =
= · · · = 1
12
+
β21
36
+
β21 lnβ1
6
− β
3
1
12
. (6.15)
The denominator is given by
1∫
0
dβ˜0EPO0(β˜0, β1) =
β1∫
0
dβ˜0(1− β˜0) β˜03β1 +
1∫
β1
dβ˜0(1− β˜0)(12 −
β21
6β˜20
) =
= · · · = 1
4
− β1
2
+
11β21
36
− β
2
1
6
lnβ1) (6.16)
Simplification yields the following
Theorem 6.3 Consider a two bidder first-price open bid auction with linear strategies and
vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that bidder 1 plays a fixed strategy and bidder 0 follows a perfect memory
quantal response rule for strategy updating: Strategies are selected with probability proportional
to the cumulated payoff the strategy would have generated in all auctions up to time t. Then,
her average strategy is given by
β¯pQR0 (β1) =
3 + β21 − 3β31 + 6β21 lnβ1
9− 18β1 + 11β21 − 6β21 lnβ1
(6.17)
In particular, β¯pQR0 <
1
2 ∀β1 ∈ U(0, 1).
Average perfect memory quantal response against a fixed strategy of bidder 1 is plotted in Figure
6.3. Note from Figs. 6.2 and 6.3 that linear quantal response leads under both, myopic and
perfect memory play, bidders to use the (average) strategy βi = 13 if the opponent bids nothing,
β−i = 0. This shows that bidders overbid significantly for low strategies when compared to
their best response. For higher strategies, myopic quantal response leads to overbidding whereas
perfect memory quantal response stays below the NE for all strategies of the opponent.
6.2.2 Payoff-Exponential Perfect Memory Quantal Response
Like for the myopic case I tried to investigate perfect memory payoff-exponential quantal re-
sponse play where the probability that a certain strategy is played is proportional to POξ0. By
proceeding exactly like for the ξ = 1-case we can write
β¯0
pQR(β1, ξ) =
1∫
0
dβ˜0
EPOξ0(β˜0, β1)β˜0
1∫
0
dβ˜0EPO
ξ
0(β˜0, β1)
(6.18)
where the expected payoff is given by
EPO0(β0, β1) =
{
(1− β0) β03β1 for β0 < β1
(1− β0)( 12 − β
2
1
6β20
) for β0 > β1
(6.19)
The problem is however that I could not derive closed-form expressions for these integrals. In
the parts of the integrals that I could solve there occur hypergeometric functions.
Of course it would have been nice to have a closed-form solution for each value of ξ. The Auc-
tion Simulator gives the possibility to investigate payoff-exponential perfect memory quantal
response. I will show with the Auction Simulator in a later chapter that analogous to my-
opic quantal response, perfect memory payoff-exponential quantal response converges to best
response play for ξ →∞.
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Figure 6.3: Perfect Memory Quantal Response Play against Fixed β1
6.3 Quantal Response in 2POBAs
Under quantal response strategy updating, the equilibrium strategy of bidding the true value
in 2PAs is in general not found. This is intuitively clear by looking back at Figure 4.8. The
average play depends on the size of the strategy set:
In 1PAs it is intuitively clear that bidders have to confine themselves to the strategy set βi ∈
(0, 1). Strategies have to be bigger than 0 to be able to obtain the object and they have to
be smaller than 1 to avoid losses. In 2PAs, all strategies between 0 and ∞ generate positive
expected payoff.4 Therefore, the average play against a fixed strategy depends on the cutoff-
level that human bidders assume for their strategy set. In conclusion, quantal response in 2PAs
does not give rise to a unique analytical solution.
Note however that the reasoning, why in 2PAs it is optimal to bid exactly the own valuation is
quite simple. Therefore, even if we assume that human bidders use quantal response strategy
updating in 1PAs, it might be a reasonable assumption that most bidders in 2PAs do discover
their NE bidding functions or at least play very close to it.
Experimental evidence shows that bidders in repeated second price auctions move very closely
to the NE. However, some experiments show small but significant deviations from NE play
(see, e.g., Kagel and Roth (1995), Garrat and Wooders (2004)). This can be explained by a
perfect memory quantal response model with very high ξ. Intuitively, the interpretation of this
model is that bidders in principle can determine their best strategy, but they can make small
errors in this determination. They play good strategies more often than bad ones. Now, take a
look at Figure 4.8. If ξ is very high, this means that bidders’ selection criteria are very strict.
Strategies with a payoff below some treshold level are virtually never played. Therefore, the
integration to determine the average strategy can be approximated by integrating only over a
certain region around the NE of β = 1.
β¯ =
∞∫
0
dβ βPOξ(β) ∼
1+²∫
1−²
dβ βPOξ(β) (6.20)
where ² is such that strategies outside the interval 1 ± ² are virtually never played. A look at
Figure 4.8 shows that the payoff function is flatter to the right than to the left. This means that
– no matter, which strategy the opponent plays – strategies above the NE of βi = 1 are more
4See the section about perfect memory best response in 2PAs.
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often played than strategies below it. Therefore a perfect memory payoff-exponential quantal
response model with high ξ could explain the experimentally observed overbidding in 2PAs.
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Chapter 7
Best Response in Pure Seller
Auctions
To investigate auctions where only sellers and no bidders participate, I will in principle make
the same analyses as in the case of pure bidder auctions. Again I consider a formalized setting
where the sellers’ private values are in each round drawn anew from U(0, 1).
An example for such an auction in a repeated setting is e.g. procurement. In a specific industry
sector, big suppliers repeatedly compete for contracts. They want to sell their products or
services to a specific firm. The firm takes the role of the bidder. In this chapter I assume that
the bidder posts no reservation price – so her willingness to pay is assumed to be infinitely high.
Though this might not be very realistic, it helps to focus only on the interaction of the sellers.
Extensions that allow for a bidder reservation price can be calculated exactly in the same way
as in the case of pure bidder auctions that were considered in section 4.2.3. Pure seller auctions
can – like in the pure bidder case – be organized as first- second- or higher-price auctions. The
question is here again, which of these auction formats converge under which assumptions.
As in the case of pure bidder auctions I allow only for linear asking strategies. I stick to the
convention that a seller with value v and strategy σ asks vσ . This convention guarantees that
the set of feasible asking strategies is confined to the interval (0, 1].
Note however that the seller perspective is not completely symmetric to the bidder perspective:
Assuming a value distribution U(0, 1), a bidder’s maximal possible payoff in a pure bidder auc-
tion is 11. A seller in a pure seller auction can obtain an infinitely high profit if the bidder has
no reservation price, i.e., if the bidders willingness to pay is infinitely high. Due to this asym-
metry between the bidder- and the seller-format, it is a priori not clear, wether the convergence
behavior of the auction formats will be similar.
7.1 Payoff Function for Sellers
The probability that seller 0 wins by asking v0/σ0 against a second seller who asks v1/σ1, is
given by
pwin0 =
{
1 if v0σ0 <
v1
σ1
⇔ if v0σ1 < v1σ0
0 if v0σ0 >
v1
σ1
⇔ if v0σ1 > v1σ0 .
(7.1)
In closed form, the winning probability for seller 0 can therefore be written as
pwin0 = Θ(v1σ0 − v0σ1) (7.2)
and the payoff is given as
PO0(σ0, σ1, v0, v1) = v0(
1
σ0
− 1)Θ(v1σ0 − v0σ1) (7.3)
1Assuming that the bidder’s value is 1 and she wins the auction with a bid of ²→ 0
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because if seller 0 can sell the item that she values at v0 for a price of v0/σ0, her payoff is
v0/σ0− v0. Figure 7.1 shows the payoff of seller 0 if she uses different strategies against a fixed
combination of σ1, v0 and v1.
Figure 7.1: Payoff of Ask Strategies
7.2 Myopic Best Response to Fixed σ1
In this section I assume that seller 1 uses a fixed strategy σ1 that is the same in all rounds. I
want to assess seller 0s average myopic best response to σ1, i.e., I want to assess the long term
average of her strategy if she uses myopic best response. Like in the pure bidder case I stick to
the convention that seller 0 keeps last round’s strategy if no feasible strategy of her could have
won the auction. Seller 0’s best response strategy against last rounds’ play is therefore given as
σnew0 (σ
old
0 , σ1, v0, v1)
!= σbr0 (σ
old
0 , σ1, v0, v1) =
{
lim
²→0
v0σ1
v1
+ ² = v0σ1v1 if
v0σ1
v1
< 1
σold0 if
v0σ1
v0
> 1
(7.4)
where σnew0 denotes the respondent’s strategy in round t+1 whereas the values of σ
old
0 , v0 and
v1 are taken at time t. In short term notation I can write this as
σnew0 (σ
old
0 , σ1, v0, v1) =
v0σ1
v1
Θ(v1 − v0σ1) + σold0 Θ(v0σ1 − v1) (7.5)
Integration over v1 yields the expected value of the myopic best response strategy in dependence
of the opponent’s strategy and the respondent’s value v0,
σ¯new0 (σ
old
0 , σ1, v0) = v0σ1(σ
old
0 − ln(v0σ1)) (7.6)
and finally integration over v0 and setting σ¯new0 = σ¯
old
0
!= σ¯0mBR yields the following
Theorem 7.1 Consider a two seller first-price open bid auction with linear ask strategies and
vi ∼ U(0, 1). Assume that seller 1 plays a fixed strategy σ1 and seller 0 plays in each round the
strategy that would have maximized her payoff in the previous round. If she could not have won
the last round with any feasible strategy σ0 ∈ (0, 1], she continues to use the previous round’s
strategy. Then, in the long term, her average strategy satisfies
σ¯0
mBR(σ1) =
σ1(1− 2 lnσ1)
2(2− σ1) (7.7)
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In particular, σ¯0mBR(σ1) < 12 ∀σ1 ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the result is the same as in Theorem 4.1 only that the βs are replaced by σs. Therefore,
the plot of the myopic best response function for seller auctions would look like in Figure 4.2.
Consequently, also the behavior of mutually adapting sellers is completely analogous to the case
of mutually adapting bidders. In particular, they would end up by asking infinitely much in the
case of mutual adaptation. The underlying reason is that myopic best response in both, the
seller and the bidder case, only depends on the place where the payoff function is discontinuous
but not on the specific shape of the payoff function. The updating equations – given in (4.6) and
(7.4) – have the same structure for both, the pure seller and the pure bidder case. Therefore,
myopic best response yields the same equation structure in Theorems 4.1 and 7.1.
7.3 Perfect Memory Best Response to Fixed σ1
Assume, seller 1 plays a fixed strategy σ1, then the payoff for seller 0 is given by
PO0(σ0, σ1, v0, v1) =
{
v0
σ0
− v0 if v0σ0 < v1σ1
0 if v0σ0 >
v1
σ1
.
(7.8)
In closed form, the payoff can be written as
PO0 = v0(
1
σ0
− 1)Θ(σ0v1 − σ1v0) . (7.9)
Like in the previous chapter, the best response function is found by integration over v0 and v1
and subsequent solving of the FOC.
EPO0(σ0, σ1, v1) =
1∫
0
dv0v0(
1
σ0
− 1)Θ(σ0v1
σ1
− v0) =
min(1,
σ0v1
σ1
)∫
0
dv0v0(
1
σ0
− 1) =
=
1−Θ(1−σ0v1σ1 )(1−
σ0v1
σ1
)∫
0
dv0v0(
1
σ0
− 1) = ( 1
σ0
− 1)1
2
{1−Θ(1− σ0v1
σ1
)(1− σ0v1
σ1
)}2 =
=
{
1
2 (
1
σ0
− 1) if σ1 < σ0v1
1
2 (
1
σ0
− 1)σ20v21
σ21
if σ1 > σ0v1 .
(7.10)
In closed form this can be rewritten as
EPO0(σ0, σ1, v1) =
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1){Θ(v1 − σ1
σ0
) +
σ20v
2
1
σ21
Θ(
σ1
σ0
− v1)} . (7.11)
Integration over v1 yields
EPO0(σ0, σ1) =
1∫
0
dv1
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)Θ(v1 − σ1
σ0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+
1∫
0
dv1
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)σ
2
0v
2
1
σ21
Θ(
σ1
σ0
− v1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
. (7.12)
The first integral is given as
(I) =
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)Θ(1− σ1
σ0
)
1∫
σ1
σ0
dv1 =
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)(1− σ1
σ0
)Θ(σ0 − σ1) (7.13)
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where the Θ−function in front of the integral guarantees that the value of the integral is 0 if
σ1
σ0
> 1 since then all v1 ∈ (0, 1) give no contribution due to Θ(v1− σ1σ0 ) = 0. The second integral
is given as
(II) =
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)
1−Θ(σ0−σ1)(1−σ1σ0 )∫
0
dv1
σ20v
2
1
σ21
=
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)σ
2
0
σ21
v31
3
|1−Θ(σ0−σ1)(1−
σ1
σ0
)
0 =
1
6
(
1
σ0
− 1)σ
2
0
σ21
{1−Θ(σ0 − σ1)(1− σ1
σ0
)}3 . (7.14)
Therefore the expected payoff is given by
EPO0(σ0, σ1) =
1
2
(
1
σ0
−1)(1− σ1
σ0
)Θ(σ0−σ1)+ 16(
1
σ0
−1)σ
2
0
σ21
{1−Θ(σ0−σ1)(1− σ1
σ0
)}3 . (7.15)
To solve the first order condition, ∂/∂σ0EPO0(σ0, σ1)
!= 0, I have to distinguish two cases2.
For σ0 < σ1, the expected payoff is given as
EPO0(σ0, σ1) =
1
6
(
1
σ0
− 1)(σ
2
0
σ21
) =
1
6σ21
(σ0 − σ20) (7.16)
The FOC is given by
∂
∂σ0
EPO0(σ0, σ1) =
1
6σ21
(1− 2σ0) != 0 (7.17)
with the solution
σpBR0 (σ1) =
1
2
∀σ1 ≥ 12 (7.18)
where the condition σ1 ≥ 12 is obtained by plugging the solution back into the condition σ0 < σ1.
Similarly, if σ0 > σ1 the expected payoff is given as
EPO0(σ0, σ1) =
1
2
(
1
σ0
− 1)(1− σ1
σ0
) +
1
6
(
1
σ0
− 1)σ
2
0
σ21
σ31
σ30
= · · · =
= −1
2
+
1
σ0
(
1
2
+
σ1
2
− σ1
6
)− 1
σ20
σ1
3
(7.19)
The FOC is given by
∂
∂σ0
EPO0(σ0, σ1) = − 1
σ20
(
1
2
+
σ1
3
) +
2σ1
3σ30
!= 0 (7.20)
The solution to this equation is easily determined as
σpBR0 (σ1) =
4σ1
3 + 2σ1
∀σ1 ≤ 12 (7.21)
Therefore I arrive at the following
Theorem 7.2 Consider a two seller first-price auction with linear ask strategies and vi ∼
U(0, 1). Assume that seller 1 plays a fixed strategy σ1 and seller 0 follows a perfect memory
best response strategy updating rule. Then, in the long term, her strategy is given as
σpBR0 (σ1) =
4σ1
3 + 2σ1
Θ(
1
2
− σ1) + 12Θ(σ1 −
1
2
) . (7.22)
2The symmetric case follows from continuity arguments. Alternatively I could also apply the same method-
ology as in the case of pure bidder auctions.
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Note that the structure of this equation is the same as the structure of equation (4.67) in the
bidder case: If seller 1 uses a strategy above 0.5, the best response of the opponent is 0.5 as well.
If seller 1 uses a strategy below 0.5, then the best response of the opponent is also smaller than
0.5 but above the strategy of seller 1. Therefore, the plot of the perfect memory best response
of seller 0 to seller 1 looks qualitatively like in the bidder case which is shown in Figure 4.7. The
only difference is that the left branch for strategies of seller 1 below 0.5 is higher than in the
bidder case. The underlying reason is that the shape of the payoff-function and therefore also
the shape of the expected payoff is different in the pure bidder and in the pure seller case. As
a consequence of this, since the equations for pure bidder and pure seller perfect memory best
response have qualitatively the same structure, also the discussion of the convergence properties
of pure seller auctions under truncated fictitious play and perfect memory best response are like
in the pure bidder case: Perfect memory best response slowly converges from below to the NE
whereas truncated fictitious play involves in permanent strategy fluctuations around a mean
below the NE.
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Chapter 8
Best Response in Double
Auctions
8.1 Double Auctions with Linear Bidding Strategies
In this chapter I consider a repeated double auction with one bidder and one seller. Private
values for both, the bidder and the seller, are drawn in each round independently from a uniform
random distribution, vi ∼ U(0, 1). Let the bidder with private value v0 bid b0(v0) and let the
seller with value v1 ask s1(v1). If b0(v0) > s1(v1), the price is set at
p =
1
2
(b0(v0) + s1(v1)) . (8.1)
The bidder then obtains a payoff of
PO0(v0, b0(v0), s1(v1)) = v0 − p (8.2)
whereas the seller obtains a payoff of
PO1(v1, s1(v1), b0(v0)) = p− v1 (8.3)
If b0(v0) < s1(v1), no trade takes place and both participants obtain zero payoff.
This setup corresponds to bargaining under incomplete information. It serves, e.g., as a model
for union negotiations which may result in a compromise (a trade) or a strike (no trade takes
place). It has first been investigated in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).
In the first section I consider the case of linear bidding strategies. Bidder 0 decides on her
strategy β0 ∈ [0, 1] and offers for value v0 the bid b0(v0) = β0v0 where β0 is the same for all v0.
Analogously, the seller demands for value v1 the ask v1/σ1 with σ1 ∈ [0, 1]. This section shows
that perfect memory best response with linear bidding strategies yields a dominant strategy
pair (β∗0(σ1) =
2
3 , σ
∗
1(β0) =
3
4 ). This means that no matter what the opponent does, it is always
optimal to play the strategy 23 for the bidder and
3
4 for the seller. Note that this leaves exactly
the same expected payoff for the bidder and the seller: For values v0 resp. v1, the bidders payoff
is
PO0(v0) = v0 − 23v0 =
v0
3
(8.4)
and the sellers payoff is
PO1(v1) =
4
3
v1 − v1 = v13 . (8.5)
Since values come from the same distribution, their expected payoff is equal.
In conclusion, a double auction under perfect memory best response comes to a remarkably
robust equilibrium if the participants are confined to linear bidding strategies. Moreover, the
expected gains from trade are split in this equilibrium equally between the seller and the bidder.
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Though these insights are quite interesting, the model in this section suffers a fundamental flaw:
The considered linear strategy space does not entail the NE of a double auction. Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) have shown that double auctions with uniform value distributions and one
participating bidder and seller each have affine NE bidding functions b0(v0) = α0 + β0v0 and
s1(v1) = α1 + v1σ1 respectively. Therefore, the restriction to linear strategies is not innocuous
anymore – even not near the NE. In the next section I will outline how to investigate this more
complex case of affine bidding functions with four free parameters.
However, this section about linear strategies is not in vain: It gives additional opportunity to
practice the mathematical methods. And – maybe more important – it gives additional data
points to gauge the correctness of simulation results in the later chapters of this thesis.
8.1.1 Myopic Best Response
Bidder Response
The myopic best response function for bidder 0 is given as
βnew0 (σ1, v0, v1, β
old
0 ) =
{
v1
σ1v0
if v1σ1v0 < 1
βold0 if
v1
σ1v0
> 1
(8.6)
which can be written in closed form by means of the Θ-function as
βnew0 (σ1, v0, v1, β
old
0 ) =
v1
σ1v0
Θ(σ1v0 − v1) + βold0 Θ(v1 − σ1v0) . (8.7)
Integration over v1 yields the average strategy of bidder 0 in dependence of her own value v0,
β¯new0 (σ1, v0, β
old
0 ) =
1∫
0
dv1β
new
0 (σ1, v0, v1, β
old
0 ) =
v21
2σ1v0
|σ1v00 +βold0 v1 |1σ1v0=
=
σ1v0
2
+ βold0 (1− σ1v0) . (8.8)
Subsequent integration over v0 yields
β¯new0 (σ1, β
old
0 ) =
∫ 1
0
dv0{σ1v02 + β
old
0 (1− σ1v0)} =
σ1v
2
0
4
+ βold0 v0 − βold0 σ1
v20
2
|10=
=
σ1
4
+ βold0 − βold0
σ1
2
(8.9)
On average the relation β¯0
new = β¯0
old != β¯0
mBR must hold and by solving for β¯0
mBR, the myopic
best response of the bidder must satisfy the equation
β¯0
mBR =
σ1
4
+ β¯0
mBR − β¯0mBRσ12 (8.10)
with the unique solution
β¯0
mBR =
1
2
. (8.11)
So I arrive at the following
Theorem 8.1 Consider a repeated single-unit double auction with one bidder and one seller,
linear strategies and vi ∼ U(0, 1). If a trade occurs, the price is set in the middle of bid and
ask. Then, in the long term, the average myopic best response function of the bidder is given
by
β¯0
mBR(σ1) =
1
2
∀σ1 (8.12)
Note in particular that the average myopic best response function of the bidder does not depend
on the strategy of the seller.
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Seller Response
Analogously to the bidder case, the myopic best response function of the seller is given in a
closed form as
σnew1 (β0, v1, v0, σ
old
1 ) =
v1
β0v0
Θ(β0v0 − v1) + σold1 Θ(v1 − β0v0) (8.13)
Integration over v1 yields
σ¯new1 (β0, v0, σ
old
1 ) =
v21
2β0v0
|β0v00 +σold1 (1− β0v0) =
β0v0
2
+ σold1 (1− β0v0) (8.14)
By double integration over v0 and v1 and denoting σ¯1new = σ¯1old
!= σ¯1mBR I arrive at
σ¯1
mBR =
β0
4
+ σ¯1mBR − β0σ¯1
mBR
2
(8.15)
with the solution
σ¯1
mBR =
1
2
(8.16)
So I arrive at
Theorem 8.2 Consider a repeated single-unit double auction with one bidder and one seller,
linear strategies and vi ∼ U(0, 1). Then, in the long term, the average myopic best response
function of the seller is given by
σ¯1
mBR(β0) =
1
2
∀β0 . (8.17)
Note in particular the average myopic best response function of the seller does not depend on
the strategy of the bidder.
Note that (β = 1/2, σ = 1/2) is not a dominant strategy pair. Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 describe
the average strategy of the bidder and the seller, however under myopic best response, strategies
constantly fluctuate around the mean and never settle down because the participants react to
every new information.
8.1.2 Perfect Memory Best Response
Bidder Response
Bidder 0s payoff is given as
PO0(β0, σ1, v0, v1) =
{
0 for β0v0 < v1σ1
v0 − β0v0+
v1
σ1
2 for β0v0 >
v1
σ1
.
(8.18)
So the payoff can be written in a closed form as
PO0(β0, σ1, v0, v1) = {v0 −
β0v0 + v1σ1
2
}Θ(β0v0σ1 − v1) . (8.19)
Integration over v1 yields
EPO0(β0, σ1, v0) =
β0v0σ1∫
0
dv1(v0 − β0v02 −
v1
2σ1
) (8.20)
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since β0v0σ1 < 1. Evaluation of the integral yields
EPO0(β0, σ1, v0) = v0v1 − β0v0v12 −
v21
4σ1
|β0v0σ10 =
= v20β0σ1 −
β20v
2
0σ1
2
− β
2
0v
2
0σ
2
1
4σ1
= v20β0σ1 −
3β20v
2
0σ1
4
. (8.21)
Subsequent integration over v0 yields
EPO0(β0, σ1) =
v30
3
β0σ1 − 3β
2
0v
3
0σ1
12
|10=
β0σ1
3
− β
2
0σ1
4
. (8.22)
Taking the FOC
∂
∂β0
EPO0(β0, σ1) =
σ1
3
− 2β0σ1
4
!= 0 (8.23)
yields the best response function
βpBR0 (σ1) =
2
3
. (8.24)
So we arrive at the following
Theorem 8.3 Consider a repeated single-unit double auction with one bidder and one seller,
linear strategies and vi ∼ U(0, 1). If a trade occurs, the price is set in the middle of bid and
ask. Then the perfect memory best response function of the bidder is given by
βpBR0 (σ1) =
2
3
∀σ1 . (8.25)
Note in particular that the perfect memory best response function of the bidder does not depend
on the strategy of the seller, so it is a dominant strategy.
Seller Response
The payoff for the seller is given by
PO1(σ1, β0, v1, v0) =
{
0 for β0v0 < v1σ1
β0v0+
v1
σ1
2 for β0v0 >
v1
σ1
.
(8.26)
Therefore
PO1(σ1, β0, v1, v0) = {
β0v0 + v1σ1
2
− v1}Θ(β0v0σ1 − v1) . (8.27)
Integration over v1 yields
EPO1(σ1, β0, v0) =
β0v0σ1∫
0
dv1(
β0v0
2
+
v1
2σ1
− v1) = β0v0v12 +
v21
4σ1
− v
2
1
2
|β0v0σ10 =
=
β20v
2
0σ1
2
+
β20v
2
0σ1
4
− β
2
0v
2
0σ
2
1
2
=
3β20v
2
0σ1
4
− β
2
0v
2
0σ
2
1
2
. (8.28)
Subsequent integration over v0 yields
EPO1(σ1, β0) =
1∫
0
dv0EPO1(σ1, β0, v0) =
β20σ1
4
− β
2
0σ
2
1
6
. (8.29)
Solving the FOC
∂
∂σ1
EPO1(σ1, β0) =
β20
4
− σ1β
2
0
3
!= 0 (8.30)
yields the following
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Theorem 8.4 Consider a repeated single-unit double auction with one bidder and one seller,
linear strategies and vi ∼ U(0, 1). If a trade occurs, the price is set in the middle of bid and
ask. Then the perfect memory best response function of the seller is given by
σpBR1 (β0) =
3
4
∀β0 . (8.31)
Note in particular that the perfect memory best response of the seller does not depend on the
strategy of the bidder, so it is a dominant strategy.
8.2 Outlook to Future Research: Dynamics in Repeated
DAs with Affine Bidding Strategies
As noted in the previous section, in their seminal paper on double auctions, Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) consider a very simple double auction: One bidder and one seller face each
other, each with private value ∼ U(0, 1). The price is set exactly in the middle of bid and ask.1
The authors interpret this setup as a toy-model for union negotiations and their breakdown
such as strikes or work stoppages.
The authors derive the Nash Equilibrium solutions as affine functions of the form
b0(v0) = α0 + β0v0 (8.32)
s1(v1) = α1 +
v1
σ1
(8.33)
with
α0 =
1
12
; α1 =
1
4
; β0 =
2
3
; σ1 =
3
2
. (8.34)
In this section I want to investigate wether best response bidders in repeated double auctions
have any chance to find this NE under best response dynamics. In other words, I check whether
the NE is attracting, repelling or is a saddle point with respect to the phase space dynamics
that arises form best response play. Therefore I extend the methodology that I derived in the
previous chapters. The analysis is tedious: Instead of 2 free parameters β0, β1, respectively
σ0, σ1, I consider now four free parameters α0, α1, β0, σ1. Like in the case of first-price auc-
tions, I derive the expected bidder payoff EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) and the expected seller payoff
EPO1(α0, β0, α1, σ1). Then I use the first order conditions
∂
∂α0
EPO0
!= 0 ∂∂β0EPO0
!= 0
∂
∂α1
EPO1
!= 0 ∂∂σ1EPO1
!= 0
to derive the best response functions of the bidder and the seller.
The necessary calculations involve some nasty expressions. I will in the worst cases refrain
from replicating such formula-monsters which provide no intuitive insights. Instead I will focus
on the logic of the derivation. I did the calculations in Mathematica and the notebooks are
obtainable upon request.
Note that in this section – like in the case of first-price auctions – I again restrict the agents
to the minimal functional space that entails the NE. This is motivated by the assumption that
sufficiently close to the NE I can closely approximate the true non-linear best response functions
by affine ones. By applying this methodology I show that the NE is not attracting. Moreover
I discover distinct phase space regions where the parameters are coupled via different sets of
equations. Since the other regions are not near the NE anymore, I probably can not accurately
describe them by affine functions anymore. The unrestricted adaptation dynamics of non-linear
best response functions might be richer than indicated in this section where I look only at affine
strategies.
1Actually, the authors investigate broader classes of double auctions with different price setting mechanisms
k and more general value distributions f(v). Their focus is on the comparative statics of the NE in dependence
of k and f(v). However, one of their examples is this particular setup.
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The remarkable result in this section is that I find NE-repelling dynamics in double auctions
even under perfect memory best response. This is in stark contrast to perfect memory best
response in single sided 1PAs where players converged to the NE at least in infinite time. The
observation that even perfect memory play does not converge to the NE in double auctions
raises serious doubts on the efficiency of standard double auction mechanisms in the economy.
In particular, it has drastic implications not only in repeated settings but also if we think about
strategic sophistication in one-shot auctions where participants play the best response to the
best response of their opponent to ... to their prior beliefs. If the participants are not completely
sure that their opponent plays in the NE, they will in general play off-NE as a best response.
If they are however strategically sophisticated, they will play the best response against the
opponent’s best response to this off-NE play. The results of this section show that she then
is even further away from the NE than by just playing the best response against her believe
about the opponent’s play. So, instead of convergence to the NE by increasing the iterations of
strategic sophistication, bidders who have any initial doubt on the rationality of her opponent
or on the quality of information that she possesses are led away from the NE. And they are led
away the further, the more sophisticated we assume them. Even more persistent than in the
case of single sided auctions I conjecture therefore that double auctions with weakly dominant
strategies like the one suggested in McAfee (1992) could significantly reduce risk in the real
economy.
In this thesis my focus is on single-sided auctions and linear bidding strategies. The extension
of my research to the rigorous mathematical analysis and simulation of double auctions with
non-linear bidding functions is something I want to pursue in more detail in the future when I
have obtained my PhD.
8.2.1 Expected Payoffs under Perfect Memory Play
I assume affine bidding- and asking functions of the form
b0(v0) = α0 + β0v0 , (8.35)
s1(v1) = α1 +
v1
σ1
. (8.36)
A trade is only made if b0(v0) > s1(v1)⇔ α0+β0v0−α1− v1σ1 > 0⇔ v1 < α0σ1+β0σ1v0−α1σ1.
The price is then given as
1
2
(b0(v0) + s1(v1)) =
1
2
(α0 + β0v0 + α1 +
v1
σ1
) . (8.37)
The bidder’s payoff is v0− p if a trade is made and 0 otherwise. In closed form it can therefore
be written as
PO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1, v0, v1) = (v0 − p)Θ(b0(v0)− s1(v1)) =
= (v0 − 12(α0 + β0v0 + α1 +
v1
σ1
))Θ(α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1 − v1) . (8.38)
The expected bidder payoff for v0, v1 ∼ U(0, 1) is given by integrating the payoff over all possible
value combinations,
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) =
1∫
0
dv0
1∫
0
dv1PO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1, v0, v1) . (8.39)
The problem is now to determine the correct integration borders since the values that provide
a positive contribution to the integral are restricted by the Θ-function and by the integration
borders.
The expected payoff of bidder 0 in dependence on v0 is given as
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1, v0) =
1∫
0
dv1(v0 − p)Θ(α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1 − v1) . (8.40)
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For later reference I define here the expression E1 as
E1 := α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1 . (8.41)
The integrand in the integral for EPO0 gives a positive contribution only if
0 ≤ v1 ≤ 1
v1 ≤ E1
(8.42)
Therefore v1 has to be smaller than min(1, E1). However, if E1 ≤ 0, the expected payoff is
not negative but 0. Therefore I multiply with the expression Θ(E1) that guarantees that the
expected payoff if zero for E1 < 0. This simplifies equation (8.40) to
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1, v0) = Θ(E1)
min(1,E1)∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) . (8.43)
The expected payoff in dependence only of the parameters is then obtained by integration over
v0 as
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) =
1∫
0
dv0Θ(E1)
min(1,E1)∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) . (8.44)
Rewriting Θ(E1) as
Θ(E1) = Θ(α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1) = Θ(v0 − α1 − α0
β0
) (8.45)
shows that the integrand takes on non-zero values only for v0 > α1−α0β0 and the integral is 0 if
α1−α0
β0
> 1. Therefore I obtain a closed form solution for the expected payoff as
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) = Θ(1− α1 − α0
β0
)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
min(1,E1)∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) =
= Θ(α0 + β0 − α1)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
min(1,E1)∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) . (8.46)
Completely analogously I obtain for the expected seller payoff
EPO1(α0, β0, α1, σ1) = Θ(α0 + β0 − α1)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
min(1,E1)∫
0
dv1(p− v1) (8.47)
The value of the expected payoff for both, bidder and seller, depends critically on the value of
E1 because the upper border of the integral over E1 is given by min(1, E1). Therefore, I have
to distinguish three regions of the four-dimensional phase space (α0, β0, α1, σ1), depending on
the value of E1 = α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1:
Case 1: E1 ≤ 1 ∀v0 ∈ (0, 1)
Case 2: E1 ≥ 1 ∀v0 ∈ (0, 1)
Case 3: E1 < 1 for some v0 ∈ (0, 1) and E1 > 1 for some v0 ∈ (0, 1)
(8.48)
In the following I treat the three cases one by one.
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8.2.2 The NE Region
Starting with case 1, a sufficient and necessary condition for E1 = α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1 ≤ 1
∀v0 ∈ (0, 1) is that the condition is satisfied for v0 = 1 since v0 < 1 gives an even lower value
of E1. Therefore the condition E1 ≤ 1 reduces to
α0σ1 + β0σ1 − α1σ1 ≤ 1 . (8.49)
For later reference I denote this value-independent expression on the left side of the equation
as E2:
E2
!= α0σ1 + β0σ1 − α1σ1 (8.50)
Note that the NE derived by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) lies in the region E2 ≤ 1 because
1
12
3
2
+
2
3
3
2
− 1
4
3
2
=
3
4
< 1 (8.51)
In this region min(E1, 1) = E1 ∀v0 and therefore the expected bidder payoff is given as
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) = Θ(α0 + β0 − α1)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
E1∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) =
= −Θ(α0 + β0 − α1) σ112β20
{(α0 − α1 + β0)2(β0(3β0 − 4) + α1(3β0 − 2) + α0(3β0 + 2))} . (8.52)
Note that the term Θ(α0+β0−α1) simply says that the expected payoff is 0 if the parameters
are such that a trade can never happen. If α1 > α0 + β0, then, even for the extreme value
combination v0 = 1, v1 = 0, no trade would happen because the amount that the seller asks
is more than the bidder is willing to give. Surely then, also for all other value combinations,
no trade would happen since they would lead the bidder to bid even less and the seller to ask
more.
In completely the same way, the seller payoff in this phase space regions is obtained as
EPO1(α0, β0, α1, σ1) = Θ(α0 + β0 − α1)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
E1∫
0
dv1(p− v1) =
= −Θ(α0 + β0 − α1) σ112β0 {(α0 + β0 − α1)
2(β0(2σ1 − 3) + α0(2σ1 − 3)− α1(2σ1 + 3))} . (8.53)
Of course, the same closed-form solutions for the expected payoff of the bidder and the seller
could have also been obtained by integrating first over v0 and in the second step over v1.
However, the choice of the appropriate integration borders has to be adapted. I have calculated
the expected payoff with reversed order of integration in a Mathematica-Notebook that can be
obtained from me.
The best response parameter settings are – like in the case of first-price auctions – obtained
by solving the FOCs for the bidder and the seller. The bidder chooses her parameters (α0, β0)
such as to maximize EPO0 whereas the seller chooses (α1, σ1) to maximize EPO1. For the
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linear parameters α0, α1, I get two solutions each, for σ1 I get a unique solution:
∂
∂α0
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1)
!= 0⇒
α
(1)
0 (β0, α1, σ1) = α1 − β0
α
(2)
0 (β0, α1, σ1) =
β0(2− 3β0) + α1(2− β0)
2 + 3β0
,
∂
∂α1
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1)
!= 0⇒
α
(1)
1 (α0, β0, σ1) = α0 + β0
α
(2)
1 (α0, β0, σ1) =
(α0 + β0)(2σ1 − 1)
3 + 2σ1
,
∂
∂σ1
EPO1(α0, β0, σ1)
!= 0⇒
σ1(α0, β0, α1) =
3(α0 + α1 + β0)
4(α0 − α1 + β0) .
(8.54)
For β0(α0, α1, σ1), Mathematica gives four solutions. One solution, β
(1)
0 = α1−α0, is the mirror
image of the first set of solutions for α(1)0 and α
(1)
1 . The three other solutions are in general
given by complex numbers. However, one of the solutions has the nice feature that in the NE
and in a region around the NE, the imaginary part of that solution is equal to 0. Since the
parameters have to be real-valued numbers, this is the apt solution to approximate the behavior
of bidders around the NE.2 The other two complex solutions have a non-vanishing imaginary
part in this region.
I refrain here from explicitly writing the solution because this would need about one page and
doesn’t provide any interesting insights. The Mathematica Notebook with the explicit solution
for β0 can of course be obtained from the author.
So, there exist two sets of solutions that describe the parameter evolution of bidder and seller
around the NE. The first set of solutions consists of the equations
α0(α1, β0, σ1) = α1 − β0
β0(α0, α1, σ1) = α1 − α0
α1(α0, β0, σ1) = α0 + β0
σ1(α0, β0, α1) =
3(α0 + α1 + β0)
4(α0 − α1 + β0) .
(8.55)
Parameter substitution of α1 in the last equation yields
σ1(α0, β0, α1) =
3(α0 + α0 + β0 + β0)
4(α0 − α0 − β0 + β0) = ”∞” . (8.56)
So the seller asks in this scenario a value-independent reserve price of α1 = α0+ β03. Since the
bid is always smaller than the ask,
b0(v0) = α0 + β0v0 < α0 + β0 = α1 = s1(v1) ∀v0 ∈ (0, 1) , (8.57)
this is not a NE. A unilateral increase of α0 or β0 by the bidder or a decrease of α1 by the seller
would increase the revenue of both participants. Therefore, this set of solution minimizes the
expected payoff of both participants as opposed to the NE strategy combination that would
locally maximize it.
Note that the formula for the EPO0 and EPO1 correctly predicts zero expected payoff in this
phase space region because of the multiplicative term Θ(α0 + β0 − α1).
2I have to assess in the future wether the imaginary part really vanishes in all of the phase-space region with
E1 ≤ 1. But for all the parameter combinations that I tried out, it did vanish.
3Since the term v1
σ1
vanishes for σ1 →∞.
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The more interesting case is the second set of solutions which entails the Chatterjee and Samuel-
son (1983)- NE.
α0(α1, β0, σ1) =
β0(2− 3β0) + α1(2− β0)
2 + 3β0
β0(α0, α1, σ1) = [ A very nasty expression (see Mathematica) ]
α1(α0, β0, σ1) =
(α0 + β0)(2σ1 − 1)
3 + 2σ1
σ1(α0, β0, α1) =
3(α0 + α1 + β0)
4(α0 − α1 + β0) .
(8.58)
The solution to this system of equations is the NE derived in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983),
{α∗0, β∗0 , α∗1, σ∗1} = {
1
12
,
2
3
,
1
4
,
3
2
} , (8.59)
since
α0(β∗0 , α
∗
1, σ
∗
1) =
2
3 (2− 2) + 14 (2− 23 )
2 + 2
=
1
4
4
3
4
=
1
12
β0(α∗0, α
∗
1, σ
∗
1) = [See Mathematica Notebook] =
2
3
α1(α∗0, β
∗
0 , σ
∗
1) =
( 112 +
2
3 )(2 · 32 − 1)
3 + 3
=
3
4 · 2
6
=
1
4
σ1(α∗0, β
∗
0 , α
∗
1) =
3( 112 +
1
4 +
2
3 )
4( 112 − 14 + 23 )
=
3 · 1
4 · 12
=
3
2
.
(8.60)
These is exactly the parameter combination that is derived in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)
for the NE. In the following section I will investigate the phase space dynamics around the NE.
8.2.3 Dynamics around the NE
In the following I use the set of equations (8.58) to investigate the phase space dynamics around
the Nash Equilibrium. In particular I am interested wether the NE is attracting, repelling or
wether it shows saddle point behavior. For this I consider what happens if bidders repeatedly
adapt their parameters to the parameters of their opponents.
From an interpretational point of view I am describing here the long term dynamics of repeated
double auctions or repeated bargaining situations under truncated fictitious play: I describe
bidders and sellers who stick to their strategies for sufficiently many rounds that the opponent
can accurately assess them.4 After this time, both opponents simultaneously update their
strategies according to the set of equations (8.58). In particular, I am interested wether this
dynamics leads bidders from near the NE into the NE or away from it, i.e., I am interested
whether the NE is attracting or repelling.
As a first assessment of the system’s behavior, I computed the table of comparative statics
around the NE: Table 8.1 shows the direction of change of the row-parameter if the column-
parameter is increased and the other parameters are set to their NE values. A plus means that
an increase in the column-parameter induces an increase in the row-parameter, a minus means
that an increase in the column-parameter induces a decrease in the row-parameter.
The comparative static results are quite intuitive:
Looking at the first column, an increase in the reservation price α0 allows the bidder to decrease
her linear component β0. However, it allows the seller to ask more by increasing α1 or reducing
σ1.5
The analogous reasoning holds for β0. Note that the mutual negative feedback between α0
and β0 induces a vicious cycle between α0 and β0: Increasing β0 decreases α0 which in turn
increases β0 again. Therefore the NE is unstable.
4This is the same situation as for truncated fictitious play in the case of 1PAs.
5Remember that the seller strategy was given by α1 +
v1
σ1
, so an decrease in σ means that the seller asks
more.
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α0 β0 α1 σ1
α0 + - + 0
β0 - + + 0
α1 + + + +
σ1 - - + +
Table 8.1: Comparative Statics around the NE Region in a Double Auction
An increase in the sellers minimum ask α1 forces the bidder to bid more on average and hence
to increase α0 and/or β0. On the other hand, it allows the seller to reduce her average ask by
increasing σ1.
Intuitively it is also clear that an increase in σ1 leads to an increase in α1. However, it is
not obvious to me, why the bidder parameters α0 and β0 do not depend directly on the linear
strategy parameter σ1 of the seller. α0 and β0 depend on σ1 only indirectly via α1. This means
that a change in σ1 has an impact on α0 and β0 only two rounds later. To find a plausible
interpretation of this remains a task for future research.
To get a more detailed understanding of the dynamics I wrote a small program in Mathematica.
The program can be obtained from the author. The program flow is as follows:
• Start with an initial configuration (αStart0 , αStart1 , βStart0 , σStart1 ) near the NE
• Calculate the next round’s strategy parameter values as the perfect memory best response
to the old round’s strategies. The according formulas are given in (8.58)
• Repeat this procedure; record and plot the values of the parameters over time
• In each time step also check that the system stays in the appropriate parameter range.
First, I have to control that the imaginary part of β0 is 0, =(β0) != 0. This guarantees
that the strategies don’t get complex. Second, take care that the system doesn’t leave the
appropriate region of the parameter space that I used for deriving the expected payoff:
E2 = α0σ1 + β0σ1 − α1σ1
!≤ 1 6
I started with an initial configuration {α0 = α∗0 +0.0001, β∗0 , α∗1, σ∗1) near the NE. Slight devia-
tions of other parameter values yield qualitatively the same results. Figure 8.1 shows that the
NE is not stable. A small initial perturbation is of little effect in the first few rounds and the
system initially stays near the NE. However, approximately around round 10, the parameters
begin to oscillate visibly. The oscillations increase ever more until in round 22, the system
leaves the phase space region with E2 ≤ 1.
Of course, the mathematically exact way to proof that the NE is not stable would be to analyze
the Eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the set of equations (8.58). This is a topic for further re-
search. For me the results that I obtained by the simulation with Mathematica seem sufficient
for the following
Conjecture 8.1 The NE that Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) derived for double auctions is
repelling. Even under perfect memory best response dynamics the players will never move to
the NE. Instead, once they have left the NE they will be pushed even further away.
The phase space dynamics drives the system from the parameter region that entails the NE
into the other parameter regions that I denoted by Case 2 and Case 3. In the following section
I shortly investigate these phase space regions.
8.2.4 Phase Space Regions off the NE
The NE region was described by the condition E1 = α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1 ≤ 1.
In region 2 I consider the part of the phase space where E1 ≥ 1. The condition can be written
out as
E1 = α0σ1 + β0v0σ1 − α1σ1 ≥ 1 ∀v0 ∈ (0, 1) . (8.61)
6In general, in all initial parameter constellations that I investigated, the first time that =(β0) 6= 0 is after the
first time that E2 ≥ 1. This suggests, that we can ignore the control for =(β0) because this is always satisfied
in the phase space region E2 ≤ 1. However, a proof of this hypothesis is a topic for further research.
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Figure 8.1: Parameter Evolution in Double Auctions Near the NE
Since β0v0σ1 > 0, a sufficient condition for this is
α0σ1 − α1σ1 ≥ 1 . (8.62)
Then, min(1, E1) = 1 and equations (8.52) and (8.53) for the expected payoffs reduce to
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) = Θ(α0 + β0 − α1)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
1∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) =
= − 1
2β20σ1
{(α0 + β0 − α1)(2(α0 − α1)σ1 + β20 + β0(1 + (α0 + 3α1 − 2)σ1))} (8.63)
and
EPO1(α0, β0, α1, σ1) = Θ(α0 + β0 − α1)
1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
1∫
0
dv1(p− v1) =
=
1
4β0σ1
{(α0 + β0 − α1)(1 + (α0 + β0 + 3α1 − 2)σ1)} . (8.64)
Note that the Θ-function is always one since
E1 ≥ 1⇔ α0 + β0 − α1 ≥ 1
σ1
≥ 0. (8.65)
Solving the FOCs yields the equations
α0 = −β0 + β
2
0 − 4α1σ1 + 2α1β0σ1 + β20σ1
2(2 + β0)σ1
α1 = −1− 2σ1 − 2α0σ1 − 2β0σ16σ1
σ1 = − 2
α0 + 3α1 − β0 − 2
(8.66)
Again, for β0 there are three solutions, where only one of them is real.
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Region 3 has the condition E1 = 1 for some v˜0 ∈ (0, 1). This condition can be rewritten as a
condition on the parameters:
α0σ1 + β0v˜0σ1 − α1σ1 = 1⇔
⇔ v˜0 = 1
β0σ1
+
α1
β0
− α0
β0
∈ (0, 1) (8.67)
Therefore, E1 < 1 iff v0 < 1β0σ1 +
α1
β0
− α0β0 and E1 > 1 iff v0 > 1β0σ1 + α1β0 − α0β0 . Accordingly,
the expected payoffs are given as
EPO0(α0, β0, α1, σ1) =
= Θ(α0 + β0 − α1){
α1−α0
β0
+ 1β0σ1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
E1∫
0
dv1(v0 − p) +
1∫
α1−α0
β0
+ 1β0σ1
dv0
1∫
0
dv1(v0 − p)} (8.68)
and
EPO1(α0, β0, α1, σ1) =
= Θ(α0 + β0 − α1){
α1−α0
β0
+ 1β0σ1∫
α1−α0
β0
dv0
E1∫
0
dv1(p− v1) +
1∫
α1−α0
β0
+ 1β0σ1
dv0
1∫
0
dv1(p− v1)} (8.69)
The FOCs yield
α0 =
2 + 4α1σ1 + β0(−1− 2(α1 + β0)σ1)
2(2 + β0)σ1
α1 =
−3 + 2(1 + α0 + β0)σ1
6σ1
σ1 =
6
4 + 3α0 − 9α1 + 3β0
(8.70)
Like in the other two phase space regions, there again exist three solutions for β0 that can be
in general complex but where one of them seems to be real in the whole region. The dynamic
assessment of this phase space region via simulations suggests that this phase space region is
left within one round after it is entered.
In conclusion this section suggest that the mathematical formalism that I developed for the
analysis of perfect memory best response in 1PAs is a promising route for further research on
more general auction setups. Of course, the analysis in this section is not comprehensive: I
derived some times only sufficient but not necessary conditions for the determination of the
different phase-space regions. This means that there are some parts of the phase-space that
I didn’t analyze yet. Moreover, also for the regions that I investigated much remains to be
done – like a rigorous proof that always the same solution of β0 is real within a given region
or an intuitive explanation why the solutions for β0 are so much more complicated than the
respective equations for the other parameters.
The switching of the phase space dynamics between the different regions and thereby a compre-
hensive description of the – probably chaotic – behavior of mutually adapting players in double
auctions under truncated fictitious play with sufficient long time between the updatings remains
a topic for future research. In this chapter I just wanted to line out some of the possibilities
that the methodology of perfect memory best response provides and to show that the NE that
was derived in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) is repelling.
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Chapter 9
The Auction Simulator
9.1 Motivation for Simulation
As noted in the introduction, the idea of simulating auctions is not new, see e.g., Andreoni
and Miller (1995), Dawid (1999) or Byde (2002). Still, there are various reasons why I devel-
oped my own computational auction simulation, the Auction Simulator(AS), in parallel to the
mathematical models about bounded rational behavior in auctions:
• First of all, the development of the simulation provided guidance in identifying the driving
forces of bounded rational bidding in 1POBAs. It forced me to think through the various
decisions that bounded rational bidders face. Therefore, the model gave significant help
in structuring the analysis and the proofs in the mathematical part of the thesis.
• Even if several people have worked through mathematical proofs, this is still not a guar-
antee that they have no flaws. Therefore it is of great help to be able to double-check the
quantitative predictions from the pertinent theorems against a computational model.
• Conversely, the mathematics also provides a quality check for the computer program. It
is thereby easier to guarantee a bug-free program. As I will show, the Auction Simulator
correctly reproduces most predictions of the mathematical analysis. Therefore, it is a
good starting place to investigate learning in more general auction setups in the same
conceptual framework that are mathematically nasty or simply too complicated for a
closed-form solution.
Because of all these reasons I programmed the Auction Simulator. At the current stage, the
program can simulate single-unit open-bid double-auctions under best response and payoff-
exponential quantal response dynamics with myopic, incomplete and perfect memory. The
strategy set is at the current stage restricted to linear ones. By setting appropriate parameters,
pure bidder or seller first-, second- or higher-price auctions can be simulated. The AS can deal
with an arbitrary number of participants and with a wide range of random value distributions.
In most simulations I investigated single sided auctions.1 The simulation of double auctions
with the AS, is at the current stage not very insightful since, as discussed above, the NE in
double auctions is not given by linear bidding strategies.2 Still, the program is designed to be
easily extendable to the simulation of double auctions in the future.
9.2 Program Architecture
The AS is programmed in SWARM. SWARM is an object oriented programming language
that was designed at the Santa Fe Institute. In principle it is a library of Objective C and
1In fact, the AS always simulates double auctions. However, by choosing fixed values and /or strategies for
one side of the market this reduces effectively to the simulation of single sided auctions. I will say more on this
in the next chapter.
2Compare the chapter about Double Auctions.
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Java routines. It is published under the open GNU license and is freely downloadable from
http://wiki.swarm.org. It runs under Linux, Windows, Apple and Unix operating systems and
guarantees the transferability of code among different platforms.
SWARM has an active user community that is organized in several newsgroups. Questions on
programming technicalities are usually answered within few hours. A variety of tutorials are
available which provide also complete programming newbies with the skills to write their first
applications.
The power of SWARM is that it provides a number of routines for facilitating common tasks
in agent based modeling (ABM) while still allowing for all the flexibility of the underlying pro-
gramming languages Objective C and Java. The term agent based models defines computer
models that are built ”bottom-up”. The programmer puts considerable effort into defining how
one single agent reacts to her environment. After, a multitude of agents are put together and
the model calculates the emergent properties of the system: Each agent’s behavior influences
the other agents’ reactions which in turn influence the behavior of the agent again.
A dummy model of such a system is an ant colony. Even if the individual ant shows very little
intelligence and mainly reacts to the pheromone trails of other ants, the ant colony at a collec-
tive level shows intelligence in identifying the shortest ways to food resources and coordinating
the ants on these paths.
Another example would be financial market models – as discussed in the third chapter – where
traders with heterogeneous technical trading strategies interact in a common market. The trad-
ing strategies influence supply and demand of the investors. This influences the price which in
turn influences again the trading strategies of the investors.
Several famous models have been (re)built in SWARM. As a prominent example, the Santa
Fe Artificial Stock Market (SFASM) - though originally developed in plain Objective C - has
been ported to SWARM and extended by several types of investors, including investors that
are modeled via neural networks. The extension of the SFASM by new features is an on-
going effort. The latest SWARM implementation of the SFASM is downloadable, e.g., from
http://sourceforge.net/projects/artstkmkt. Luna and Stefansson (2000) collect articles on eco-
nomic simulations that were implemented in SWARM. For a recension of that book and of
the discussed models see http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/4/2/reviews/johnson.html. For a book
that focuses more on the building of simulations than on the economic intuitions behind them
see Luna and Perrone (2002). A comprehensive overview of books and articles that deal with
SWARM simulations can be found at http://www.swarm.org/pubs.html.
Figure 9.1 schematically shows the program architecture of the AS. The parts have the following
Figure 9.1: Program Structure of the Auction Simulator
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purposes:
ObserverSwarm: This object allows the real-time observation of simulation runs. The Ob-
serverSwarm manages graphical output in windows that show online the time series of bidder
and seller strategies, time series of prices and payoffs as well as the histograms of strategies.
ExperSwarm: This object governs the writing of simulation results to files for further evalu-
ation with statistical programs.
exper.setup: This file determines simulation technicalities like ranges and step sizes of para-
meter values or random seeds.
ModelSwarm: This object governs the simulation flow as described in the next section. The
ModelSwarm holds lists with competing sellers and bidders and manages the assignment of
payoffs to strategies under various auction formats. The allocation of payoffs will be explained
below.
model.setup: This file determines the auction format used in the simulation, the number of
buyers and sellers and the random seed for real-time observation.
Bidder resp. Seller: These objects represent the individuals that participate in the auction.
In particular, each bidder possesses a list of strategies that are updated according to best re-
sponse or quantal response via Fixed Strategies (FSs) or Genetic Algorithms (GAs). For details
on the updating mechanism see below.
bidder.setup resp. seller.setup: This file determines the details of the simulation of learning
like the number of strategies, wether FSs or GAs are used, the memoryStrength, etc.
BidderStrategy resp. SellerStrategy: These objects hold the constant, linear and square
parameters for each strategy.3
bStrat.setup resp. sStrat.setup: These files determine wether constant, linear and quadratic
terms are included in the strategies.
bStratElement resp. sStratElement: These objects hold the values of the strategy parame-
ters.
9.3 Main Aspects of the Program
9.3.1 Simulation Flow
The program simulates an arbitrary number of bidders, numBidders and sellers, numSellers.
Each participant i has access to a private set of numStrategies strategies. Strategies are
real numbers βi for bidders resp. σi for sellers. Each player chooses an active strategy that
determines the bid βivi resp. the ask viσi that she is actually placing. All other strategies are
evaluated as well to see how they would have performed if they would have been the active
ones. Changes of the active strategy are possible only every numRounds rounds. In the FS case,
simply a new strategy is chosen as active while the strategy set remains fixed. In the GA case,
at these times, the strategy population is additionally replaced by a new generation.
A model run consists of the following steps:
1. in the beginning, participants initialize their active and numStrategies-1 non-active
strategies
2. for numGenerations generations of strategy sets
(a) bidders and seller reset their current payoffs
(b) for numRounds auctions
i. players’ values are randomly chosen from the underlying value distribution
ii. players submit their bids and asks according to their active strategy
iii. the auction module determines the winners
iv. players update the current payoffs of their active and passive strategies
(c) players evaluate the payoff, their strategies (would) have generated during the numRounds
auctions and choose an active one for the next numRounds auctions according to best
response or quantal response dynamics
3The feature for constant and square parameters is not fully implemented yet, currently I can simulate only
linear strategies. However, the future extension to nonlinear value dependent strategies is already considered in
the program architecture.
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(d) if the GA is used, the strategy population is updated
i. the best numElite strategies are kept unchanged for the next generation
ii. the best numParents strategies are taken as parents to create offspring
iii. players update their worst numStrategies-numElite strategies using the genetic
operators mutation and crossover
(e) proceed with (a)
For further reference and to get a feeling for the program capabilities, take a look at the model
parameters in Appendix B.
9.3.2 Determination of Payoffs
The core of the auction simulator is the determination of payoffs for active and inactive strate-
gies. At the moment, the auction simulator can simulate arbitrary kth price auctions with
an arbitrary number of participants. Figure 9.2 shows exemplarily the basic principle for an
auction with three bidders and three sellers: The left most part of the Figure shows for each
Figure 9.2: Payoffs in single-unit double-auctions
bidder and each seller her value, her strategy and her bid resp. ask. The winning players the
highest bidder B1 with a bid of 0.56 and the lowest seller S2 with an ask of 0.28. The middle
part of the figure shows, how the prices can be calculated in various ways to reflect different
auction formats:
P1: (settings: auctionType=1, priceDet=0.5). This simulates a first-price double-auction
where the price is set in the middle between the highest bid and the lowest ask.
P2: (settings: auctionType=2, priceDet=0.5). This simulates a second-price double-auction
where the price is set in the middle between the second highest bid and the second lowest ask.
P3: (settings: auctionType=1, priceDet=1). This simulates a first-price auction where the
winning seller gets exactly her ask but no more. In connection with setting a fixed very high
bid for each bidder4, this setup allows the simulation of pure seller auctions.
P4: (settings: auctionType=1, priceDet=0). This simulates a first-price auction where the
winning bidder pays exactly her bid but no less. In connection with setting a fixed value of 0
for each seller, this setup allows the simulation of pure bidder auctions.
The rightmost part of Figure 9.2 shows the bidder and seller payoffs for the different price
4to ensure that each winning ask is payed for
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determination mechanisms. The Figure illustrates only a fraction of all the possible parame-
ter combinations. In addition, the AS is also able to simulate 3rd and higher price auctions
(auctionType=3, 4, · · · ), provided that sufficiently many bidders and sellers participate in the
auction.
9.4 Learning in the Auction Simulator
9.4.1 Real GAs
In the Auction Simulator I use real GAs instead of ones with bit string populations. Real GAs
are faster than bit string GAs, note however that the theoretical properties are less well under-
stood than for bit string GAs (see, e.g., Holland (1992) and Lux and Schornstein (2002)). In
particular, it is not obvious what the equivalent of Holland’s Schema Theorem should be. Still,
also with this lack of theoretical foundation, real GAs seem to work, which is why they are used
in practice. To check for the differences between real and bit string GAs, I also implemented in
an earlier version bit string GAs with the AS. The simulation results are basically the same as
in the case of real GAs, however, the simulations take a much longer time. Therefore I report
in this thesis only the results of the simulations with real GAs.
The implementation of the real GA in the AS is as follows:In the beginning, numStrategies
real numbers are randomly generated for each bidder and used as bidding strategies. Strategy
number 0 is used as the active strategy that determines the playing behavior of the bidder.
Subsequently, bidders use their active strategy for bidding in numRounds consecutive auctions.
For each strategy, the payoff is added up for the numRounds rounds.5 After that, the population
of bidding strategies is updated:
The first step in the updating process is to rank the strategies according to their fitness and
select the strategies that determine future play:
The best strategy is chosen as the active one for the next generation. Therefore, GAs at the cur-
rent stage are apt for the simulation of best response but not of quantal response play. The best
numElite strategies are left unchanged for the next round. This elitism reflects the assumption
that a bidder would like to evaluate her most successful strategies also in the next auction
without any change. The best numParents different strategies are collected in the breedingList.
Two strategies βi and βj are considered as different if | βi−βj |>strategyDistance.6. If there
are less than numParents different strategies in the strategy set, the missing positions are filled
up by randomly generated strategies.
The second step is the creation of numStrategies-numElite new strategies by applying the
crossover operator:
The crossover operator randomly selects two different parent strategies from the breedingList.
The selection probabilities are assigned according to their rank: The best strategy is selected
with relative probability numParents, the next with relative probability numParents-1 and
so on. The last strategy in the breedingList has a relative selection probability of 1. Rank
selection for crossover is better suited than fitness proportional selection for the simulation
of best response dynamics. The reason is that in fitness proportional selection, the selection
pressure rapidly declines if all strategies are near the global optimum. With rank-proportional
selection, the best solutions in the breedingList are always much more likely to create off-
spring than worse ones - even if their absolute fitness advantage is very small. Having se-
lected the two strategies, denote the lower by βmin and the larger by βmax. A new strat-
egy is constructed by selecting a number between βmin(1 − crossoverPar(βmax − βmin)) and
βmax(1+crossoverPar(βmax−βmin)) with uniform probability. The extension of the crossover
interval offsets the tendency of crossover to equalize all strategies7.
The third step is to subject the offspring to the mutation operator:
Strategy β is with probability mutationProb changed into another value according to a normal
distribution with mean β and a variance of mutationPar percent. The mutation operator is a
further mechanism that prevents the population from getting too homogenous.
5For the inactive strategies this is the payoff, they would have generated if they had been the active one.
6This prevents the GA from getting stuck in too homogenous populations
7Usually the literature suggests a normal distribution for the crossover. However, in my experience a uniform
distribution yields better results.
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Together with the numElite unchanged strategies, the newly constructed strategies form the
next generation strategy set.
9.4.2 Fixed Strategies
As an alternative simulation tool I employ fixed strategies:
In the beginning I partition the strategy space (0, 1) into a grid of equidistant strategies, e.g.
numStrategies=100 ranging from 0.00 to 0.99. In the first round, one strategy is randomly
selected as active and determines the initial bidding behavior of the agent.
For each auction the current payoff that each strategy β0 would have generated in round i is
calculated by POcurr;(i)0 (β0) = v0(1− β0)Θ(β0v0 − β1v1).
After the first numRounds auctions, each strategy’s payoffs are added up and yield the payoff,
the strategy generated in the first numRounds auctions:
PO
numRounds;(1)
0 (β0) =
numRounds∑
i=1
PO
curr;(i)
0 (β0) (9.1)
The strategy that generated the highest payoff in the first numRounds rounds is then selected as
the active one for the next numRounds rounds. If no strategy has positive payoff8, the currently
active strategy remains active also in the next numRounds. The case that no strategy has
positive payoff happens if v0 < β1v1 for all auctions within the last generation. This is the
equivalent of the rule βnew0 = β
old
0 in the mathematical part if no feasible strategy could have
won the auction. Denote
PO
cum;(1)
0 (β0) = PO
numRounds;(1)
0 (β0) (9.2)
After the next numRounds auctions the cumulated payoff is recalculated as a weighted sum of
the old cumulated payoff and the new payoff generated in the last numRounds auctions:
PO
cum;(2)
0 (β0) = memoryStrengthPO
cum;(1)
0 (β0) + PO
numRounds;(2)
0 (β0) (9.3)
Again, the strategy that generated the highest cumulated payoff is selected as the active one
and the process starts anew.
9.4.3 Interpretation of GA and FS Results
It is a well known fact that GAs are very efficient in finding extreme values of functions - even
if these are quite rough with many local minima and maxima. However, GAs perform quite
poorly in optimizing functions that fluctuate wildly over time. Why? In each generation the
population tries to concentrate on the current maximum and therefore it is pure luck wether
the population has in the next generation enough individuals near next generation’s maximum
to identify it accurately. In this sense, the GA interpolates between the optima at consecutive
times by leaving behind ’streaks’ of old solutions like when you clean a window with a bad
cloth. The GA ’remembers’ past results and intermingles them with current results in a highly
nonlinear fashion.
Having said this it should be clear that in GA simulations we might expect the analytically
derived results only if we let players aggregate payoff over sufficiently many rounds before they
update the GA. So, the GA should be able to reproduce the predictions of my analysis for
perfect memory play if we let it aggregate payoffs over as many rounds as possible9.
If, however, the GA is updated after every round, the computational results will not correspond
to the analytical results for myopic best response.
The other simulation technique I use are FSs. They are a very mechanical approach to model
decision making: In the beginning, a fixed set of strategies is defined and in each step, all
8This happens especially likely if numRounds is low.
9To be precise, with GAs I can only simulate truncated fictitious play not fictitious play which would be
the equivalent of perfect memory play. But as the number of rounds increases after which the GA is updated,
truncated fictitious play converges to fictitious play.
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strategies are evaluated. However, by this simple approach I am able to reproduce the analytical
results on all time scales. Moreover, only with FSs, I can use the parameter memoryStrength
to simulate the effects of continuously varying memory strength on the experimental outcome.
I will highlight the differences between FS and GA simulations in the first section of the next
chapter.
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Chapter 10
Double-check of Analytic Results
This chapter aims at ensuring that the AS functions correctly. Tho this end I check wether the
AS correctly reproduces the analytic results of the previous chapters. The correct functioning
and the identification and analysis of possible error sources will ensure in the next chapter that
I can more reliably interpret the behavior of bounded rational bidders for cases where I have
no closed form solutions.
For the interpretation of the parameter settings in the simulations please consult appendix B
10.1 Bidder Response against Fixed Bidding Strategies
Hypothesis:
The AS confirms the predictions of Theorems 4.1, 4.5, 6.1 and 6.3: Means of best response and
quantal response in a two bidder first-price auction with values v0,1 ∼ U(0, 1) and one bidder
playing a fixed strategy β1 follow the equations that are stated in the pertinent theorems.
Parameter Settings:
Table 10.1 shows the basic parameter setup. The parameters in exper.setup determine the
number and the length of simulation runs. The parameters in model.setup determine the
auction setup like the chosen format and the number of participants on each side of the market.
bidder.setup and seller.setup specify the individual behavior of sellers respective bidders.
The parameters in this simulation have the following interpretation:
Unless noted otherwise, each of the experiments in this chapter consists of 4 runs with random
exper.setup
numGenerations 10.000 recordStart 4000
lowerBoundSeed 10 upperBoundSeed 14
model.setup
numRounds 1(mBR),1.000(pBR) auctionType 1 priceDet 0
RWmean 0 transactionFee 0 numBidders 2
numSellers 2
bidder.setup
bLearningType 1(FS), 2(GA) bSelectionType 1(QR), 2(BR) bMemoryStrength 0
bFixedStrategyMarker 1 bFixedBeta 0.1 · · · 0.9 bFixedValueMarker 0
bFixedValue 0 b0FixedValueMarker 0 b0FixedValue 0
bValDistShape 1 bValDet1 0 bValDet2 1
bNumStrategies 999(FS), 100(GA) bMinStrategy 0 bMaxStrategy 1
bStrategyDistance 0.0002 bNumParents 50 bNumElite 20
bCrossOverPar 0.1 bMutationProb 10 bMutationType 0
bMutationPar 0.01 bXi 1
seller.setup
sFixedStrategyMarker 3 sFixedStrategy 1 sFixedValueMarker 3
sFixedValue 0 sNumStrategies 2 all others arbitrary
Table 10.1: Standard Parameter Settings for the Auction Simulator
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seeds 10, 11, 12 and 13 respectively (lowerBoundSeed=10, upperBoundSeed=14). Each run
consists of 6.000 generations after a phase-in of 4.000 generations (numGenerations=10.000,
recordStart=4.000). The simulation records active strategies, values, payoffs and the price
for two bidders and sellers each.1
For the basic simulation setup of myopic best response in 1POBAs with FSs I use the follow-
ing parameter settings: I consider two bidders (numBidders=2)in a 1POBA (auctionType=1)
where strategies are updated in each round (numRounds=1). Each bidder has to pay exactly her
bid (priceDet=0, transactionFee=0). In each round, values are drawn anew (RWmean=0) from
U(0, 1) (bValDistShape=1, bValDet1=0, bValDet2=1) for both bidders (bFixedValueMarker=0,
b0FixedValueMarker=0).
Bidder 0 uses a best response rule (bSelectionType=2) for strategy updating. This is simu-
lated via FSs (bLearningType=1). Only the last numRounds payoffs are considered for strategy
updating (bMemoryStrength=0), so by setting bNumRounds=1 I simulate a myopically adapting
bidder 0. In contrast, bidder 1 uses a fixed strategy (bFixedStrategyMarker=1) with differ-
ent values for β1 (bFixedBeta=0.1, ..., 0.9). Each bidder has 999 equidistant strategies
(bNumStrategies=999) between 0 and 1 (bMinStrategy=0, bMaxStrategy=1).
On the seller side I instruct both sellers (numSellers=2) not to ask anything for the asset
(sFixedValueMarker=3, sFixedValue=0). Since the strategies are unequal to 0
(sFixedStrategyMarker=3, sFixedStrategy=1), this guarantees an ask of 0 by both sellers.2
Therefore, this ”double auction” mimics a pure two bidder auction where the seller(s) posts
no reserve price. Each bidder is only influenced by the other bidder’s bid. To speed up the
simulation I equip the sellers only with 2 strategies (sNumStrategies=2).
For the simulation of myopic best response play with GAs (bLearningType=2) I use the same
settings, with a few changes:
I regard it as sufficient to simulate the evolution of a population of 100 strategies
(bNumStrategies=100). To ensure that successful strategies are not lost, the best 20 strategies
always stay in the population (bNumElite=20). The best 50 strategies (bNumParents=50) – the
numElite best and the 30 next best – are used as parents to breed the remaining 80 strategies by
using the crossover- and the mutation-operator with rank-proportional selection. Strategies are
only acknowledged as different if they differ by at least 0.0002 (bStrategyDistance=0.0002).
This prevents the convergence of the population to a suboptimal state. Crossover is simulated
by extending the interval between two strategies by the factor 0.1 to each side
(bCrossOverParameter= 0.1) and choosing a new strategy value with uniform probability from
this interval. With a probability of 1% (bMutationProb=10), strategies are mutated by up to
±1% (bMutationPar=0.01) with uniform probability (bMutationType=0).
The implementation of linear myopic quantal response is available only with FSs. The simu-
lation has the same settings as myopic best response with FSs, only that bSelectionType=2.
The choice of bXi=1 guarantees that we model linear and not payoff-exponential quantal re-
sponse play.
For perfect memory play I use the same settings as for the corresponding myopic play. The
difference is that now I set numRounds=1000 and bMemoryStrength=1. (Parameter settings for
memoryStrength only have an effect on simulations with FS). So, the first recorded strategies
in generation 4.000 of each run are already based on the information that was obtained in 4
million auctions.
Results:
All results presented in Tables 10.2 - 10.5 are structured in the same format:
The first block shows the fixed strategy of bidder 1 and the theoretical prediction for bidder 0s
response. The remaining blocks show the simulation results for FSs and - in the case of best
response - for GAs. The first column in each block reports the mean of the 24.000 experimental
data points that were recorded during the simulation. The second column reports the deviation
between mean and theoretical prediction and the third column the variance of the 4 individual
means of the simulation runs.
For second-price auctions I performed the analogous experiments with GAs and FSs. As theo-
retically predicted, strategies in 2PAs under best response converge to 1, however I have to use
perfect memory strength to obtain this result, otherwise the simulation finds the NE strategy
1For technical reasons, the simulation needs at least two participants on each side of the market.
2If strategies were 0, the seller asks 0
0
which is indeterminate.
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β¯0
mBR(β1) via FSs and GAs
β1 β
th
0 (β1) β
FS
0 (β1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
FS
0 ) σmean(β
FS
0 ) β
GA
0 (β1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
GA
0 ) σmean(β
GA
0 )
0.1 0.14750 0.14767 0.11% 0.95% 0.17254 16.97% 1.56%
0.2 0.23438 0.23442 0.02% 1.79% 0.25585 9.16% 0.98%
0.3 0.30070 0.30334 0.88% 1.36% 0.31690 5.39% 0.76%
0.4 0.35407 0.35375 -0.09% 1.27% 0.35994 1.66% 1.07%
0.5 0.39772 0.39692 -0.20% 1.31% 0.39608 -0.41% 0.60%
0.6 0.43321 0.43041 -0.65% 0.97% 0.41821 -3.46% 0.42%
0.7 0.46129 0.45880 -0.54% 0.76% 0.43185 -6.38% 1.56%
0.8 0.48210 0.47834 -0.78% 1.27% 0.43996 -8.74% 1.29%
0.9 0.49530 0.49320 -0.42% 0.97% 0.44469 -10.22% 1.80%
Table 10.2: Simulation of Myopic Best Response
βpBR0 (β1) via FSs and GAs
β1 β
th
0 (β1) β
FS
0 (β1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
FS
0 ) σmean(β
FS
0 ) β
GA
0 (β1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
GA
0 ) σmean(β
GA
0 )
0.1 0.18231 0.18194 -0.20% 0.27% 0.18162 -0.38% 0.11%
0.2 0.28390 0.28389 0.00% 0.21% 0.28266 -0.37% 0.07%
0.3 0.36598 0.36610 0.03% 0.14% 0.36271 -0.35% 0.08%
0.4 0.43685 0.43711 0.06% 0.07% 0.43522 -0.37% 0.01%
0.5 0.5 0.49920 -0.16% 0.14% 0.48905 -2.19% 0.08%
0.6 0.5 0.50081 0.16% 0.20% 0.49601 -0.8% 0.04%
0.7 0.5 0.49931 -0.14% 0.28% 0.49629 -0.74% 0.04%
0.8 0.5 0.50014 0.03% 0.06% 0.49552 -0.90% 0.08%
0.9 0.5 0.49946 -0.11% 0.44% 0.49520 -0.96% 0.02%
Table 10.3: Simulation of Perfect Memory Best Response
β¯mQR0 (β1) via FSs
β1 β
th
0 (β1) β
FS
0 (β1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
FS
0 ) σmean(β
FS
0 )
0.1 0.43167 0.43243 0.18% 0.79%
0.2 0.48959 0.48990 0.06% 1.04%
0.3 0.53380 0.53591 0.40% 0.75%
0.4 0.56938 0.56938 0.07% 0.77%
0.5 0.59848 0.59844 -0.01% 0.82%
0.6 0.62214 0.62090 -0.20% 0.63%
0.7 0.64086 0.64018 -0.11% 0.83%
0.8 0.65473 0.65348 -0.19% 1.16%
0.9 0.66353 0.66294 -0.09% 0.99%
Table 10.4: Simulation of Myopic Quantal Response
βpQR0 (β1) via FSs
β1 β
th
0 (β1) β
FS
0 (β1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
FS
0 ) σmean(β
FS
0 )
0.1 0.38518 0.38563 0.12% 1.12%
0.2 0.42236 0.42276 0.09% 0.99%
0.3 0.45015 0.45049 0.08% 0.93%
0.4 0.47039 0.47073 0.07% 0.91%
0.5 0.48428 0.48454 0.05% 0.91%
0.6 0.49293 0.49318 0.05% 0.89%
0.7 0.49756 0.49780 0.05% 1.25%
0.8 0.49948 0.49972 0.05% 0.90%
0.9 0.49997 0.50020 0.05% 0.90%
Table 10.5: Simulation of Perfect Memory Quantal Response
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of 1 but looses it again.3 For quantal response play in 2PAs, as theoretically predicted, the
result depends on the cutoff-level of the strategy set.
Discussion:
For all setups, the AS replicates the analytical predictions of bounded rational play in 1PAs
very accurately with FSs. The means of all runs are without exception less than 1% away from
the analytic predictions as can be seen from Tables 10.2-10.5. Naturally, perfect memory results
are more accurate than the results of myopic play since I used 1.000 times more auctions to
assess them.
Since ”a picture says more than 1000 words resp. numbers” I graphed the simulation results
of Tables 10.2 and 10.3. FSs in comparison to the theoretical predictions for myopic and
perfect memory best response. The solid line in Figure 10.1 gives the theoretical prediction of
myopic resp. perfect memory best response against a fixed strategy whereas the crosses give the
simulation results. As one can easily see, there are virtually no deviations between the line and
the crosses. Similarly, also a plot of the results for quantal response play would show virtually
no deviations between theoretical predictions and simulation results. With GAs, a look at Table
Figure 10.1: Theory vs Simulation under Best Response with FSs
10.3 shows that the Auction Simulator does a good job for the simulation of perfect memory
play. However, its results are persistently a little too low. The most significant underbidding
of over 2% occurs if bidder 1 plays the NE strategy β1 = 0.5. This can be explained by the
concave kink of the best response function βpBR0 (β1) that we see in Figure 4.7 respectively the
lower part of Figure 10.1.
To understand the underbidding intuitively assume that bidder 1 sets her strategy fixed to the
NE value β1 = 12 . Bidder 0 does not know this but she selects her strategy as the one that
performed best in the last 1.000 rounds. This is about the same as if she would estimate her
opponent’s bid from the last 1.000 rounds as
β¯1 =
1.000∑
i=1
bi
0.5
(10.1)
3In theory, for FS, a positive but arbitrarily small memoryStrength is needed for convergence. In the simu-
lations I had to use perfect memory strength. The reason is the finite working precision of computers:
The computer uses internally 8 digits behind the dot. In 2PAs, the strategies 0.999 and 1 give the same result in
999 of 1000 auctions. If I use however for instance a memoryStrength of 0.5, then 27 generations after an auction
where the strategy 1 performed better than the strategy 0.999, this difference is forgotten by the computer again
(since 1
2
27
< 10−8 < 1
2
26
). Therefore I set the variable memoryStrength to 1, so that the computer can not
forget anything. In the simulation of 1PAs the finite working precision is no problem since in each round each
strategy yields different payoff and therefore the effect of past returns is not so important.
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and play her perfect memory best response against this estimate according to Figure 4.7. Her
estimate β¯1 is after each 1.000 rounds approximately normally distributed around the true value
of 12 . In half of the 1.000 auction-rounds bidder 0 therefore estimates her opponent’s strategy
too low. In these cases her best response is below the NE. In the cases where she overestimates
her opponent’s strategy, her best reply is just the NE strategy 12
4. Therefore, bidder 0 under-
bids on average significantly if her opponent plays the NE strategy β1 = 12 . She underbids the
less, the narrower the distribution of her estimates is. In the simulation, this can be achieved
by increasing numRounds.
For lower values of β1 between 0 and 12 , a similar reasoning holds but the underbidding of bidder
0 is less pronounced there since the slope of the best response function is more symmetric to
the left and the right of β1 than at β1 = 12 .
For FSs, there occurs no significant underbidding for perfect memory best response. The rea-
son is that for FS simulation I set memoryStrength=1 which reduces the stochasticity of value
realizations: In the end of each of the 4 simulation runs, bidder 0 bases her response on the
accumulated information she gets from 10 million independent value realizations.
For the simulation of myopic strategy updating with GAs, Table 10.2 shows systematic devi-
ations between theoretical predictions and simulation results. For low values of β1, the GA
significantly overbids whereas for high β1 it significantly underbids. As argued above, this
simply reflects the fact that GAs perform poorly in optimizing functions that fluctuate over
time.
In conclusion, FS are the better tool to guarantee simulation results that correspond to the
mathematical models of bounded rationality. First of all, FS – in contrast to GAs - don’t
show intertemporal smoothing under myopic play. Second, FS simulations can be influenced
by the parameter memoryStrength. On the one hand, this means that they don’t suffer from
underbidding under perfect memory best response because memoryStrength can be set to 1.
On the other hand, varying the parameter memoryStrength provides a possibility to smoothly
interpolate between myopic and perfect memory play. The GA lacks this feature because it is
not clear, how payoff-information should be transferred between generations of strategies.
The claim that the AS with FS modeling also correctly simulates intermediate memory strengths
requires a little explanation: I have shown that myopic play (memoryStrength= 0, numRounds=
1) is correctly simulated by the AS. On the other hand, also perfect memory play (memoryStrength=
1, numRounds= 1) is simulated correctly5. So, since the AS replicates the correct solutions for
the extreme settings memoryStrength= 0 resp. = 1, I can be sure that it also delivers the
correct results for intermediate memory capabilities like, e.g., memoryStrength= 0.3.
For all these reasons, I will stick to FS for most of the remaining thesis. However, this doesn’t
mean that the implementation of the GA is in vain. As I will discuss at the end of the next
chapter, the GA is better suited to locate NEs than FSs.
10.2 Seller Best Response against Fixed Asking Strategies
Hypothesis:
The AS correctly reproduces the predictions of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 for the behavior of two
bounded rational sellers under myopic and perfect memory best response where one seller plays
a fixed strategy.
Parameter Settings:
The settings are symmetric to the two bidder case. The differences are shown in table 10.2: The
setting of priceDet= 1 ensures that the winning seller gets the full payoff POi = vi( 1σi − 1).
Each bidder bids a fixed amount of 1.000 (bFixedStrategyMarker= 3, bFixedBeta= 1.000,
bfixedValueMarker= 3, bFixedValue= 1). Because of sMinStrategy= 0.001 and v ∼ U(0, 1),
the sellers’ asks are always between 0 and 1/0.001 = 1.000. Therefore, each ask is absorbed by
4Note that in the simulations, responding bidders choose sometimes even strategies slightly above the NE.
The reason is that they base their strategies only on finitely many value realizations and not on the mathematical
theory. However, the mathematical theory still shows, why underbidding is much more likely than overbidding.
5Though I have made the simulations with numRounds= 1.000 to increase the accuracy of the simulation,
analogous results for perfect memory play could also have been obtained by setting numRounds= 1 if, e.g., I
would have simulated 1.000 times more generations.
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model.setup
priceDet 1
bidder.setup
bFixedStrategyMarker 3 bFixedBeta 1000 bFixedValueMarker 3
bFixedValue 1 bNumStrategies 2
seller.setup
sFixedStrategyMarker 1 sFixedSigma 0.1,...,0.9
sNumStrategies 999 sMinStrategy 0.001
Table 10.6: Specific Parameter Settings for Pure Seller Auctions
σ¯0
mBR(σ1) via FSs
σ1 σ
th
0 (σ1) σ
FS
0 (σ1) dev(σ
th
0 ,σ
FS
0 ) σ
2
mean(σ
FS
0 )
0.1 0.14750 0.14744 -0.04% 1.56%
0.2 0.23438 0.23345 -0.40% 0.60%
0.3 0.30070 0.29917 -0.51% 1.56%
0.4 0.35407 0.35197 -0.59% 1.50%
0.5 0.39772 0.39714 -0.14% 1.21%
0.6 0.43321 0.43207 -0.26% 1.02%
0.7 0.46129 0.45818 -0.67% 0.82%
0.8 0.48210 0.47839 -0.77% 0.71%
0.9 0.49530 0.49358 -0.35% 0.40%
Table 10.7: Simulation of Myopic Best Response for Seller
the bidder-side of the market, the only relevant parameter for the updating seller is therefore her
opponent’s strategy. Again, I keep the strategy of one seller fixed (sFixedStrategyMarker= 1)
at σ1 = 0.1, · · · , 0.9 (sFixedSigma= 0.1 · · · 0.9) while the other seller updates against this strat-
egy. For a sufficiently accurate assessment of the seller’s strategy I use 999 possible strategies
(sNumStrategies= 999) while I use only 2 strategies for each bidder in order to save simulation
time.
Results:
The structure of Tables 10.7 and 10.8 is the same as in the previous section. I did not make
experiments with GAs since, as noted in the previous section, FSs are much better apt for
reproducing the analytic results for myopic as well as for perfect memory play.
Discussion:
Again, all the results for FS are well within the 1% range of the theoretical predictions and it
can not be rejected that they are equal. The correct simulation of myopic and perfect memory
best response for pure seller auctions shows that the AS simulates the seller side correctly.
In this section I checked only for best response play since I derived no analytic predictions for
quantal response of sellers. But this isn’t even necessary to still guarantee the correctness of the
σpBR0 (σ1) via FSs
σ1 σ
th
0 (σ1) σ
FS
0 (σ1) dev(σ
th
0 ,σ
FS
0 ) σmean(σ
FS
0 )
0.1 0.1250 0.1245 -0.40% 0.48%
0.2 0.2353 0.2354 0.04% 0.21%
0.3 0.3333 0.3330 -0.10% 0.48%
0.4 0.4211 0.4212 0.03% 0.33%
0.5 0.5 0.4998 -0.04% 0.26%
0.6 0.5 0.5001 0.02% 0.40%
0.7 0.5 0.5000 0.00% 0.88%
0.8 0.5 0.4978 -0.44% 0.40%
0.9 0.5 0.5003 0.06% 0.72%
Table 10.8: Simulation of Perfect Memory Best Response for Seller
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simulation results: From the last section we know that quantal response is simulated correctly
for the bidder side, so the AS translates correctly payoffs into selection probabilities. Since the
same part of the program is responsible for the seller side, the selection probabilities are also
determined correctly for the seller side. On the other hand, this section shows that also the
payoff-updating routines are correct for the seller side. Payoff-updating and the translation of
payoffs into selection probabilities are the only two ingredients for the simulation of quantal
response. Since both routines work correctly, quantal response must be simulated correctly for
the seller side. An analogous argument as in the previous section shows that the AS correctly
simulates imperfect memory seller play because it gives the correct predictions for myopic best
response and for perfect memory best response.
10.3 Linear Strategy Best Response in Double Auctions
Hypothesis:
The AS correctly reproduces the predictions of Theorems 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 for double
auctions with one bidder and one seller where agents are restricted to linear strategies and one
participant plays a fixed strategy. As already noted in the chapter about double auctions, the
simulation of linear strategies in double auctions provides additional data points to gauge the
correctness of the simulation results in the linear case. However – even under perfect memory
play – it is not a realistic description of behavior since the participants’ strategy space does not
entail the NE of double auctions.
The more realistic simulation of affine bidding strategies is only possible when the Auction
Simulator is extended to allow for nonlinear strategies. This is a project for future research. I
will say more on this in the last chapter.
Parameter Settings: The non-obvious parameter settings for double auctions with one bidder
who adapts against one seller with fixed strategy σ1 are given as follows:
model.setup
numBidders 2 numSellers 2 auctionType 1 priceDet 0.5
bidder.setup
bFixedStrategyMarker 1 bFixedBeta 0
bFixedValueMarker 0
seller.setup
sFixedStrategyMarker 3 sFixedSigma 0.1, ·, 0.9
sFixedValueMarker 1 sFixedValue 1000
The setting of priceDet= 0.5 guarantees that the price is set in the middle between the high-
est bid and the lowest ask, if a trade occurs. As already noted before, due to technical rea-
sons, the number of bidders and seller in the auction simulation has to be at least two for
each side of the market (numBidders= 2, numSellers= 2). Therefore, I have to keep the
second participant on each side of the market ”artificially” out of the game. On the bid-
der side, setting bFixedStrategyMarker= 1 and bFixedBeta= 0 lets one bidder bid 0 while
the other bidder updates her strategy. On the seller side, both sellers play a fixed strat-
egy (sFixedStrategyMarker= 3) between 0.1 and 0.9. However, one seller has a fixed value
(sFixedValueMarker= 1) of 1.000 (sFixedValue= 1.000), so even with a low strategy of 0.1,
she asks 100 – more than the bidder could afford because she has a maximal bid of 1. There-
fore, this seller gets involved in no trade and effectively only one seller with a fixed strategy
and values drawn from U(0, 1) participates in the auction.
In the case of one adapting seller, the pertinent settings for bidder and seller are interchanged.
Results:
The results are given in the well-known format in Tables 10.9-10.12.
Discussion:
The Auction Simulator gives the correct simulation results for double auctions if we confine
the strategy space to linear strategies and one participant plays a fixed strategy. This shows
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β¯0
mBR(σ1) via FSs
σ1 β
th
0 (σ1) β
FS
0 (σ1) dev(β
th
0 ,β
FS
0 ) σmean(β
FS
0 )
0.1 0.5 0.5127 2.54% 1.14%
0.2 0.5 0.5103 2.06% 2.34%
0.3 0.5 0.506 1.20% 3.78%
0.4 0.5 0.4999 -0.02% 1.92%
0.5 0.5 0.4940 -0.12% 1.28%
0.6 0.5 0.5018 0.36% 2.16%
0.7 0.5 0.4986 -0.28% 2.18%
0.8 0.5 0.4958 -0.84% 1.54%
0.9 0.5 0.4943 -1.14% 1.58%
Table 10.9: Simulation of Myopic Best Response Bidder Adaptation in Double Auction
βpBR0 (σ1) via FSs
σ1 β
th
0 (σ1) β
FS
0 (σ1) dev(β
th
0 , β
FS
0 ) σmean(β
FS
0 )
0.1 0.6667 0.6670 0.05% 0.44%
0.2 0.6667 0.6677 0.16% 0.48%
0.3 0.6667 0.6648 -0.28% 0.51%
0.4 0.6667 0.6659 -0.11% 0.42%
0.5 0.6667 0.6681 0.22% 0.41%
0.6 0.6667 0.6664 -0.04% 0.17%
0.7 0.6667 0.6656 -0.16% 0.14%
0.8 0.6667 0.6665 -0.02% 0.21%
0.9 0.6667 0.6660 -0.10% 0.29%
Table 10.10: Simulation of Perfect Memory Best Response Bidder Adaptation in Double Auc-
tion
σ¯0
mBR(β1) via FSs
β1 σ
th
0 (β1) σ
FS
0 (β1) dev(σ
th
0 , σ
FS
0 ) σmean(σ
FS
0 )
0.1 0.5 0.5127 2.54% 1.14%
0.2 0.5 0.5103 2.06% 2.34%
0.3 0.5 0.506 1.20% 3.78%
0.4 0.5 0.4999 -0.02% 1.92%
0.5 0.5 0.4940 -0.12% 1.28%
0.6 0.5 0.5018 0.36% 2.16%
0.7 0.5 0.4986 -0.28% 2.18%
0.8 0.5 0.4958 -0.84% 1.54%
0.9 0.5 0.4943 -1.14% 1.58%
Table 10.11: Simulation of Myopic Best Response Seller Adaptation in Double Auction
σpBR0 (β1) via FSs
β1 σ
th
0 (β1) σ
FS
0 (β1) dev(σ
th
0 , σ
FS
0 ) σmean(σ
FS
0 )
0.1 0.75 0.7491 -0.12% 0.44%
0.2 0.75 0.7494 -0.08% 0.17%
0.3 0.75 0.7477 -0.31% 0.32%
0.4 0.75 0.7495 -0.07% 0.13%
0.5 0.75 0.7494 -0.08% 0.17%
0.6 0.75 0.7481 -0.25% 0.32%
0.7 0.75 0.7501 0.01% 0.15%
0.8 0.75 0.7492 -0.11% 0.28%
0.9 0.75 0.7519 0.25% 0.15%
Table 10.12: Simulation of Perfect Memory Best Response Adaptation in Double Auction
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β¯0
mBR(β1, ρ) via FSs
β1 β
th
0 (β1, 0.1) β
FS
0 dev β
th
0 (β1, 0.5) β
FS
0 dev β
th
0 (β1, 0.9) β
FS
0 dev
0.2 0.29258 0.29265 0.08% 0.69315 0.69215 -0.21% 0.94825 0.94890 0.07%
0.5 0.42745 0.42691 -0.30% 0.69315 0.69215 -0.21% 0.94825 0.94890 0.07%
0.8 0.50615 0.50245 -1.44% 0.71986 0.71850 -0.26% 0.94825 0.94890 0.07%
Table 10.13: Simulation of Myopic Best Response with Seller Reserve Price
that the AS correctly simulates the interaction between the bidder- and the seller side of the
market. Together with the previous sections, we see that the AS would also correctly simulate,
e.g., imperfect memory quantal response in double auctions with linear strategies.
Note however that the simulation doesn’t give the correct results under purely myopic mutual
adaptation: Though the myopic best response is on average 12 against each strategy of the
opponent, under mutual adaptation the strategies don’t converge to 12 . The reason is – like
in the case of pure bidder auctions – the finiteness of the underlying strategy space. I will
comment on this effect in more detail below in section 10.6.
10.4 Myopic Best Response with Reserve Price
Hypothesis:
The AS correctly reproduces the predictions of Theorem 4.2 for myopic best response of one
bidder to another bidder who bids according to a fixed strategy β1 and a seller who posts a
fixed reserve price ρ as given by Theorem 4.2.
Parameter Settings:
The only difference to the pertinent settings without reserve price is that instead of setting
sFixedValue= 0, I set sFixedValue=0.1, 0.5, 0.9.
Results:
The first column in Table 10.13 indicates the fixed strategy of bidder 1. The remainder of the
table is segmented into three identical blocks for the reserve prices 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8. In each
block the first column reports the theoretical value, the second column the simulation result
with FS and the third column the deviation between the two.
Discussion:
The results show again – like in the case of double auctions – that the interaction between
bidders and sellers is correctly simulated by the AS. Therefore, the AS is a solid basis for an
extension to investigate the mutual interaction of several bidders and sellers in the future.
Note that the results are exactly the same for a given value of ρ as long as β1 ≤ ρ. As explained
in section 4.2.3 this results from the fact that for β1 ≤ ρ bidder 1s bid is always below the seller
reservation price and therefore irrelevant for bidder 0s considerations.
10.5 Strategy Distribution under Myopic Best Response
Hypothesis:
The AS correctly reproduces the predictions of Theorem 4.3 for the strategy distribution of a
myopic best response bidder 0 against a fixed strategy of bidder 1.
Parameter Settings:
The parameter settings are the same as in the first simulation that are given in Table 10.1.
Results:
Figure 10.2 shows the frequency histogram of bidder 0’s strategies if she plays her myopic best
response against a fixed strategy β1 = 0.3 of bidder 1.
Discussion:
Though I did not prove it by statistical methods,it is obvious that under myopic best response,
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Figure 10.2: Strategy Distribution under mBR against β1 = 0.3
the simulation results for the strategy histogram f(β0) against a fixed strategy of bidder 1 fits
the theoretical prediction. This result gives additional proof for the reliability of the simulation
results on the micro-level. While the previous sections showed that means are simulated cor-
rectly, this section shows that also the distribution of strategies around these means is simulated
correctly.
10.6 Convergence under Mutual Best Response Adapta-
tion
Hypothesis:
The AS correctly reproduces the predictions of Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 for two mutually adapting
bidders under myopic and perfect memory best response.
Parameter Settings:
The setting are analogous to adaptation against a fixed strategy only that
bidder.setup
bFixedStrategyMarker 0
This guarantees that both bidders update their strategies.
Results:
For myopic best response, Table 10.14 reports the simulation outcome for different settings of
bNumStrategies. The first column gives numStrategies, the second column the simulation
result. The third column gives the theoretical prediction of equation (4.49) for the average
strategy of the bidders when they have a lowest strategy of ² = 1/bNumStrategies. The fourth
column gives the deviation between the theoretical and the simulated value. To visualize the
time series properties of mutually adapting myopic best response bidders, Figure 10.3 shows
the strategies of both bidders over 100 time steps in the middle of the simulation. The solid
line is bidder 0’s strategy while the dashed line shows bidder 1’s strategy.
For perfect memory best response, the upper part of Figure 10.4 shows the development
of β0 during the first 100.000 rounds if bNumRounds=1 and bMemoryStrength=1. I set here
numRounds=1 – instead of numRounds= 1.000 as in the previous sections – to show the pure
effect of perfect memory best response without using fictitious play truncation.
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β¯0
mBR via FS
bNumStrat βFS0 β
th
0 dev(β
FS
0 , β
th
0 )
9 0.3009 0.2996 3%
99 0.1194 0.112 6%
999 0.0608 0.0573 6%
9999 0.0387 0.0348 10%
49999 0.0282 0.0262 7%
Table 10.14: Simulation of Myopic Best Response under Mutual Adaptation
The lower part of Figure 10.4 shows both bidders’ strategies if they follow not perfect memory
play put truncated Fictitious play. I show here 100 strategy updatings in the middle of a sim-
ulation if updating occurs every 1.000 auctions (numRounds= 1.000 and memoryStrength= 0).
Again, the solid line shows bidder 0’s strategy and the dashed line bidder 1’s strategy. To
get a more accurate assessment of the convergence of perfect memory play if more information
is aggregated, I left numRounds=1.000 but set memoryStrength= 1. Then I simulated 24.000
generations where recording started in generation 1. Table 10.15 reports the strategy averages
of the first to the fourth quarter of the simulation.
Discussion:
Table 10.14 shows that in simulations of myopic best response, strategies in general do not
converge to 0 under mutual adaptation. This is in contradiction to the prediction of Theorem
4.4 that predicts the convergence to a steady state where bidders do not bid anything at all.
However, the means of simulations with increasing numbers of strategies – given in the second
column of Table 10.14 – show that this is a finite size effect. As the number of strategies goes to
infinity, the strategies converge to 0 under mutual adaptation. The underlying reason for this
is that in FS simulations with finitely many strategies there exists a lowest strategy βmin that
is unequal to 0. In the case of 1.000 strategies this would be βmin = 1/1.000. Under myopic
best response, updating bidders change their strategy according to
β(t+1) = nx(
β
(t)
−iv
(t)
−i
v
(t)
i
) (10.2)
where nx(arg) denotes the strategy in the strategy set of bidder i that is next highest to the
argument6. Therefore, a bidder who would be led by myopic best response to play a strategy
between the lowest strategy and 0 overbids significantly in the simulation. For higher strategies
of the bidder, the effect is still there, however it gets ever less significant, as the percentage of
overbidding shrinks with increasing strategy. At the lower end of the strategy set, however, this
effect constitutes a natural barrier against the convergence to 0:
Even if bidder 1 plays her lowest strategy, bidder 0 has a fixed positive probability that her
next strategy is arbitrarily high. The probability to exceed a given strategy is given by
P (β(t+1)i > β˜) = P (
βminv
(t)
−i
v0
> β˜) =
βmin
2β˜
(10.3)
and does not decrease over time. So, even if both bidders play the lowest strategies in their
strategy set, there is a positive nonvanishing probability that at least one bidder breaks away
and plays a much higher strategy in the next time step. Once, the strategy of one bidder has
jumped up by chance, the other bidder will tend to use a high strategy after the next updating.
The bidder who plays the high strategy at time t will in general jump down to a low level
again since she uses the old low strategy of her opponent in the calculation of her new strategy.
So bidders’ strategies fall in mutual oscillations that eventually die out again – as derived in
chapter 4 – because the long-term dynamics pushes strategies towards 0. Figure 10.3 shows
these intermittent bursts of strategy oscillations for bidder 0 – solid line – and bidder 1 – dashed
line – in the middle of a simulation run. Clearly, this gives rise also to clustered volatility in
6If no strategy could have won the auction, bidders keep using their old strategy. However, this rule is not of
much interest here, since I want to assess why bidders loose their strategy combination of bidding their lowest
strategy. If the opponent uses a very low strategy, she bids low and therefore the opponent has only very seldom
a value below the opponent’s bid. Therefore, the rule is applied very seldom.
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Figure 10.3: Myopic Best Response under Mutual Adaptation with vi ∼ U(0, 1)
seller revenues, i.e., the asset prices and returns. As numStrategies increases, the bursts occur
less and less often and the strategies are most of the time at low levels.
The convergence rate of the average strategy towards 0 with increasing numStrategies in
Table 10.14 is quantitatively in accordance with the predictions of equation (4.49). The third
and the fourth column of Table 10.14 show the theoretical prediction of equation (4.49) for a
minimum strategy of ² = 1/numStrategies and its deviation to the simulation results. The
mean strategies are for all investigated cases within 10% of the theoretical prediction of equation
4.49. The difference between the simulation means and the prediction of equation (4.49) arises
since the theory assumes a continuum of feasible strategies between the lowest strategy and
1 whereas the simulation also quantizes strategies in this interval. Therefore, also for higher
strategies there occurs a certain overbidding which shifts the mean strategies in the simulation
above the theoretical prediction.
Figure 10.4 shows the average strategy of bidder 0 under perfect memory best response (fictitious
play) and truncated fictitious play.
The upper part shows that under perfect memory best response (numRounds= 1 and
memoryStrength= 1), strategies converge towards the NE. However, in accordance with Theo-
rem 4.6 bidders need infinitely long to arrive in the NE.
As discussed in the mathematical part of the thesis, the underlying reason is that with a setting
of memoryStrength= 1, bidders never forget anything. A bidder who wants to estimate her
opponent’s strategy in round t would calculate
β¯−i =
t∑
j=1
β
(j)
−i v
(j)
−i
0.5
. (10.4)
Because of the convergence of myopic play towards 0, strategies in the beginning of the simula-
tion are relatively low. The longer the simulation runs, the better the strategy updating of each
bidder is described by perfect memory best response against the estimate of the opponent’s
strategy. This updating is quantified by Theorem 4.5. In particular, when bidders estimate
their opponent’s strategy as β¯−i < 0.5, their best response satisfies β¯−i < β
pBR
i (β¯−i) < 0.5.
Therefore, strategies increase over time. However,the convergence towards the NE is extremely
slow since strategies below the NE also induce lower strategies in later rounds.
To assess the long term behavior of perfect memory best response, I set numRounds= 1.000 –
instead of numRounds= 1 – while still keeping memoryStrength= 1. Then I simulated 24.000
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Figure 10.4: Perfect Memory Best Response and truncated Fictitious Play under Mutual Adap-
tation
generations where recording started in round 1. Table 10.15 shows that the average strategy
converges towards the NE. However, even in the fourth quarter of the simulation where bidders
based their strategy updating on the results of 18 to 24 million auctions, strategies are still some
3% below the NE. This shows that under any realistic assumptions on the frequency of auctions
and on the memory capabilities of participants we have to assume significant deviations from
NE play in first-price auctions.
In many games, perfect memory best response doesn’t converge towards the NE because play-
ers can never forget the information from the beginning of the game. An alternative model
that often still converges towards the NE is truncated fictitious play. There, players forget
the information from previous stages of the game and can thereby more accurately assess the
strategies that their opponents currently use. Theorem 4.6 predicts that in first-price auctions,
also truncated fictitious play doesn’t converge but instead leads to permanent strategy fluctu-
ations below the NE.
The underlying reason here is that a finite number of rounds is not sufficient to assess the
opponent’s strategy arbitrarily accurate. Even if the opponent would play the NE strategy, the
best response would be below the NE half of the times. However, under mutual adaptation, if a
bidder plays a strategy below the NE, this increases the chance that her opponent updates to a
strategy below the NE even above one half. This mutual pushing to lower strategies eventually
comes to a halt because there also is an increasing trend according to Theorem 4.5. In the long
term, these two trends interact and lead to a stable strategy distribution with a mean below
the NE. The lower part of Figure 10.4 shows the simulation result for numRounds=1.000 and
memoryStrength= 0. Player 0’s strategy is given by the solid line whereas bidder 1’s strategy
is given by the dashed line. Both strategies show persistent fluctuations around a mean that is
well below the NE of 0.5. Moreover we see that the strategies are correlated. They involve in
simultaneous up- and down movements. This shows that the main determinant of each bidder’s
strategy is the opponent’s strategy and not the stochasticity of the value realizations. I will say
more on truncated fictitious play in the next chapter.
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βpBR0 via FS
generation βmean0
0-6k 0.4574
6-12k 0.4771
12k-18k 0.4818
18k-24k 0.4842
Table 10.15: Simulation of Perfect Memory Best Response under Mutual Adaptation
β¯0
mQR(β1, ξ)
β1 β
th
0 (β1, 1) β
FS
0 (β1, 1) β
th
0 (β1, 10) β
FS
0 (β1, 10) β
th
0 (β1, 100) β
FS
0 (β1, 100) β
mBR
0 (β1)
0.2 0.48959 0.48990 0.29818 0.29816 0.24189 0.24113 0.23438
0.5 0.59848 0.59844 0.44791 0.44710 0.40362 0.40189 0.39772
0.8 0.65473 0.65349 0.52525 0.52188 0.48717 0.48273 0.48210
Table 10.16: Simulation of Myopic Quantal Response with Variable ξ
10.7 Payoff-Exponential Quantal Response
Hypothesis:
The AS correctly replicates the predictions of Theorem 6.2 for myopic payoff-exponential quan-
tal response against a fixed strategy for all ξ. For perfect memory quantal response, the AS
correctly interpolates between the predictions of Theorem 6.3 for ξ = 1 and Theorem 4.6 for
ξ →∞.
Parameter Settings:
The settings are the same as for myopic and perfect memory quantal response, only that bXi
varies between 1 and 100.
Results:
Table 10.16 shows the simulation results for myopic payoff-exponential quantal response. The
rows differ by bidder 1’s strategy which is given in the first column. The three blocks in
the middle show the theoretical prediction and the simulation result for different values of ξ.
The rightmost column gives the theoretical best response value that should be approached for
ξ → ∞. In table 10.17 I show exemplarily the results for the simulation of perfect memory
payoff-exponential quantal response with a fixed strategy of β1 = 0.2 and varying levels of ξ.
The second column shows the theoretical result for ξ = 1 and the rightmost column shows the
best response result that should be obtained for ξ →∞.
Discussion:
We see that for varying ξ the AS gives results that are consistent with the theory. For myopic
quantal response, the results are in line with the theoretical predictions for all ξ. For perfect
memory play, where no general closed-form solutions were obtainable for intermediate levels of
ξ, the simulation replicates the theoretical prediction of ξ = 1. With increasing ξ it decreases
from there monotonically and converges towards βpBR0 (β1), the theoretical value for ξ → ∞.
Therefore, the results of this section show that payoff-exponential quantal response is simulated
correctly by the AS.
βpQR0 (0.2, ξ)
β1 β
th
0 (β1, 1) β
FS
0 (β1, 1) β
FS
0 (β1, 5) β
FS
0 (β1, 10) β
FS
0 (β1, 50) β
pBR
0 (β1)
0.2 0.42236 0.42276 0.34081 0.31758 0.29143 0.28390
Table 10.17: Simulation of Perfect Memory Quantal Response with Variable ξ
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10.8 Comments on Chapter 5
In the thesis, I do not replicate any results from chapter 5. I want to shortly argue, why:
I can not double-check the results from section 5.1 since the AS can only simulate linear strate-
gies. The prediction about the shape for the bidding function can therefore currently not be
checked. I plan to do this, when I have extended the AS for the simulation of non-linear bidding
functions. I will say more on this in the last chapter.
Section 5.2 dealt with a very specific model that bidders used to estimate the opponent’s strat-
egy from her bid. It works in the specified form if there are only two bidders and both are
perfectly sure that values are uniformly distributed. These assumption are in contrast to the
usual assumption from agent based modeling that bidders react to their environment without
knowing the determinants of this environment. Moreover, the results would have to be calcu-
lated anew for each different number of bidders and value distribution. Therefore I refrained
from implementing this estimation procedure in the AS.
Section 5.3 considered the differences between open and sealed bid auctions. Since I can not
decide on a canonical model for the winner’s strategy-lowering rule, I refrain at the current level
from implementing such a specific rule in the AS. However, it might be an interesting route
for further research to experimentally determine how winning bidders update their strategies in
sealed bid auctions. Then, I would aim to analyze the effects of this mechanism mathematically
and to implement it into the AS.
10.9 Conclusions from this Chapter
In this chapter I have shown that the AS correctly reproduces the mathematical results that
I derived in the first part of the thesis: The first two sections show that both, the bidder
and the seller side are simulated correctly. The correct results for myopic and perfect memory
play strongly suggest that also for intermediate memory strengths, the setups are simulated
correctly. The third and the fourth section indicate that also the interaction between bidders
and sellers is simulated correctly. Sections 5 and 6 show that not only against fixed strategies
but also under mutual adaptation, the results are in general correct. And section seven shows
that the AS correctly simulates QR with arbitrary ξ.
I draw two main conclusions from this:
First of all, the mathematical analysis is correct. Wherever mathematical predictions were
not matched by simulation results, I was able to explain this by the particularities of the
simulation technique. As a particularly interesting route for further mathematical research, the
Θ−function-based formalism that I developed for the analysis of perfect memory best response
seems to be a reliable tool to assess the phase space dynamics around the NE. Therefore I want
in future research to extend the methodology to investigate in more general auction setups,
whether NEs are attracting, repelling or show saddle path behavior.
Second, the AS seems to be free of bugs. Especially with FSs, it is a reliable tool to replicate
analytical results. The setups that I investigated can be characterized along the following
dimensions:
• Memory Strength: Myopic vs perfect memory play (interpolation via λ or numRounds)
• Learning Model: Best response vs quantal response (interpolation via ξ)
• Participants: Bidder and Seller Side of a market; with or without interaction (setup via
numBidders resp. numSellers, priceDet, respective fixed strategies and/or values)
One can think of this chapter as building a hypercube in the space of auction setups that are
reliably assessable with the AS. I rigorously check the vertices of the hypercube and then claim
that, if the results in the vertices are correct, also the whole space of auction setups within the
hypercube that is spanned by the vertices is simulated correctly. An example for this rather
abstract claim:
Myopic and perfect memory best response are simulated correctly, therefore I claim that also
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imperfect memory play and truncated fictitious play are simulated correctly as they are interpo-
lations between these two extremes. On the other hand, the parameter ξ interpolates correctly
between best and linear quantal response for myopic and perfect memory play. Therefore I
assume that the AS also correctly simulates all possible combinations of λ and ξ – any kind
of imperfect memory payoff-exponential quantal response. In this sense I can guarantee that –
within its functionality – the AS gives for very general auction setups the results that would
also be obtained by the according rigorous mathematical analysis - though the analysis is too
tedious.
In the following chapter I will follow this route by changing several assumptions and looking at
characteristics of the generated time series.
Where do I have to be careful in interpreting the results of the AS?
First, the AS has problems in simulating 2PAs correctly. However, since I know that the
error only comes from the finite computation accuracy, I can overcome this problem by setting
the memory strength in these simulations equal to 1. Still, the same problem could distort
the results in the simulation of 3rd and higher price auctions under imperfect memory best
response.7
Second, the simulation of myopic bidders in 1PAs under mutual adaptation, is biased towards
higher strategies by the finiteness of the strategy set. This severely distorts the dynamics of the
auction. As a counter-measure, I should use in such simulations as many strategies as possible.
Note however that the problem of overbidding is especially severe for the particular setup of
2 myopic best response bidders with uniform value distributions, since strategies in this setup
tend towards 0. By allowing for positive memory strength, truncated fictitious play, normal
value distributions or more than two bidders, the lowest strategies are played less often or not
at all. Therefore, the degree of overbidding is much lower in such setups and I can expect
simulation results that – largely – correspond to the mathematical predictions.
7I think, this error in simulating 3rd and higher price auctions is not too big, given that the error in the
simulation of 2PAs is also quite small.
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Chapter 11
Computational Analysis of
Mutually Adapting Bidders
In the previous chapter I discussed in detail that the AS correctly reproduces the mathematical
predictions of the first part of the thesis. This serves as a quality check for the AS. However,
the auction setups that I considered there were very restricted: They focused only on first-price
auctions with two bidders and values from a uniform distribution. In this chapter I want to use
the AS to investigate auction setups where I have no mathematical predictions.
11.1 Auction Efficiency
In the previous chapter, I considered two-bidder 1PAs with uniform value distributions and
myopic or perfect memory best response. Under these assumptions, the simulation replicated
correctly the analytic predictions. In particular, the simulation showed that even for the case
of perfect memory best response, it takes bidders infinitely long to converge to the NE. Under
truncated fictitious play, strategies fluctuate below the NE. The mutual adaptation leads to an
inefficient allocation since strategies βi are in general different among bidders and therefore the
good is not necessarily allocated to the bidder who values it the most. However, we saw also
correlation between the strategies, so, while fluctuating, the strategies stay quite close together
and therefore we might suspect that the good is at least in most of the cases obtained by the
bidder who values it the most. In this section I want to investigate the efficiency of different
auction setups. In particular, I am interested in the dependence of auction efficiency on the
memory strength, on the number of bidders and on the auction format.
Varying Memory Strength:
Table 11.1 shows the effect of varying the memory strength λ of two mutually adapting bidders
in repeated first-price open bid auctions. I chose λ and not numRounds as the interpolation
variable because I consider imperfect memory best response as a more realistic model for finite
memory strength than truncated fictitious play. However, the dynamics arising from these
two interpolation methods should be similar as bidders use information from ever more rounds
to update their strategies. The average auction efficiency in the fifth row is determined by
calculating the ratio of the values of the winning bidder and the winner with the highest
valuation,
∑
vwin/
∑
vmax where the summation goes over all auctions. The deviation of the
average auction efficiency from 1 shows, how much potential surplus is wasted by the allocation
mechanism in comparison to the pareto optimal allocation. The last row reports the percentage
of auctions in which the bidder with the highest valuation got assigned the asset.
The mathematical analysis predicts convergence of the strategies to 0 for myopic best response
(λ = 0) and to the NE for perfect memory best response (λ = 1). Intuitively, imperfect
memory with λ ∈ (0, 1) should therefore smoothly interpolate between these two extremes and
lead to underbidding that is the more severe, the lower λ is. This intuition is verified by the
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Memory Strength λ 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
NE Strategy 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Average Strategy 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.36
Deviation from NE Strategy -78% -68% -59% -47% -29%
Average Auction Efficiency 87% 91% 94% 96% 99%
Percentage of Efficient Auctions 67% 73% 78% 84% 91%
Table 11.1: Effect of Memory Strength on 1POBAs
Participating Bidders 2 3 5 10 20
NE Strategy 0.5 0.67 0.8 0.9 0.95
Average Strategy 0.16 0.40 0.66 0.84 0.93
Deviation from NE Strategy -68% -41% -18% -6% -2%
ρ 68% 81% 71% 58% 48%
Average Auction Efficiency 91% 91% 95% 97% 99%
Percentage of Efficient Auctions 73% 66% 65% 66% 66%
Table 11.2: Effect of Number of Bidders on 1POBAs
simulation: All memory strengths λ ∈ (0, 1) lead to average strategies above 0 but below the NE.
The average strategy increases monotonically in λ, however, even a unrealistically high memory
strength of λ = 0.91 still leads to an underbidding of 29% and hence to 29% lower expected
revenue for the seller when compared to a second-price auction with bidders who bid the true
value.2 A plot of the average strategy over the memory strength λ would be increasing in λ
where the first derivative is the higher, the higher λ is – i.e., with positive second derivative.
For the efficiency we see that both measures, average auction efficiency and percentage of
efficient auctions are below 100% for all memory strengths. With increasing memory strength
the efficiency increases. This means that the correlation between the two bidders’ strategies
increases, strategies move closer together. However, the average auction efficiency stays for all
imperfect memory strengths below the benchmark of perfect efficiency that would be reached
by a 2PA with imperfect memory strength.3. Furthermore we see that efficiency losses occur
mainly when bidders’ valuations are close to each other since the average auction efficiency is
significantly above the percentage of efficient auctions. This tendency gets more significant for
higher memory strengths: While the average social loss per inefficient auction is 13%/33% ∼
40% for λ = 0.1, it falls down to 1%/9% ∼ 10% for λ = 0.9.
More than 2 Bidders:
Table 11.2 reports the impact of increasing the number of participants n in first-price auctions.
Memory strength was fixed at 0.3.4 The first row reports the number n of participating bidders.
The second row shows the NE strategy βi = (n − 1)/n. The third row gives the deviation
between the average strategy and the NE strategy, 1 − βNE/β¯. The fourth row shows the
quotient ρ = (βNE − β¯)/(1 − βNE). The remainder of the table is structured as the previous
one.
The results show that first-price auctions fail to converge to the NE also with an increasing
number of bidders. However, as the number of bidders increases, the deviations from the NE
get rapidly smaller. At first sight, one could therefore conclude that for an increasing number
of participants, bidders converge into the NE. This convergence could however be an artefact:
Two monotonically increasing series that both converge towards 1 with increasing number of
bidders – namely the series of NEs and the series of average strategies – naturally converge in
absolute terms to each other. However, it is not clear wether they also move closer to each other
1From an information theoretic point of view, λ = 0.9 should roughly correspond to truncated fictitious play
with 1 + 0.9 + 0.92 + 0.93 + · · · = 1 + 1
1−0.9 = 11 rounds.
2For low memory strengths, the finiteness of the strategy set could - like under myopic play - lead to
overbidding when compared to the analytical predictions. However, also then, analytically the qualitative
behavior is the same as in the simulation: Theoretically, average strategies for small values would be even
smaller, therefore the increase of the average strategy in the memory strength is even bigger.
3As lined out above, the 2PA simulation fails to capture this convergence due to the finite working precision
of computers. Still, mathematically it is clear the also 2PAs with any positive memory strength must in Theory
converge to the NE and therefore 2PAs are perfectly efficient. Note that this does not affect the results of 1PAs.
4The relatively low value of λ is motivated by experimental observations that participants in repeated games
mainly react to the outcome of the last rounds.
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Auction Format 1 2 3 4 5
NE Strategy (10 bidders) 0.9 1 1.125 1.29 1.5
Average Strategy 0.84 1 1.13 1.34 1.56
Deviation from NE Strategy -6% 0% +1% +4% +4%
Average Auction Efficiency 97% 100% 97% 96% 97%
Percentage of Efficient Auctions 66% 100% 62% 57% 60%
Table 11.3: Effect of Auction Format
in relative terms. The natural quantity to assess this as numBidders increases is the quotient
ρ = (βNE − β¯)/(1 − βNE). It compares the distances of the NE and the average strategy to 1
and tells us, by how much further away the average strategy is from 1 than the NE is away from
1. With respect to this quantity, there is no clear convergence of the average strategy towards
the NE. Even for 20 bidders, the average strategy has about 50% more distance from 1 than
the NE. However, the results might still indicate a very slow convergence towards the NE as ρ
falls from ∼ 80% for 3 bidders to ∼ 50% for 20 bidders. Simulations with many more bidders
could clarify this point in the future.
From the fifth row we see that the amount of wasted social surplus decreases with increasing
number of bidders. This means that bidders’s strategies move closer together as the number
of bidders increases. This is a simple consequence of the fact that increasing the number of
bidders leads each bidder to use a higher strategy since competition gets fiercer. Consequently,
the strategies are confined in a smaller interval and therefore closer together.
For more than 2 bidders the probability that the bidder with the highest valuation gets assigned
the asset stays essentially at 2/3. Interestingly, this probability seems also largely independent
of the memory strength and the auction format - as long as it is not a 2PA (see also Table 11.3).
In the future, it would be interesting to identify the underlying reasons for this constant.
Auction Format:
Table 11.3 reports the outcome of simulations to assess the impact of choosing different auction
formats. Again I choose λ = 0.3 and simulate a fixed number of 10 participating bidders. The
first row reports the auction format, ranging from 1st- to 5th-price auctions. The rest of the
rows are as in the previous simulations where the NE strategy in a kth-price auction with n
participants and uniform value distributions is given by
b(v) = (1 +
k − 2
n− k + 1)v , (11.1)
see e.g., Wolfstetter (1996).
While first-price open bid auctions lead to underbidding for finite memory strengths, all
kth-price auctions with k ≥ 3 lead strategies above the NE where the overbidding increases
with increasing k. So, a revenue-maximizing seller might prefer kth price auctions with high
k. However, the increase in expected seller revenue is accompanied by fluctuating bidding
strategies and therefore by riskier seller revenue when compared to the seller revenue in a 2PA.
Therefore, the auction format that a risk averse seller prefers depends on her specific risk profile.
In conclusion I arrive at the following conjecture:
Conjecture 11.1 Among all kth-price pure bidder open or sealed bid auctions, the second-
price auction is the unique format that yields an optimal allocation of goods under best response
dynamics with imperfect memory.
11.2 Myopic Best Response with Normal Value Distribu-
tions
11.2.1 Influence of the Variance
For uniform value distributions I have derived a variety of analytical results and proved them
in the last section. But what can be said about the case of normal value distributions?
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βmBR0 (σ
2
v)
βFS0 (0) β
FS
0 (0.001) β
FS
0 (0.01) β
FS
0 (0.1) β
FS
0 (1) β
FS
0 (10) β
FS
0 (100) β
FS
0 (U)
1 0.9955 0.9565 0.7437 0.1772 0.0799 0.0621 0.0608
Table 11.4: Effect of Value Distribution on Strategy
Simple Gedankenexperimente show that the outcome of 1POBAs must depend critically on the
variance σ2v of the value distribution for bidders. For very small standard deviation resp. vari-
ance of the normal value distribution, β¯0
br(β1) must for all memory strengths be approximately
equal to 1: In the extreme case, if both bidders have the same value each, each bidder does
optimal if she bids more than her opponent. Naturally, since feasible strategies are bounded
from above by one, the process of mutual best response adaptation therefore increases both
bidders bids and leads them in the long term to bid exactly their true value.
For very large standard deviations, on the other hand, results must converge to the results for
an underlying uniform distribution: In the simulation, the normal value distribution N(µv, σ2v)
gets cut off at v = 0 and v = 2µv to avoid negative values but still guarantee symmetry. The
higher σv, the flatter the normal distribution in the interval (0, 2µv). If a value is outside
(0, 2µv), the value gets repeatedly drawn anew until it lies inside (0, 2µv). For σ →∞, each of
the values on (0, 2µ) gets drawn with equal probability and therefore the distribution converges
for σv →∞ to a uniform distribution U(0, 2µv).
Parameter Settings:
The recording in this simulation started in generation 5.000 to guarantee sufficient time for
swinging in and lasted for 24.000 generations thereafter. Parameter settings are as for myopic
best response under mutual adaptation in section 10.6 except that
bidder.setup
valDistShape 0 valDet1 0.001,...,100 valDet2 100
Setting valDistShape= 0 instructs the AS to draw values from a normal distribution. The mean
of this normal distribution is given by valDet2= 100. The variance is given by valDet1 and
varies in the different runs between 0.001 and 100. Note that in my notation the variance is given
in % of the mean. In this particular simulation this also is the absolute value of the variance
since µv = 100. Additionally I did one run with the parameter settings (valDistShape= 1,
valDet1= 0, valDet2= 100) to simulate a uniform distribution on (0, 100).
Note furthermore, that for normal value distributions the average strategy depends crucially on
the density of strategies used in the simulation. If neighboring strategies in the simulation are
far apart when compared to the typical difference between two value realizations, the model
will fail to simulate the dynamics of mutual strategy adaptation correctly. Therefore, I adapted
the value of bMinStrat in response to the peakedness of the normal value distribution: The
lower σ2, the closer the strategies are to 1 and therefore I chose bMinStrat near 1 in order to
maximize the coverage of the used part of the strategy space. I determined the appropriate
value of bMinStrat in pre-runs to guarantee that the strategy space was still large enough so
that strategies would never leave it.
Results:
Table 11.4 shows the mean strategy of bidder 0 for different variances of the underlying normal
distributions (given in % of the mean). The leftmost column denotes the extreme case σv = 0
where both bidders always get the same value. The uniform value distribution in the rightmost
column is the other extreme case with σv →∞.
Figure 11.1 shows the strategy histograms of bidder 0 for four different underlying value distri-
butions. The figure should be read row-wise starting from the upper-left corner.
Discussion:
Table 11.4 shows that the Auction Simulator smoothly interpolates between the predictions for
mean strategies for a fixed value and uniform value distributions. For the case of an underlying
uniform value distribution, as I showed in the last chapter, the theoretical correct value of
convergence to 0 is not replicated by the AS because of the finite strategy set. As noted there,
this is a problem that influences the results particularly strong if strategies are very low.
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A look at Figure 11.1 shows, however, that the results for normal value distributions should be
not influenced by the finiteness of the strategy set as long as their variance is sufficiently small.
Looking at the upper-left plot, we see that for v ∼ N(100, 0.01), strategies never drop below
0.84. Therefore, the overbidding of a player with 1000 strategies is at most 1/10000.84 ∼ 0.12%.
This shows that for myopic best response with sufficiently narrow normal distributions – as
opposed to uniform distributions – the finiteness of the strategy set does not influence the
results significantly.
From Figure 11.1 we see that strategy distributions are skewed. For low variances of the
Figure 11.1: Effect of Value Distribution on Strategy Distribution
value distribution, the strategy distribution is left-skewed. As the variance of the normal
distribution increases, the strategy distribution changes into an exponential distribution with
negative exponent. For uniform distributions and normal distributions that are sufficiently flat
so that strategies come arbitrarily close to 0, as I have argued above, the strategy distribution
is not simulated correctly, however, the lower right plot shows that the lowest strategy is played
most of the time. In the future, it would be interesting to find a one-parameter family of
distribution functions that smoothly interpolates between the different strategy distributions
by taking the variance σv of the underlying value distribution as parameter.
Besides the strategy distribution, another interesting characteristics of the data is shown by a
log-log-plot of the absolute seller returns. The returns are calculated in each round as
rt =
POsellt − POsellt−1
POsellt−1
(11.2)
The plot is made in the following way:
In step 1, all absolute returns are ranked by size: r1 > r2 > · · · .
In step 2, the logs of the absolute returns are plotted over the logs of their ranks: f(ln(rank)) =
ln(rrank). This gives a monotonically decreasing plot. If a region within this plot is approxi-
mately given by a straight line, this means that within this region, returns are characterized by
a power-law.
The log-log-plots in Figure 11.2 show for normal value distributions two different regions.5. For
a uniform value distribution, such a distinction into two regions does not occur. This indicates,
that in the case of normal value distributions, there are two different mechanisms responsible
for price changes. One governs the extreme returns that occur in the left part of the plot.
5Note that the two regions of the return characteristics only arise if the strategy space is sufficiently dense
in the simulation. Otherwise, the simulation fails to capture the two regions.
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Figure 11.2: Effect of Value Distribution on Log-Log-Plot of Returns
Figure 11.2 shows that these extreme returns are only a fraction of the total sample of returns
since the x-axis is logarithmic. The other mechanism governs the more moderate changes that
make up the main part of the observations. In the following I investigate the emergence of these
two regions in more detail.
11.2.2 Myopic Best Response
Figure 11.3 shows the begin of a simulation with two mutually adapting bidders under best
response. In contrast to most other simulations I recorded here the parameters without a phase
in, starting at time 0. Each bidder starts with the strategy β0 = β1 = 0. Each bidder has
999 strategies between 0 and 1. For the underlying value distribution I chose µv = 1 and
σ2v = 0.001%. The narrowness of this distribution allows me to single out the effects that stem
from the mutual interaction of bidders.
We see in the upper two plots of the figure the bidders strategies in the beginning of the
simulation. Bidders increase their strategies for the first approximately 2000 generations from
0 to slightly below 1. This increase is accompanied by oscillations with time-varying amplitude
– as can be seen by the ’thickness’ of the strategy plots that changes over time.
The price is given by the highest bid. Since the values in each round are very close to 1 – and
therefore also close to each other – , in general the bidder with the higher strategy wins the
auction. Consequently, the price – shown in the lower left plot – closely follows the highest
strategy over time and increases steadily without any jumps or sudden losses.
How can we understand this strategy increase?
Assume – for a simulation with 1.000 strategies between 0 and 1 – that in the beginning both
bidders play their lowest strategy β(0)0 = β
(0)
1 = 0.001. Assume further that v
(0)
0 = 0.998 and
v
(0)
1 = 1.001. Then,
β
(1)
0 = nx(
0.001 · 1.001
0.998
) = nx(0.001003) = 0.002 (11.3)
and
β
(1)
1 = nx(
0.001 · 0.998
1.001
) = nx(0.000997) = 0.001 (11.4)
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Figure 11.3: Oscillations - Ramp Up
By nx(α) I denote the operator that assigns to any number α ∈ (0, 1) the next highest strategy
in the strategy set. Assume now values for the next round as v(1)0 = 0.994 and v
(1)
1 = 0.998.
Then,
β
(2)
0 = nx(
0.001 · 0.998
0.994
) = 0.002, β(2)1 = nx(
0.002 · 0.994
0.998
) = 0.002 (11.5)
If values had been the other way around, v’(1)0 = 0.998 and v
’(1)
1 = 0.994, then
β
’(2)
0 = nx(
0.001 · 0.994
0.998
) = 0.001 β’(2)1 = nx(
0.002 · 0.998
0.994
) = 0.002 (11.6)
So, we see the following pattern for the strategies:
(0.001, 0.001)→ (0.002, 0.001)→ (0.002, 0.002) resp. (0.001, 0.002) (11.7)
So, on average, strategies increase in the beginning of the simulation run. You might also check
this by trying other value realizations. The underlying reason is the finiteness of the strategy
grid that leads to overbidding in each time step.
Next I investigate a strategy combination in the middle of the ramp-up:
Assume that β(25)0 = 0.011 and β
(25)
1 = 0.008. Assume for this round value realizations of
v
(25)
0 = 0.998, v
(25)
1 = 1.002. Then,
β
(26)
0 = nx(
0.008 · 1.002
0.998
) = 0.009 β(26)1 = nx(
0.011 · 0.998
1.002
) = 0.011 (11.8)
Conversely, if v’(25)0 = 1.002 and v
’(25)
1 = 0.998 we would obtain
β
’(26)
0 = nx(
0.008 · 0.998
1.002
) = 0.008 β’(25)1 = nx(
(0.011 · 1.002
0.998
) = 0.012 (11.9)
So we see that bidders’ strategies start to oscillate. While bidder 0s strategy was at time 25
above bidder 1s strategy, in time step 26 it is the other way around. The oscillation is largely
independent of the value realizations in the respective round, the value realizations mainly
influence wether the gap between the high and the low strategy increases or decreases in the
next round. Moreover we see that strategies on average continue to increase.
Figure 11.4 shows the first 50 observations of the ramp-up. The first two plots show the
strategies of bidder 0 and bidder 1. We see, how in the very first steps the strategies either
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increase or stay constant. At around time 5, permanent oscillations set in and their mean
increases over time. Comparison between β0 and β1 for a specific time step shows that the
strategies alternatingly jump to high and low levels: If the strategy of one bidder is high, the
strategy of the other bidder is low and vice versa. The third and the fourth row show the
bidders’ values for control purposes. As we see, they are purely random and show no signs
of oscillations. This highlights graphically that the oscillations are internally generated by the
updating rules of the bidders.
Figure 11.4: Oscillations - The first 50 observations
Fig11.3 shows that at time ∼ 2000 the system stops the increase because feasible strategies
have to stay below one. Once the value combinations would be such that
urenx(
β
(t)
−iv
(t)
−i
v
(t)
i
) > 1 (11.10)
the rule β(t+1)i = β
(t)
i kicks in and so bidder i keeps her old strategy. Note that the slope of the
ramp-up and therefore also the time step at which the kink appears depends on the number
of strategies I use in the simulation. For 100 strategies the ramp-up would reach the plateau
already after 200 time steps.
The application of the rule βnewi = β
old
i changes the behavior of the system dramatically. In
Figure 11.5 I show 150 observations between time 3900 and 4050.
Note that scales in this exhibit are much smaller than in Figure 11.4: The fluctuations of
strategies and prices in this time window are at the 3% level. I observe only a small window of
150 time steps. At this zoom level we see that both strategies oscillate regularly. Usually, the
mean of the oscillations increases over time. However, when strategies have increased by too
much and the higher strategy approaches 1, a crash occurs that drops both strategies back to a
lower level. From there they start to increase again. Correspondingly we see sharp drops in the
time series of prices because the price is mainly determined by the higher of the two strategies.
After a crash the price gradually rises again.
To understand the crash behavior better, imagine the following typical sequence taken from the
middle of the simulation: In each round, bidders draw random value realizations and calculate
β
(t+1)
i = nx(
β
(t)
−i · v(t)−i
v
(t)
i
) (11.11)
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Figure 11.5: Oscillations near 1 - 150 observations
t β
(t)
0 β
(t)
1 v
(t)
0 v
(t)
1 b
(t)
0 b1(t) p return
1 0.993 0.975 1.002 0.998 0.9949 0.9370 0.9949
2 0.972 0.997 1.005 1.004 0.9786 1.0009 1.0009 0.6%
3 0.997 0.973 0.999 1.002 0.9960 0.9749 0.9960 -0.5%
4 0.976 0.995 0.996 1.004 0.9720 0.9989 0.9989 0.3%
5 0.976 0.969 0.995 1.001 0.9711 0.9699 0.9711 -2.79%
Table 11.5: Typical Sequence of mutual Strategy Adaptation under mBR
as next period’s strategies. I assume that the bidders have 1000 strategies each, so the strategy
space for each bidder is (0, 0.001, ..., 0.999). Then, a typical set of consecutive data could look
as in Table 11.5.
Between time t = 1 and t = 4 strategies are in the oscillation phase. Next period’s strategies
are given by nx(β−iv−ivi ) ∼ nx(β−i) since vi ∼ v−i due to the narrowness of the distribution. The
price is close to 1. At time t = 5, however, bidder 0’s strategy would be given by nx(0.99890.996 ) =
nx(1.002992) = 1.003. Since this strategy is infeasible, player 0 sticks to her old strategy 0.976.
Bidder 1, however shows the regular oscillation pattern and drops to 0.969. Consequently, both
strategies are now at a low level. The lower right plot in Figure 11.5 shows the scatter plot of
strategies where strategy combinations that follow each other in time are connected by lines.
From the symmetry around the first median we see that strategies basically exchange their
values in each time step. Since strategies increase on average, the points move to the upper
right of the plot. Crashes drop them back to a lower level which is visualized by horizontal
respective vertical lines.
Since the price follows closely the time series of higher strategies, this behavior induces a sharp
price drop and therefore a high negative return: The price is given by the highest bid. In
periods of oscillation, the time series of highest bids - basically given by the bids of the bidder
who is currently in the top-position - is smoothly increasing. However, if one strategy can not
oscillate to a higher level since it would be > 1, it stays at its previous low level while the
other strategy also oscillates to the lower level. So the time series of highest strategies drops
suddenly and the consequence is a price crash. The lower left plot in Figure 11.5 shows the
corresponding squared returns.
In conclusion, the behavior of mutually adapting myopic best response bidders with normal
value distributions depends crucially on the updating rule that bidders use if no feasible bid
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could have obtained the item. The special rule that I used in that case was βnew0 = β
old
0 .
Alternatively, one could imagine several other plausible updating rules. The updating bidder
could start bidding higher, βnew0 ∼ U(βold0 , 1) or even βnew0 = 1. This would reduce or even
eliminate the extreme crashes. Since I see no arguments in favor of any particular updating
rule6, I refrain from analyzing the alternative updating rules.
11.3 Imperfect Memory Best Response with Normal Value
Distributions
In this section I assess the influence of the parameter memoryStrength on the outcome of first-
price auctions with 2 bidders. For the value distribution I choose N(1, σ2v = 0.1%)7. Figure
11.6 shows the impact of the memory strength on the strategies.
The upper-left plot shows that for myopic play, as discussed in detail above, strategies oscillate,
Figure 11.6: Strategy - 150 Observations
while crashing frequently. As the memory strength increases, we see several interrelated effects.
For increasing memory strength, also the average strategy increases. This is in principle the
same effect that we have already seen in section 11.1 for uniform value distributions: There,
increasing the memory strength interpolates smoothly between the underbidding of myopic best
response and the (near to) NE-play of perfect memory best response. A similar result holds in
the case of a normal value distribution and simulation with linear strategies: Myopic play leads
on average to underbidding whereas the linear strategy converges under perfect memory best
response, as I will show in section 11.5, to a strategy that is about double as far away from 1
as the NE strategy.
With increasing memoryStrength, the lock-ins of strategies into oscillations are increasingly of-
ten interrupted by phases where they seem to move irregularly. The variance of the strategies’
movements over time decreases drastically as the memory strength increases. This is also intu-
itive since in the extreme case of perfect memory best response (memoryStrength=1) strategies
6Hints for realistic updating rules could probably be obtained from human experiments
7I.e., the standard deviation σv of the underlying value distribution is ten times as high as in the detailed
analysis of the last section.
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would not fluctuate but increase monotonically over time towards 1. For low memoryStrength
up to ∼ 0.6 where strategies still involve at least sometimes in mutual oscillations, the decreased
variance of strategies for increasing memoryStrength corresponds to a decreased crash size. On
the other hand, strategy crashes occur more and more often as memoryStrength increases. For
sufficiently high memoryStrength, like in the lower right plot with memoryStrength= 0.9, there
are no oscillations any more. Strategies stay constant for relatively long periods. Note however
that this is not an artefact of the rule βnewi = β
old
i if no feasible strategy could have won:
Since both bidders play strategies significantly below 1 and values are very close to 1, bidders’
values satisfy in all auctions v(t)i > b
(t)
−i and therefore the rule is not applied. The reason for
the consecutive time steps of strategies is that as information from more and more auctions is
used in the determination of the best response, the influence of one individual auction on the
outcome gets less significant. Therefore, even if some feasible strategies could have won the
auction, this need not necessarily change the active strategy since the old strategy is still the
one that would have maximized the cumulated payoff.
Note that the simulation of imperfect memory play with sufficiently high memory strength, e.g.,
λ = 0.9, is robust: The overbidding due to the finite strategy set is of very little consequence
since the lowest strategy is ∼ 0.9 and therefore simulation with 1.000 strategies leads to very
low overbidding. On the other hand, since the bids are significantly below one, also the rule
βnew = βold is not applied. Therefore, the simulation results in such a setting do not depend on
the peculiarities of the simulation but correspond to a large extend to the mathematical results
that would be obtained by the corresponding mathematical analysis. Note however that as
numBidders increases and the auction becomes more competitive, also the strategies increase.
Therefore, it might happen that for sufficiently many bidders, the highest bids are often above
one and therefore the rule βnew0 = β
old has to be applied. Therefore, simulations of imperfect
memory play with many bidders will in general become inrobust.
The phases of constant strategies that we see especially for λ = 0.9 correspond to an AR-
process for the strategies and therefore also for the price: The price shows much longer phases
of consecutive time steps above and below the mean than we could expect if it was a random
walk. The corresponding autocorrelation function declines very slowly. However currently I
did not assess this process in more detail, because the Nash Equilibrium strategies for normal
value distributions are non-linear. I will consider the AR-process for normal value distributions
in more detail when I have extended the AS for nonlinear strategies. In contrast, in the next
section I will consider truncated fictitious play with uniform value distributions. There, the
estimation of the AR model has more predictive power because play near the NE can at least
be approximated by linear strategies.
The crash characteristics is summarized in a compact way by the return distributions in Figure
11.7.
For low memoryStrength, the return distribution is clearly separated into two different parts.
The main part of the distribution simply reflects the stochasticity that is introduced into the
simulation by the random value realizations. The left cluster reflects the crashes that arise
from the updating rule βnew0 = β
old
0 if no feasible strategy would have won. As memoryStrength
increases, the left tail of the return distribution increases in mass: As memoryStrength increases
from 0 to 0.1, the left cluster extends over more bins8 and also to higher levels within each bin.
This shows that the number of crash events increases with the memory strength. On the other
hand the crash size decreases in the memory strength so that the left tail moves towards the
central part of the return distribution. For sufficiently high memory strengths, the cluster of
extreme returns merges into the main part. This is, when the simulation becomes robust and
the rule βnew = βold is not applied anymore.
11.4 Truncated Fictitious Play with Uniform Value Dis-
tributions
From the simulations so far we have seen that the interpretation of simulation results can
be problematic. If strategies are close to 0, then the finiteness of the strategy set leads to
8A bin in a histogram is the interval on the x-axis for which events are summed up.
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Figure 11.7: Left Tail of Return Distribution
overbidding that fundamentally changes the dynamics of the bidding process when compared
to the mathematical predictions. If, on the other hand, strategies are in a round such that the
current value couldn’t have won the auction, then the results depend on the updating rule that
is chosen if the opponent’s bid exceeds a bidder’s value. This happens especially often when
bidders use high strategies.
The simulation results get independent of the number of strategies and also independent of the
updating rule, when I investigate bidders under truncated fictitious play with sufficiently high
numRounds. For the simulations in this section I switch back to a uniform value distribution.
Then the NE is given by a linear bidding strategy and the true non-liner strategies under
truncated fictitious play get at least approximated near the NE. I consider 10 bidders in a
first-price auction and assume that they update every numRounds= 100 rounds.
For such a high value of numRounds, play is already quite close to the NE which is given
in this setting by βi = 0.9. Therefore – like in the case of sufficiently high memoryStrength –
strategies are bounded away from 0. In the particular simulation that I consider here, strategies
fluctuate around 0.85. I simulate with 1.000 strategies, so the overbidding is in the range of
0.001/0.85 ∗ 100 = 0.1%. Even for the lowest strategy βi ∼ 0.4 that occurred in the simulation,
the overbidding is at most ∼ 0.25%. Therefore the finiteness of the strategy grid doesn’t
influence the simulation results significantly and therefore the results don’t depend on the
number of strategies chosen as long as the strategy grid is fine enough to accurately simulate
the dynamics9.
On the other hand, truncated fictitious play also guarantees that the rule β(t+1) = β(t) does not
influence the results: The rule is only applied when extreme value combinations (e.g., high v1
and low v0) leave no feasible strategy for the updating bidder. As numRounds increases, bidders
base their updating decisions on more and more value realizations. Therefore the chance that
for a certain bidder, in no round any of her strategies could have won the auction decreases
exponentially with numRounds. As an example consider a two bidder auction:
I calculate for given β1 and v1 the probability that in a specific auction no feasible strategy of
9The necessary accuracy of the strategy grid depends only on numRounds. The higher numRounds, the
smaller the strategy changes and the more numStrategies we need for an accurate simulation – or at least we
need to set bMinStrategy and bMaxStrategy such that the strategy grid is fine enough in the relevant simulation
region around the NE.
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Figure 11.8: Truncated Fictitious Play with Uniform Value Distribution
bidder 0 could have won. It is given by P (v0 < β1v1) = β1v1. Since v1 comes from a uniform
value distribution, the ex ante probability without knowing v1 is given by
P (v0 < β1v1) =
1∫
0
dv1β1v1 =
β1
2
. (11.12)
Consequently, if updating occurs every n rounds, then the probability that no strategy could
ever have won the auction is given by (β1/2)n. So even if the opponent plays her highest feasi-
ble strategy, β(t)1 = 1 and strategies are updated every 10 rounds, the probability that the rule
β
(t+1)
0 = β
(t)
0 gets applied in a given time step is only 0.5
10 ∼ 0.1%. For numRounds= 20, the
rule would be applied only in every 1/(0.5)20 ∼ 1 millionth time step. If we have more than
two bidders participating in the auction, qualitatively the same results hold, though it might
be necessary to increase numRounds even more to guarantee that the rule β(t+1)i = β
(t)
i is never
applied within a simulation run.
In conclusion, the simulation results of truncated fictitious play with sufficiently high numRounds
correspond to those that we would also get by a mathematical analysis. The simulation is not
influenced by the finiteness of the strategy grid and also not by the specific updating rule if no
feasible strategy could have won the auctions.
Figure 11.8 shows typical time series over 200 time steps between 18.500 and 18.700.
The upper left plot shows the strategy of bidder 0. Of course, under mutual adaptation, the
strategies of the other bidders look qualitatively the same. As predicted by the mathematical
analysis, strategies fluctuate permanently. Moreover we see from the plot that the fluctuations
are asymmetric: There are occasional breakouts to extremely low strategies whereas correspond-
ing breakouts to high strategies are not observed. In consequence, the histogram of bidder 0’s
strategies (not shown) has an asymmetric shape, it is skewed to the left. Table 11.6 quantifies
the skewedness: the mean of β0 is below the median of β0 – i.e., the strategy value that is
obtained by ranking all strategies according to their size and taking exactly the strategy in the
middle of this series. This shows that there are less strategies below the mean than above the
mean. Therefore, the low strategies show more significant deviations from the mean than those
above the mean - the distribution is skewed to the left. The asymmetry of played strategies
comes from the shape of the best response function: As numRounds→ ∞, bidder 0s strategy
would approach her best response to the other bidders’ strategies. I conjecture that then – in
analogy to the 2-bidder case that I plotted in Figure 4.5, but now for 10 bidders – her best
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β0 β
best βmax βav
mean 0.858 0.849 0.907 0.858
median 0.864 0.854 0.907 0.859
Table 11.6: Strategy Means and Medians under Truncated Fictitious Play
response against strategies above the NE is the NE whereas her best response against strategies
below the NE is also below the NE. Since numRounds is finite, the players can not accurately
assess their opponents’ strategies and therefore play not exactly according to the best response
function. However, their reaction on the opponents’ play is influenced to a large extent by
the shape of the best response function, thus leading them to react to high strategies of their
opponents in a much more moderate way than to low strategies.
The upper right plot shows for each time step the strategy of the bidder who has obtained the
highest payoff in the numRounds rounds. The plot supports the claim that the best response
against an environment of mutually adapting bidders is in general not the NE. Again we see
visually from the plot or from Table 11.6 that the distribution is skewed to the left. Note that
the fluctuations of the best strategies to low strategies are much more modest than the individ-
ual strategies. This is intuitively clear: A player with high values throughout the numRounds
auctions of a certain time step, will play a low strategy in the next round. Such a low strategy
occurs then in the time series of the bidder’s strategies. However, the chance that she will be
the most successful among all the other players with this low strategy in these next numRounds
auctions – which would put this strategy into the time series of best strategies – is very low,
since in these next auctions new value realizations are drawn.
The lower two plots in Figure 11.8 shows the maximum strategy and the average of the strate-
gies used by all bidders in the corresponding time steps. Visually and by comparison with Table
11.6 we see that these strategies are distributed symmetrically around their mean.10 Note from
table 11.6 that the mean of the average strategy is equal to the mean of the individual strategy
in the leftmost column. This is no coincidence since bidders are symmetric and in the one case
we average over the strategies of one representative player while in the other case we average
over the strategies of all players.
The maximum strategy is on average above the NE. So, though mathematically the best re-
sponse function doesn’t get higher than the NE11, the finiteness of numRounds lets strategies
also increase beyond the NE. The average of all strategies played by the bidders, however, is
usually below the NE. We know that average seller revenue in a repeated auction is lower than
in the NE. But, it is a priori not clear, how important the maximum strategy is in determining
the seller revenue when compared to the average strategy: The highest strategy is on average
the most likely to win each auction, therefore the maximum strategy is the most important
single strategy for determining seller revenue. On the other hand, due to the random value
realizations, the highest strategy will not win all of the numRounds auctions but all players
will win some of the auctions. Therefore, the average strategy is also an important factor in
determining the expected seller revenue. The question is, which of the two is more important
in determining the seller revenue12.
To get a feeling for which of the factors is more important for the determination of seller
revenue, I computed the effective strategy. This is the strategy that would give the same seller
revenue as truncated fictitious play if all bidders would use it constantly as their active strategy.
To calculate it I use the seller revenue: Average seller revenue in a first-price auction with 10
bidders where bidders bid according to the NE of βi = 0.9 is in the simulation obtained as
0.81838. Average seller revenue in the 1PA with truncated fictitious play is 0.78660. Therefore,
the effective strategy of the bidders is given as
βeffi = 0.9 ·
0.78660
0.81838
= 0.86505 . (11.13)
Comparison with the means in Table 11.6 show that this is much closer to the mean of the
average strategy than to the mean maximum strategy. Therefore, the average strategy is the
10βav might be slightly skewed to the left. However, this remains to be assessed in longer simulation runs.
11I assume that this is the case in analogy to the two-bidder case
12If, for instance, the average strategy was 5% below the NE, the maximum strategy was 1% above the NE
and seller revenue was one 1% below the NE level, then the maximum strategy would be more important in
determining the seller revenue.
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more important factor for seller revenue than the maximum strategy. The intuition behind
this is the following: Bidders’ strategies in a given time step typically are between 0.6 and 0.9
whereas values come from U(0, 1). Therefore, the more important determinant of the single bid
bi(vi) = βivi is the bidder’s value. So, the bidder with the maximum strategy will not make
that many more successful bids than an average bidder and therefore she is not the main driver
of seller revenue. An open question is, what would happen if values come from a sufficiently
narrow normal distribution. Values would be closer together but strategies as well. It remains
a topic for further research to assess wether the effective strategy moves closer to the maximum
strategy or wether its position between average and maximum strategy is a constant that is
independent of the underlying value distribution. I want to assess this in the future when I
have extended the AS for the simulation of nonlinear strategies.
The simulation result for a 2PA with 10 NE bidders is an average seller revenue – cumulated
over 100 rounds – of 81.835. This is virtually the same as the 81.838 in the first-price auction in
the NE. The equality highlights the validity of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem in this special
setting. The numerical value of expected seller revenue is in line with the theoretical prediction,
as can be seen by calculating the expected cumulated seller revenue for 100 auctions.:
The density of the highest of 10 values from a random distribution is given as
dFn(v) = nF (v)n−1f(v) . (11.14)
In the case of v ∼ U(0, 1), the CDF is given by F (v) = v and the PDF is given by f(v) = 1.
Therefore, the expected highest value vhigh is therefore given as
1∫
0
dv v10v9 =
1∫
0
dv 10v10 = 10
1
11
=
10
11
(11.15)
and the average cumulated seller revenue in 100 auctions where the bidders play according to
their NE strategies is given as
EPOsell100auctions = 100 · 0.9 ·
10
11
= 81.818 (11.16)
This is in perfect agreement with the simulation result. The standard deviation of the seller
revenue – cumulated over 100 rounds – in the 1PA where bidders use their NE strategies is 0.74
whereas in the second-price auction it is 1.112. This is simply a consequence of the fact that
the variance of the second highest of 10 values is higher than the variance of the highest of 10
values. In the literature this observation has been used to claim that risk averse sellers should
prefer first-price auctions over second-price auctions.
Under truncated fictitious play, this result doesn’t hold anymore. In 1PAs, in addition to the
random value realizations, the seller revenue is influenced by the fluctuating strategies. The
standard deviation of cumulated seller revenue in the 1PA under truncated fictitious play with
numBidders= 10 and numRounds= 100 is 1.417 which is about 25% above the standard deviation
in the second-price auction. In consequence, I would argue that only a sufficiently risk-loving
seller should employ first-price auctions to allocate goods. Risk neutral and risk averse sellers
would prefer second price auctions since they give more expected revenue and less risk for that
revenue.
To assess the dynamics of truncated fictitious play in more detail, I estimate an AR(p)-model13
for the average strategy βav. The first step in estimating such a model is to decide on the number
of lags of the observable. Allowing for too few parameters might neglect useful information,
allowing for too many parameters dilutes the focus on the core drivers of the time evolution.
For the model specification I chose p that minimizes the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
The BIC is defined as
BICp = lnσ2p +
lnT
T
p (11.17)
Here, T is the number of time steps in the sample and p the number of considered lags. The
first part in BICp gives lower values, the better the goodness of fit is. The second part gets
13I do not consider general ARIMA-models since the time series is obviously stationary. Estimation of an
ARMA(1, 1)-model gives the same BIC-criterion as an AR(2)-model, so alternatively we could also investigate
this model.
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the bigger, the more parameters the estimation uses.
Estimation with different settings for p in GAUSS shows that the BIC is minimized for p = 2
with a value of −136420. Therefore I choose the AR-Model
β(t)av = α0 + α1(β
(t-1)
av − α0) + α2(β(t-2)av − α0) + ²(t) (11.18)
The parameter estimates are given by GAUSS as
α0 = 0.858± 0 α1 = 0.344± 0.007 (0.330, 0.357) α2 = −0.030± 0.009 (−0.047,−.0.014) ,
where the numbers in the bracket give the upper and lower confidence interval at the 2σ-level.
All coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 2σ- level and therefore the AR(2)-
equation for the average strategy is given as
β(t)av = 0.858 + 0.344(β
(t-1)
av − 0.858)− 0.03(β(t-2)av − 0.858) + ²(t) (11.19)
The equation has the following interpretation: If β(t-1)av was above the long-term average of
0.858, this raises the expected value of the average strategy also at time (t) to about a third of
the distance between β(t-1)av and the mean. The distance of β
(t−2)
av to the mean would via β
(t-1)
av
also influence β(t)av s distance to the mean with a factor of 0.342∼ 0.1. This influence is reduced
to about two thirds by the coefficient of the second lag. That high average strategies promote
high average strategies in the next round is intuitively clear: If each bidder faces at time t an
environment of high bidding competitors, she will in the next round also use a high strategy.
Conversely, by low bidding competitors she is led to use a low strategy in the next round.
Compared to a random walk, this AR(2) process leads to longer consecutive periods of the
average strategy above the mean respectively below it. So, in repeated auctions we might
expect periods of fiercer competition among bidders that interchange with periods of lower
competition. This process is purely internally generated and stems only from the mutual
adaptation of bidding strategies.
Analogously I estimated an AR(2)-model of the cumulated seller revenue over the time steps
of 100 rounds and obtained the parameter estimates
α0 = 78.6± 0 α1 = 0.285± 0.006 (0.273; 0.298) α2 = −0.009± 0.004 (−0.017;−0.001) .
The process is qualitatively the same as for the average strategy: Periods of relatively high
seller revenue change with periods of relatively low seller revenue. However, the parameter α1
is lower than in the AR(2) model for βav. The reason is that the random value realizations
dilute the effects of the time evolution of the strategies. I did not estimate AR-models for
the individual strategy β0 and the minimum strategy βmin since they are not symmetrically
distributed around their mean and therefore an AR model with a normal noise specification is
not apt for their investigation.
By setting numRounds= 1.000, I obtain the following AR(2)-models for βav
β(t)av = 0.858 + 0.374(β
(t-1)
av − 0.858)− 0.042(β(t-2)av − 0.858) + ²(t) (11.20)
and for the cumulated seller revenue
POtsell = 807 + 0.296(PO
(t-1)
sell − 807)− 0.005(PO(t-2)sell − 807) + ²(t) . (11.21)
Comparing the coefficients with the coefficient estimates of the simulation with numRounds= 100
shows that the parameter numRounds has virtually no effect on the time evolution of β(t)av and
PO
(t)
sell: The long term dynamics is independent of the number of rounds after which the bidders
update their strategies.
The coefficients are quantities that depend only on the number of bidders in the auction14.
Table 11.7 shows the coefficients of the AR(2) estimation for different numbers of bidders. The
first-order autocorrelation decreases slowly when we increase the number of bidders. It remains
a topic for further research to investigate wether the autocorrelation vanishes for numBidders→
∞. I want to investigate this when I have access to faster computer facilities.
14The simulations for table 11.7 were made with numRounds=1.000 for 2 and for 10 bidders and with num-
Rounds=300 for 5 bidders and 20 bidders. As shown above, the different numbers of rounds have virtually no
influence on the results.
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numBidders 2 5 10 20
α0(βav) 0.423 0.395 0.374 0.34
α1(βav) -0.009 -0.032 -0.042 -0.041
α0(POsell) 0.396 0.328 0.295 0.274
α1(POsell) 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012
Table 11.7: Coefficient Estimates for Different Number of Bidders
11.5 Computational Assessment of Nash Equilibria
It is a well known theoretical results that the NE in nth price auctions with underlying uniform
value distributions are given by linear bidding strategies. Therefore it is natural to ask if we
can use the AS to assess these NEs.
The restriction to linear bidding strategies prevents the AS from finding exact solutions to
general auction setups like, e.g., first-price auctions with normal value distributions. Therefore
I want to assess as a second question in this section, how big the simulation error for non-uniform
value distributions is from restricting the bidding functions to linear ones. I can not expect the
AS to replicate the NE correctly. However, I am interested wether I can use the AS at least
to replicate comparative static predictions. A route for further research is to extend the AS to
allow for the simulation of nonlinear bidding functions. Then, I can use the AS to determine
NEs of more general auction setups such as normal or asymmetric value distributions.15 I will
say more on this in the last chapter.
As an example for an auction with linear NE strategies I investigate a 4th price auction with 8
participants. I assume that initially I don’t know anything about the NE. For FS I would have
to determine a feasible strategy range in the beginning of the simulation. Therefore I use the GA
to find the approximate position since the results are then not confined to a strategy interval.
I put numRounds=49.999 to limit the effects of fictitious play truncation and thereby come as
close to perfect memory best response as possible. I assess the last 50 of 150 generations. The
result indicates that the NE is at
β¯GA = 1.3998± 0.0133 (11.22)
Wolfstetter (1996) analytically derives the NE for a kth price auction with n participants and
uniform value distributions as
b(v) = (1 +
k − 2
n− k + 1)v (11.23)
In the particular of 8 bidders in a 4th price auction, this amounts to a linear NE strategy of
βNE = 1 + 4−28−4+1 = 1.4 which is in perfect agreement with the simulation result.
More general, for all kth price auctions with n bidders I was able to get the analytically predicted
result for the NE. This shows that the linear NE in all kth price auctions is attracting. Therefore,
the AS is apt to quantify correctly the predictions of Wolfstetter (1996) for kth price auctions
with uniform value distributions. In particular:
• Equilibrium Bids exceed bidders’ valuations for k ≥ 3
• Equilibrium bids increase in k
• Equilibrium bids diminish for k ≥ 3 if the number of bidders is increased
As a second auction setup I investigate the ability of the AS to correctly predict average
strategies for normal distributions. As stated above, the AS can not assess the non-linear
bidding functions. Therefore I focus on average strategies since they determine expected seller
revenue which is one of the most important characteristics of auctions. Table 11.5 compares
the NE strategies for normal value distributions with the bids that AS simulations predict. The
normal value distributions have a mean of µ = 100 and differ in their variance σ2v . The NE
bidding function b(v) can be calculated by equation 2.4. Note that the NE has no closed-form
solution. A Mathematica- Notebook with the numerical calculations can be obtained from the
15Of course, I can only assess these NEs if they are attracting and not repelling like, e.g., in double auctions.
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σ2 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10
β¯NE 0.999714 0.999092 0.997144 0.990968 0.971438
β¯GA 0.999439 0.998226 0.994419 0.982510 0.945885
dev(β¯NE,β¯GA) -0.03% -0.09% -0.27% -0.85% -2.63%
Table 11.8: Comparison of NE with simulation results for v ∼ N(100, σ2)
author.
The first line in the table gives the average best strategy, calculated as
β¯NE =
average bid in the NE
average value
=
∫ 2µ
0
b(v)f(v)dv
µ
. (11.24)
The second line gives the simulation results for the linear bidding strategy simulation, where
I used a GA run with 500 generations of 49.999 auctions each from which I recorded the last
150. The third line gives the deviation between NE-strategy and simulation results.
We see from the results that the tendency of the AS to underbid when compared to the
NE prevails also in the case of normal value distributions. The AS-result is persistently about
double as far away from the 1 as the NE. Therefore, the deviation gets ever more pronounced
as the variance of the value distribution increases. This is intuitively clear: Remember that in
the degenerate case of zero variance, strategies must converge to 1 which is a linear strategy.
For bigger σv, higher-order terms become increasingly more important and therefore the linear
simulation technique of the AS fails to give correct results.
So, if values come from a normal distribution, the AS shows qualitatively correctly the decrease
of the mean strategy with the variance of the value distribution. But it fails to replicate the
quantitative predictions because it fails to simulate non-linear strategy.
11.6 Conclusion from this Chapter
Mutual adaptation between strategies induces non-trivial dynamics in repeated auctions. Under
myopic best response with 2 bidders and uniformly distributed values we saw already in the
last chapter that the results depend strongly on the number of strategies that are used in the
simulation, since they determine the amount of overbidding near 0. If strategies come close to
1, I showed in this chapter that the specification of the rule for strategy updating if no feasible
strategy could have won the auction has large influence on the results. Both of these influencing
factors vanish, however, if we investigate truncated fictitious play by increasing the number of
rounds after which strategies are updated.
Under truncated fictitious play with 10 bidders, the expected seller revenue is lower than in a
second price auction and the seller revenue is riskier. Bidders’ strategies fluctuate permanently.
On the individual level, this fluctuation is skewed: strategies significantly below the mean are
played more often than corresponding high strategies. On the aggregate level, the average
strategy shows symmetric fluctuations around a mean below the NE. These fluctuations show
autocorrelation, so periods of consecutive fiercer bidding and periods of lower bidding last longer
than they would under a random walk. Consequently also for the seller there are periods of
higher revenue that interchange with periods of lower revenue.
The intuitive reason is that if a bidder notices that her opponents pursue high strategies, then
she is led to use a high strategy after the next updating. Conversely, if she sees that her
opponents bid defensively, she does better if she also reduces her strategy in order to maximize
her payoff. This shows that repeated auctions can generate emergent properties on the macro-
level that stem from the interaction of heterogeneous agents.
Moreover I showed that the simulation of pBR allows us to accurately assess NEs if they are
given by linear bidding strategies like, e.g., in kth price auctions. However, the AS can not
simulate correctly setups that give rise to non-linear NE-functions.
A realistic simulation of repeated auctions requires a possibility to account for value-dependent
bidding strategies. Therefore, I want to equip the Auction Simulator in the future with a
possibility to simulate these. I will say more on this in the next, last chapter.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion and Areas for Future
Research
In this thesis I have developed mathematical and computational methods to investigate evolu-
tionary learning in repeated auctions. Bidders bid in repeated open auctions for assets. They
have different valuations of the asset currently under auction which change for every auction.
Over time, each bidder tries to learn her optimal bidding strategy that maximizes her payoff.
Either, she manages to do so (best response) or she makes errors but still plays profitable
strategies more often (quantal response). Additionally, bidders are discerned according to their
memory strength (myopic, perfect memory or in between).
The results of mathematical and computational analysis show that 1PAs under best response
dynamics are characterized by excess volatility and therefore lead to a suboptimal allocation
of goods. In contrast, players in second-price auctions find the NE easily - either upfront by
simple reasoning or in the course of time by following the best response strategy updating.
For double auctions, the non-convergence results was even more disturbing than in the pure
bidder case: I showed that increased sophistication leads in first-price auctions to convergence
into the NE. But players in double auctions end up further and further away from the NE, the
more sophisticated they are.
The underlying reason for the optimal properties of second-price auctions is that in these auc-
tions bidding the true value is always a (weakly) dominant strategy. Therefore, the optimal
strategy doesn’t depend on the other players’ strategies. In contrast, the optimal bid in value
shading auctions - like first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, double auctions etc. - depends on
the strategies of all other players. This induces a permanent mutual feedback of strategies, thus
raising the volatility. Analogously any value shading auction design must show excess volatility
when compared to an auction design where bidding the true value is dominant because bidders’
optimal strategies depend on each other.
For single unit pure bidder auctions the 2PA allocates goods optimally: Since under best re-
sponse all bidders end up in the NE, this auction format allocates the good to the bidder who
values it the most. For multi-unit auctions, corresponding dominant strategy auction formats
would be the Ausubel auction (see Ausubel (2004)) or the generalized Vickrey-auction. For
single-unit double auctions, McAfee (1992) has proposed a dominant strategy mechanism. This
mechanism is not maximally efficient since it potentially prevents the least valuable trade. It
remains a subject for further research to compare this inefficiency with the inefficiency that
arises in other double auction formats without dominant strategies since bidders don’t find the
NE. For single-unit single-sided with interdependent values, Perry and Reny (2002) proposes
a dominant strategy auction that basically consists of two consecutive series of second-price
auctions.
My long-term research goal is the reduction of volatility in Financial Markets. The interaction
between brokers on the floor or on the computer screens are repeated double-sided multi-unit
auctions with affiliated values. Current order books are designed as two-sided uniform price
auctions and therefore give incentives for bid shading. The design and implementation of a
dominant-strategy auction format for double-sided multi-unit auctions with affiliated values
could therefore have the potential to reduce excess volatility in financial markets.
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Other markets where redesigned order books could be implemented are electricity markets and
the currently emerging global market for greenhouse emission certificates. These markets are
essentially structured in the same way as financial markets. Especially the latter market would
be the ideal place for a first implementation of revised order books: It is a new market with-
out strong incumbents and the declared goal is - according to the Kyoto protocol - to use the
certificates as efficiently as possible.
Another field where dominant strategy auction formats could increase efficiency is with respect
to supply chains and -networks. Supply chains can be viewed as chains of interconnected double
auctions (see, e.g., Babaioff and Nisam (2001)). Consider for instance the market for rubber
tires for trucks and the two related markets for rubber and for trucks. Then, the stylized supply
chain looks as follows: Rubber manufacturers place asks for rubber in the rubber market; tire
manufacturers place bids on the rubber market and asks for the tires; truck manufacturers place
bids for the tires and asks for the trucks; and finally, customers place bids for trucks.
The usual format for double auctions is the multi-unit-equivalent of the format suggested in
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). In chapter 8 I showed that the NE of this auction format is
repelling so that participants’ strategies involve in ever increasing oscillations over time, even
if they are initially arbitrarily close to the NE. Moreover, I showed that sophistication of the
participants drives their bidding strategies even further away from the NE. Consequently, even
a very small volatility of production cost could be magnified by the various double auctions in
highly exaggerated price volatility on the consumer side.1 As a countermeasure, the implemen-
tation of dominant strategy formats like the one suggested in McAfee (1992) could significantly
reduce this volatility.
A further possible application of auction redesign is given in the context of land conservation
auctions. Hailu and Schilizzi (2003)) consider land conservation auctions in Australia where
conservation contracts for the preservation of wildlife are allocated to private landowners. By
simulations they compare the cost that arises to the government if they use fixed payment
schemes or auctions in this repeated setting. Specifically, the auctions that the Australian gov-
ernment uses are identified as repeated multi-unit pure-seller discriminatory sealed-ask auctions
– the multi-unit equivalent of first-price auctions. In the simulation, landowners use a simple
rule where they randomly either stay with their previous ask for the next round or use a simple
percentage markup/markdown rule if they have lost/won in the previous auction. The simu-
lation shows that participants involve in permanent mutual adaptation. The authors compare
the situation to a basket full of crabs that climb one upon the other to be on top and then
drop back to the bottom. On average, the landowners ask more than they would in the NE.
Note that this is qualitatively the same result as I derived in this thesis for repeated first-price
auctions under best response – the strategies are volatile and the auctioneer gets less utility
than in the NE. However, the updating rule is different here.
The deviation from the NE is so big in the simulation that even a fixed price scheme outperforms
the auction in terms of efficiency (the landowners with the best ratio of cost/environmental ben-
efit are selected for the contracts) and the total provision of environmental benefits. Therefore,
the authors suggest that the government should switch to a fixed price scheme instead of the
auctions that are currently conducted.
The results of this thesis suggest, however, that a better way to increase the efficiency of land
conservation auctions would be to switch to an Ausubel auction. This auction format has bid-
ding the true value as a weakly dominant strategy so that participants are led to bid in the NE,
either by upfront reasoning or by best response learning. Since the Ausubel auction in the NE
is maximally efficient, a switch to Ausubel auctions would allocate land conservation contracts
more efficient than a fixed price scheme which necessarily leaves some information rent to the
landowners.
There are many more economic environments where auctions occur in a repeated setting: IPOs,
the first placement of stocks on capital markets, are multi-unit auctions. Since the same big
institutional investors participate in virtually all IPOs this is a setting where they might involve
in permanent mutual interaction. Treasury bill auctions are conducted by the federal reserve
banks in regular frequencies. Again, big institutional investors compete repeatedly against each
other. Further examples of repeated auctions are procurement auctions (where the same sup-
pliers compete repeatedly against each other), agricultural or fish auctions and many more.
In all these economic systems, a switch to dominant strategy formats could significantly in-
1In a little different context, think about the beer game as a related example of how volatility gets blown up
in a supply chain if strategies are interdependent.
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crease efficiency and lower risk. However, before implementing dominant strategy formats, one
must carefully consider additional constraints. It is for instance well known that second-price
auctions allow relatively easily for collusion: The participants can determine their values in a
pre-auction. Then, in the main auction, the highest bidder bids her value while all others bid
0. In such a case, the seller would obtain nothing for the asset. A seller should therefore only
employ second-price auctions if bidders don’t know each other or if she can deter bidders from
collusion by sufficiently severe punishments upon detection. Still, the thesis suggest that the
gains from a dominant strategy format could in many cases outweigh the additional effort one
has to make for the details of the implementation.
In parallel to the development of the mathematical methodology I programmed an agent based
computer model, the Auction Simulator (AS). The simulation can capture the simple setups for
which mathematical results were obtained but it provides for a much larger space of possible
auctions setups. The AS at the current stage simulates repeated kth-price pure-bidder and
double auctions with an arbitrary number of participants who pursue linear bidding strategies.
Bidders can update their bidding strategies according to best response or quantal response
with payoff-linear or payoff-exponential strategy selection probabilities. Memory capabilities of
bidders can be smoothly interpolated between myopic and perfect memory. Alternatively, the
AS can also interpolate by truncated fictitious play with arbitrary updating intervals. Private
independent values can be drawn from uniform or normal distributions. Strategy updating can
be simulated by real Genetic Algorithms or by a fixed strategy set for each player. For control
purposes, the AS allows for the fixing of the strategy of one or more bidders to investigate the
adaptation of the remaining ones.
The AS aims at providing a comprehensive tool for analyzing auctions. The parallel develop-
ment of the mathematical formalism allows for the rigorous quality-check of the simulation. For
simple setups, the AS reproduces the quantitative predictions. Therefore I can use the simula-
tion to reliably assess more complicated auction setups which are mathematical nasty or simply
not calculable. In particular, I used the AS in the thesis to assess the dynamics and aggregate
statistics of repeated auctions. A second application is the investigation of equilibrium play.
By setting the memory strength to 1, the AS converges under best response to the NE in all
kth price auctions. By simulating quantal response, it converges analogously to the quantal
response equilibrium that predicts behavior in auction experiments better than the NE. So,
the AS can also be used as a supplementary tool for the assessment of equilibrium bidding. It
is not guaranteed to converge to the equilibrium since the equilibrium needn’t be attracting.
However, if it converges it provides much more flexibility than the mathematical techniques
that are currently used in auction theory.
The current mathematical and computational results provide a first step towards a more real-
istic description of bidding in auctions than would be possible by game theoretic methods that
restrict themselves to closed-form solutions of equilibrium play. However both, mathematics
and simulation still need further developments for supplying realistic results.
Nonlinear bidding functions:
As highlighted at numerous places in the thesis, the most important extension of all concerns
the strategies: Bidding strategies in auctions are in general nonlinear, they depend on the value
of the bidder. While I was already able to use the mathematical methodology to investigate
the nonlinear best response to a linear strategy, the simulation is still restricted to linear strate-
gies for all bidders. Therefore I want to enhance the AS by possibilities to simulate nonlinear
bidding functions. There are several ways to implement this feature in the program, each with
complementary strengths and weaknesses:
GA-implementation: One of the simulation techniques that are already implemented in the
simulation are Genetic Algorithms (GAs). They are an especially apt tool to assess equilibrium
play by letting bidders accumulate information from many auction rounds before they update
their strategies. To implement nonlinear strategies with GAs, it is necessary to implement each
strategy as a real-valued vector. One particular way to interpret the vector components is as a
Taylor-series expansion of the bidding strategy with the value. By making each strategy consist
of e.g. three parameters,
βi = (α
(1)
i , α
(2)
i , α
(3)
i )
bi(vi) = α
(1)
i + α
(2)
i vi + α
(3)
i v
2
i ,
I can model nonlinear bidding strategies with an affine, a linear and a quadratic term. The use
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of GAs for the determination of Taylor series coefficients of equilibrium play allows for a rigor-
ous double-check of mathematical predictions. In particular, I want to use GAs in this setting
to double-check results on near NE-play in double auctions and on nonlinear best response in
first-price auctions where I have already derived closed form mathematical predictions.
A second, more general, extension of the GA functionality would be a non-parametric simu-
lation of value-dependent bidding strategies. The term non-parametric refers to the fact that
we merely get a plot of the bidding function but not an equation for it. To understand this
methodology assume that I divide the value space into 10 segments of equal size. The bidding
strategy is affine2 with the same parameters for all values from the same segment, however in
general the parameters differ among segment. So, in the case of 10 value segments, a strategy
of the GA consists of 10 pairs of real numbers βi = ((α
(1)
i , γ
(1)
i ) ; · · · ; (α(10)i , γ(10)i )) that
determine the strategy if the value comes from the respective interval. The bid of bidder i for a
value in segment j is then given as bi(vi) = α
(j)
i +γ
(j)
i vi. If the simulation converges, the steady
states of the parameters (α(j)i , γ
(j)
i ) can be used to plot the value-dependent bidding function.
Of course, instead of assigning a strategy to each value-segment, one could also assign a bid to
each value-segment. This would allow more directly to determine the impact of the size of bid
increments on the outcome of auctions, however, the value segments in such simulations would
have to be chosen much smaller than if strategies are used and therefore would be more time
consuming.
The power of GAs lies in their ability to discover global optima of multi-dimensional problems.
The crossover operator leads the strategy population to local optima. The mutation operator,
on the other hand, prevents the solution from getting stuck in local optima. However, GAs work
only if the underlying function that they are trying to optimize does not fluctuate over time.
In the context of auctions this means that they are a suitable tool to asses Nash and quantal
response equilibrium bidding functions in auctions. However, if bidders with finite memory
capabilities forget information from longer ago, then the fitness function of the strategies fluc-
tuates to frequently too allow their usage.
FS-implementation: A complementary approach to GA-simulation is the modeling of nonlin-
ear bidding strategies via Fixed Strategies (FS). Their advantage over GAs is that they allow for
the accurate simulation of different degrees of memory capabilities. However, their simulation
is much more time consuming than the simulation with GAs. I want to implement nonlinear
bidding strategies with FSs only in a non-parametric way: Again, values are segmented in a
number of intervals, say, 10 intervals. For each value segment j, bidder i has a fixed set of affine
strategies β(j);(k,l)i = (α
(j);k
i , γ
(j);l
i ) that assign a bid to each value like in the GA case. In each
auction each bidder calculates for each strategy in her strategy set the payoff it would have
generated in the auction. If we allow for instance 100 possible values of α(j)i and γ
(j)
i between 0
and 1, each bidder has a set of 10 ·100 ·100 = 100.000 strategies that she has to keep track of in
each auction. Since many bidders may participate in the auction and simulation runs typically
consist of thousands of auctions, this shows that this simulation methodology is only feasible
by the use of massive computer power.
The explicit calculation of payoffs for each possible strategy, allows for a lot of flexibility in
the setups: If each bidder chooses the strategy with the highest payoff in each value segment,
this simulates best response. If she chooses strategies with a probability proportional to an
exponential of the payoff, this simulates quantal response. By multiplying past payoffs with a
discount factor, the effects of memory capabilities on the outcome can be determined.
The power of FS lies in their correct functioning on all scales of memory strength. On the other
hand, GAs converge more quickly and more reliably to global solutions. By using FS and GA
simulations complementarily, I can use the Auction Simulator to investigate dynamic behavior
in repeated auctions or equilibrium strategies.
Auction Formats:
I want to enable the AS for the simulation of more general auction setups than kth price auc-
tions. In particular, I want to implement all-pay auctions and multi-unit auction formats like
discriminatory, uniform price and Ausubel auctions. In the program multiple units correspond
2The use of affine strategies is the minimum requirement to guarantee the smoothness of the value-dependent
strategy function. Still, this approach allows a rich variety of concave or convex bidding functions. Alternatively,
one could also think about a GA implementation that assigns only one parameter to each value segment and is
interpreted as the slope of the bidding strategy in the respective value segment. However, this approach could
suffer the disadvantage that the optimal parameter settings for higher value segments depend on the parameter
choice for the lower segments.
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to a list of values for each bidder where the strategies for each value in the list can be different.
Values in multi-unit auctions should be implementable as homogeneous or heterogeneous with
different interrelation structures (supplements or complements) so that the value of the object
for sale depends on wether the bidder has already obtained one or several items before. This
would allow the simulation of many more auction setups such as they occur in treasury bill
auctions or IPOs.
Values:
I want to allow for the possibility that values are drawn from more general distributions than
currently possible. On the one hand, the AS should allow for different value distributions among
bidders. This would serve to computationally investigate the effects of low balling in auctions
with one strong and one weak bidder. Second, it should be possible to simulate affiliated or
common values where a bidder’s value depends on the other bidders’ values. This simulation
of non-private values would enhance the realism of the simulation of many auctions. Third,
it should be possible to generate more general value distributions than uniform and normal
distributions.
Risk Aversion:
Players shall be modeled with different degrees of risk aversion. In particular, the utility func-
tion shall be specifiable as a CARA or CRRA function with parameter values that can be
freely chosen. The comparison of simulation data with experimental data can later be used to
determine the effects of payoffs and experiment framing on bidders’ risk aversion in auctions.
In combination with the simulation of quantal response, this would allow to investigate in more
detail the quantal response equilibrium that is suggested as an explanation for overbidding
in auctions in Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (1999). In particular, I hypothesize that the results
therein can be further refined by considering the finite memory capabilities of the bidders.
Updating rules:
To guarantee a realistic assessment of sealed bid auctions and of auctions under myopic play,
the AS shall be enhanced by different updating rules for winning bidders in sealed bid auctions
and for updating rules for loosing bidders, if none of their strategies could have won the auction.
These rules shall be chosen based on experimental observations. Updating Times:
Currently, the bidders in the AS update their strategies simultaneously at fixed time intervals.
The simulation results could change significantly if we allow for different updating schemes
such as Poisson distributed updating times or an updating probability that is influenced by the
success of the currently active strategy in comparison to the long-term average.
For all these extensions of the simulation, the mathematical methodology should be appropri-
ately extended and applied to simple setups that entail the specific extension. This allows the
ongoing quality-check of the simulation. In the future, the mathematical methodology could
also be extended to analyze behavior in other economic fields that deal with discontinuous
payoff structures – like, e.g., the analysis of oligopolies.
When I have developed an extended version of the Auction Simulator, there are several ways
to make use of it. For my own future research I have two particular applications in mind:
Experimental Auctions:
The first application is to compare simulation results with data sets from experimental and
maybe also empirical auctions. Thereby it shall be checked, to which extent bounded rational
play is a good model of play in real auctions. In particular, it is a possibility to quantify
in a rigorous way parameters that determine the behavior of participants like the memory
strength λ or the payoff-weight ξ for quantal response: The simulation parameters should be
fine-tuned until they replicate optimally the statistics of the experiment. Alternatively, one
could also think about the development of a Meta-GA or a Neural Network that searches for
the optimal parameter combinations. The results could quantify more precisely the effects of
payoff-structures and experiment framing on the outcome of repeated auctions. Note that it is
not necessary to conduct new experiments for this but it would be sufficient to obtain old data
sets and to subject them to the analysis. Complementarily, the simulation could also be used
to analyze the time series properties of empirical repeated auctions. Again, by manual- or GA
supported parameter tuning, one could try to obtain more insights into the forces that govern
real auctions.
Simulation of Financial Markets:
This aims at extending the simulation by parts that make it possible to simulate financial
markets. The goal of this line of research is to identify possible order book designs that reduce
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the excess volatility in financial markets. The first step in this line of research is to integrate the
underlying concepts of weakly dominant strategy order books for double auctions (see McAfee
(1992)), multi-unit auctions (see Ausubel (2004)) and auctions with affiliated values (see Perry
and Reny (2002)) into a weakly dominant strategy format for multi-unit double auctions with
affiliated values. This auction format shall be implemented in the simulation. Second, the
bidder and the seller shall be merged into one agent, the trader. The trader bases her bid- and
ask-orders on the wealth, she has already accumulated and her expectation of future prices.
The value expectations of the trader consist of a fundamentalist and a chartist component, i.e.,
of a private and of an affiliated component. Then, I will compare the simulation results of the
order book designs with weakly dominant strategies with simulation results of current order
book designs. Thereby the effectiveness of order book restructuring in reducing price volatility
and the occurrence of bubbles and crashes shall be investigated. In addition, also the effects
of speculation and transaction taxes (Tobin tax) on the price stability could be investigated in
the simulation.
All in all, I think that a variety of interesting work streams could follow from this thesis.
The increasing importance of auctions in the economy makes it vital that we understand their
properties in depth. This thesis is a step into this direction and therefore towards a more stable
and efficient economic system.
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Appendix A
Θ- and δ-Function
The upper part of Figure A.1 shows the Θ-function (Unit step function, Heavyside function).
Figure A.1: Theta- and Delta Function
It assigns 0 to every negative value and 1 to every non-negative value. Formally, it is defined
as
Θ(x) =
{
0 for x < 0
1 for x ≥ 0 (A.1)
Note that in the case of continuously distributed values it is irrelevant which specific function
value is assigned to x = 0 since this event occurs only with zero probability. Other conventions
that lead to the same results in the mathematical part of this thesis would be, e.g., Θ(0) = 1/2
or Θ(0) = 0.
The Θ-function (with the convention Θ(0) = 1/2) can be written as the limes of a function
series, e.g.,
Θ(x) = lim
n→∞
1 + tanh(nx)
2
(A.2)
where the hyperbolic tangent of x is defined as
tanh(x) =
sinh(x)
cosh(x)
=
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
. (A.3)
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By means of the Θ-function, the minimum of two functions f(x) and g(x) can be written as
min(f(x), g(x))(x) = f(x)−Θ(f(x)− g(x))(f(x)− g(x)) . (A.4)
If x is such that f(x) < g(x) then the Θ-term vanishes and the result is f(x). If, however,
f(x) ≥ g(x) at x, then the Θ-function takes on the value of 1 and therefore the result is g(x).
Similarly, the maximum of two functions can be written as
max(f(x), g(x))(x) = f(x) + Θ(g(x)− f(x))(g(x)− f(x)) . (A.5)
The lower part of Figure A.1 shows a function series that converges towards the δ− function.
The δ function is the derivative of the Θ-function,
δ(x) =
∂
∂x
Θ(x) . (A.6)
Intuitively we can think about a function that satisfies
δ(x) =
{
0 for x 6= 0
∞ for x = 0 (A.7)
and ∞∫
−∞
dxδ(x) = 1 . (A.8)
The second condition implicitly quantifies the ”magnitude of infinity” that the δ-function takes
on at x = 0. This is an intuitive way to think about the δ−function but not a rigid math-
ematical definition. More formally, the δ-function is defined by means of the δ−functional.
The δ−functional maps the function space F of all smooth real-valued functions with compact
support into the real numbers by δ(f(x)) != f(0). This functional can be written in integral
form as ∞∫
−∞
dxδ(x)f(x) = f(0) (A.9)
The δ function, δ(x) is defined as the kernel of that integral.
The δ−function has the fundamental properties
∞∫
−∞
dxf(x)δ(x− a) =
a+²∫
a−²
dxf(x)δ(x− a) = f(a) (A.10)
and
δ(x− a) = 0 for x 6= a . (A.11)
The δ function can be written in a variety of ways as the limes of a series of functions, e.g.,
δ(x) =
1
pi
lim
²→0
²
x2 + ²2
= lim
²→0
² | x |²−1=
= lim
²→0
1
2
√
pi²
e−
x2
4² = lim
²→0
1
pix
sin(
x
²
) (A.12)
The value of 0 · δ(0) is not defined.
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Appendix B
Simulation Parameters
Parameters in model.setup
parameter explanation
numRounds number of auctions played between strategy updatings
auctionType if ==1: First-Price Open Bid auction
if ==2: Second-Price Open Bid auction
if ==3: Third-Price Open Bid auction
etc.
priceDet if == 0.5: price is set in the middle of auctionType highest
bid and auctionType lowest ask
if == 1: price = (auctionType) highest Bid
if == 0: price = (auctionType) lowest Ask
RWMean if == 0: Mean of normal value distribution given by valDet2
if ==1: Mean of normal value distribution given by last rounds price
transactionFee transaction fee payed in each round by winning bidder and seller
randomSeed sets the initial state of the random generator
numBidders number of bidders participating in the auction
numSellers number of sellers participating in the auction
startOfAverageCalculation number of initial strategy updatings after which the
calculation of averages for graphical output starts
reportingBidderID ID of bidder that reports her strategy list
reportingSellerID ID of seller that reports her strategy list
Parameters in bidder.setup for GAs and Fixed Strategies
parameter explanation
bLearningType if==1, FS are used; if==2, GA is used
bSelectionType if==1, fitness proportional selection (Quantal Response);
if==2, rank proportional selection (best response)
bFixedStrategyMarker if ==0: each player updates her strategy set; mutual adaptation
if ==1: player 1 plays a fixed strategy, all others update their strategy sets
if ==2: player 0 updates her strategy set, all others play fixed strategies
bFixedBeta this parameter is only important if fixedStrategyMarker 6= 0
if ∈ (0, 1): β=fixedBeta; if ∈ (−1, 0): β ∼ U(−fixedBeta, 1)
bFixedValueMarker if==0: each player has random values
if==1: player 1 always has fixed value; all other values are random
if==2: player 0 has random value; all other players have fixed value
bFixedValue determines respective values if fixedValueMarker6= 0
b0FixedValueMarker if ==0: random v0; if ==1: fixed v0
b0FixedValue if player0FixedValueMarker==1, then v0= player0FixedValue
bNumStrategies number of strategies in each players strategy set
bValDistShape if==0: values from normal Dist; if==1: values from uniform Dist
bValDet0 lower bound for uniform Dist, resp. variance for normal Dist
bValDet1 upper bound for uniform Dist, resp. mean for normal Dist
bXi exponential parameter for Quantal Response
Parameters in bidder.setup for Fixed Strategies only
parameter explanation
bMemoryStrength multiplicative weighing factor for previous rounds’ payoffs
bMinStrategy value of the minimal strategy
bMaxStrategy value of the maximal strategy
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Parameters in bidder.setup for GAs only
parameter explanation
bStrategyDistance minimum distance between strategies in the breedingList
bNumElite number of fittest strategies that stay unchanged in the population
bNumParents number of fittest strategies that are used for creating offspring by crossover
bCrossoverPar fraction of the interval between two parent strategies
by which offspring is allowed to lie outside the interval
bMutationType if==0: uniform Dist between β(1± mutationPar)
if==1: normal Dist with variance β· mutationPar
bMutationProb probability of mutation of a strategy in promille
bMutationPar determines extent of mutation; see mutationType
Parameters in seller.setup Symmetric to the parameters in bidder.setup
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Appendix C
Abbreviations
abbreviation explanation
1PA, 2PA First-Price Auction resp. Second-Price Auction
1POBA, 1PSBA First-Price Open resp. Sealed Bid Auction
2POBA, 2PSBA Second-Price Open resp. Sealed Bid Auction
ABM Agent Based Modeling
AS Auction Simulator
BR Best Response
CDF Cumulated Distribution Function
DEQ Differential Equation
ESS Evolutionary Stable Strategy
FP Fictitious Play
FS Fixed Strategy
GA Genetic Algorithm
iBR Imperfect Memory Best Response
iQR Imperfect Memory Quantal Response
mBR Myopic Best Response
mQR Myopic Quantal Response
NE Nash Equilibrium
pBR Perfect Memory Best Response
PDF Probability Distribution Function
pmBR Probability-Weighted Myopic Best Response
pQR Perfect Memory Quantal Response
QR Quantal Response
RET Revenue Equivalence Theorem
RD Replicator Dynamics
SFASM Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market
SIPV Symmetric Independent Private Values Model
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Appendix D
PhD-related Activities besides
Writing the Thesis
During my PhD, I have in addition to writing the thesis and making the required exams in the
first year of the program, done the following:
• Contributions at Conferences and Seminars
– WEHIA - Workshop on Heterogeneous Interacting Agents in Kyoto (Talk)
– World Meeting of the Game Theory Society in Marseille (Poster)
– Ecomod in Paris (Talk)
– SMYE - Spring Meeting of Young Economists in Warsaw (Talk)
– Summer Research Workshop in Bonn (Talk)
– Brownbag Seminar in Kiel (Talk)
– Workshop on Computational Finance in Kiel (Talk)
• Papers
– Working Paper ”Revenue Equivalence Revisited”
– Contribution to the book ”Economics and Heterogeneous Interacting Agents” (sub-
mitted)
• Additional Classes that I participated in1
– Learning and Bounded Rationality (University of Vienna)
– Auction Theory (University of Vienna)
1Besides the ones required by the program in the First Year
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